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Democratic states sometimes engage in covert interventions--sometimes involving forcible regime change--against other democracies. Critics charge that these interventions raise doubts about the robustness of the "democratic peace." I argue that they require analysts to rethink some aspects of democratic-peace theory. Democratic states base their behavior toward other democracies on expectations about the future trajectory of their regimes: whether, and to what extent, those states will likely remain democratic in the future. When they expect democracy to persist, the constraints of the democratic peace operate. But when democracies expect another state's democratic character to break down, or decay, they prove more willing to engage in covert forcible regime change. I test my dynamic version of democratic-peace theory by examining US efforts to forcibly depose Iran's Mohammed Mossadegh (1953) and Chile's Salvador Allende (1970-1973). The framework developed here helps to resolve a longstanding anomaly for the democratic peace--secret interventions between democracies--while also providing policymakers with a clearer sense of the stakes associated with covert democracy promotion and subversion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Nixon and Ford administrations celebrated the 1973 Chilean coup and did everything they could to help the dictatorship that followed. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, in particular, supported General Augusto Pinochet’s regime and turned a blind eye to its human rights abuses. But how did the Chilean dictatorship view the United States and how did the relationship play out in practice? Drawing on Chilean and U.S. documents, this article argues that in spite of Kissinger’s efforts, bilateral relations were actually rather tense. Not only did the Chilean dictatorship continually request more than the Ford administration could offer but Santiago’s military leaders also had different conceptions of the Cold War and how to fight it. This, in turn, sheds light on the problems U.S. policy makers faced when dealing with anti-communist Third World allies. It also points to the fragmentation of the global Cold War struggle in the mid-1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article presents a debate between a book reviewer and the author of the book "Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile," concerning a book review which was published in the 2010 Summer issue of this journal. The book's author discusses her motivation in writing it, including the strong views she held on the U.S. foreign policy towards Chile under U.S. President Richard Nixon and former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The book reviewer discusses the book "Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup in Chile," critiquing the portrayal of the importance of the U.S. in Chilean politics.

The article discusses the political opposition to the Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet during the 1970s and 1980s and the U.S.'s relationship with Chile throughout the 20th century. Topics, including possible democratization in Chile, Chilean inflation, the Chilean political party the Christian Democrats and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) role in Chilean elections, are discussed.