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This study quantitatively assesses the impact of Israeli government actions on Palestinian militant attacks according to different categories: Islamists (Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad), nationalists (Fatah and Palestine Liberation Organization-affiliated groups), and unknown assailants from 1987–2004. Few large-n studies disaggregate among Palestinian factions. This study, however, identifies the scope of factional responses to counterinsurgency measures based on similar constituency pressures and divergent organizational objectives. For example, both indiscriminate repression targeting the wider population and discriminate concessions that reward suspected militants embolden armed actors to increase attacks across the Palestinian spectrum. But Islamists with maximalist goals significantly ramp up attacks to derail peace process-related events and disrupt concessions that benefit Palestinian society. Islamist factions fight to prevent the emergence of a two-state solution and avoid being sidelined by leading nationalist organizations, who have relatively limited objectives and are more likely to strategically reduce attacks to accommodate peace efforts. Additional findings point to other determinants of militant attacks, including religious and national holidays in multi-party armed conflicts. By analyzing diverse sets of armed actors among a broader national movement, this study contributes to research on counterinsurgency, rebel fragmentation, conflict management, and the strategic logics of terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some militant groups wage sustained insurgencies while other groups do not? This study shows that shifts in nascent rival relations between militant groups, from competition to consolidation, are key to understanding this puzzle. A militant group which has consolidated its rivals—whether by destruction, merger, or hegemonic dominance—should be in a stronger position to fight the target state than groups preoccupied with counterproductive violence against rivals within a militant movement. This study uses a multi-method, three-stage, research design starting with a novel quantitative regression analysis of 246 prominent militant groups worldwide from 1970–2007, featured in the Global Terrorism Database. I find that, on average, organizational capacity and constituency dominance are stronger indicators for engagement in sustained insurgencies than traditional proxies for observable group capabilities, thereby challenging conventional wisdom. The second stage focuses on a more bounded population (Middle Eastern and North African insurgent groups) and uses cross-case comparative methods to build my theory based on three forms of primary rival relations: competition (infighting or outbidding), strategic alliance, and hegemonic consolidation. Process-tracing methods are also used to explore within-case inferences and identify causal mechanisms in three diverse case studies: Hezbollah, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Rival consolidation helps dominant groups mobilize resources effectively and overcome two major organizational hurdles: collective action and principal-agent problems. Without major competitors, dominant groups attract recruits and support, while militant leaders divert their attention to strengthening organizational capacity and preparing for war with the target state. My temporal theory of rival consolidation offers a more compelling explanation that accounts for the timing of insurgency onset, compared to scholarly arguments that rely on largely static factors or remain incomplete. From a policy perspective, this study challenges assumptions and presents a generalizable framework identifying nascent rival relations as a pragmatic indicator that can help counterterrorism analysts and practitioners better anticipate potential insurgent threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some militant groups wage sustained insurgencies while other groups do not? To address this puzzle, this study uses a resource mobilization framework and quantitative regression analyses of 246 prominent militant groups featured in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) from 1970-2007. Findings show that proxies for organizational capacity and constituency dominance are better predictors of sustained insurgencies than traditional measures of group capabilities, diverging from current explanations of insurgency onset and outcomes. An insurrection led by a single group is the strongest determinant of a sustained insurgency, suggesting that rival consolidation plays a key role in the nascent stages of an armed conflict. While rarely achieving ultimate objectives, this study finds that religious militant organizations are associated with a higher likelihood of waging sustained insurgencies. Hub-spoke structured groups, with relatively decentralized command and control, are similarly as likely to sustain insurgencies as hierarchically structured groups. There is no single model that can explain particular militant group trajectories and counterinsurgency campaigns require context-specific analysis. However, this study presents generalizable empirical associations across diverse militant groups to examine an underexplored outcome of interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]