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In the first part of the paper, I discuss Benatar's asymmetry argument for the claim that it would have been better for each of us to have never lived at all. In contrast to other commentators, I will argue that there is a way of interpreting the premises of his argument which makes all of them come out true. (This will require one departure from Benatar's own presentation.) Once we see why the premises are true, we will, however, also realise that the argument trades on an ambiguity that renders it invalid. In the second part of the paper, I consider whether discussions of how best to implement the anti-natalist conclusion crosses a moral barrier. I ask whether we can, independently of any philosophical argument, raise a legitimate moral objection to discussions of how best to end all life on earth. I discuss three views concerning the role of our pre-philosophical views and attitudes in philosophical debates: the external view according to which these attitudes set moral barriers to the content of philosophical debate whilst themselves standing outside this debate; the internal view according to which our intuitions are part of the material for philosophical reflection and play no further role; and the intermediate view according to which our pre-reflective views and attitudes, without themselves requiring philosophical validation, can play an important role when it comes to issues regarding the implementation of philosophical claims. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sosa, Williamson, and Pritchard - to name three prominent epistemologists - have all endorsed safety in one way or another, and many others have followed them. Safety for Sosa requires truth in all close-by possible worlds in which the belief is held on the same basis.[7] For Pritchard, safety is a necessary condition of knowledge. There are differences between the formulations provided by Sosa, Pritchard and Williamson. Contrast this view with Pritchard's who says that 'I am sympathetic to the idea that there is a way of thinking about the sensitivity principle such that it is equivalent to the safety principle (Pritchard [29], fn 18)'. 28 Pritchard, Duncan " Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?. [Extracted from the article]

It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evidentialism according to which it rejects the existence of norm-reasons is also presented. Therefore, no reason to reject evidentialism arises in this context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a philosophical inquiry into the elements of interest in truth. The "Standard View" of belief is defined through a desire for objective accuracy, but is then criticized through the dualistic assertions of philosopher William James regarding further desires of removing false belief. The epistemology of Roderick M. Chrisholm and Ernest Sosa are also engaged within the debate.