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India's hosting of the 2023 G20 summit presents a number of serious tests. Taking on the presidency of the G20 offers India the prospect of enormous rewards related to an enhanced role in world politics. As this article lays out, however, the hosting function exposes India to risks of three types relating to organisational capacity and status. The highest profile of these risks comes from the changing external environment under which the New Delhi G20 will meet, set against a background of complicating geopolitical tensions. Moreover, beyond the highly charged stakes attached to this shifting external context, the basic organisational responsibilities of holding the presidency of the G20 in New Delhi present a second serious challenge. The hosting function comes with enormous logistical issues that are especially sensitive for India in terms of peer status. Hosting a global summit of this type—that is to say, an institution constructed without the cushion of legitimacy attached to formal international organisations—is also complicated by India's self-identity. Performing the role of host conveys a message of India's equality of peer status vis-à-vis the other structurally important members in the G20. Nonetheless, in playing up this (insider) side of India's identity, the other side of India's (outsider) identity that privileges India's solidarity with the Global South and the privileging of aspirational multilateralism through the United Nations (UN) is potentially compromised. My article has two intertwined purposes. On the one hand, it examines the major tests that exist for India regarding the contextual, procedural, and institutional meaning dynamics of the G20, analysing the differentiated nature and implications of each of these challenges in turn. On the other hand, the article offers some insights concerning the techniques of how India has either addressed (or could address) the three tests and so ensure a positive reception for the summit process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers whether the ascendancy of China and India as global economic powers has been matched by a shift in their foreign policy profile and performance. Their individual contribution to, and relationship with, the UN system is the best available measure to gauge China and India's level of diplomatic activity. The authors argue that China has an entrenched cautious or status quo approach in its diplomacy, while India projects an uneven international persona. The sheer scale of China's and India's economies provides them not only with enhanced global weight and options, but is also tied with expectations. Size amplifies both countries' voice and reach; whether the United Nations will continue to be at the center of this activity remains uncertain. Key words--Asia, China, India, United Nations, diplomacy, global economy

This article contributes to the literature on global governance, legitimacy, and small states through a detailed analysis of the Global Governance Group. It examines in particular the operational impact and wider conceptual implications of the 3G's collective diplomatic efforts on the Group of 20. By engaging in a reconfigured form of informal multilateralism, the article finds that the 3G has been and is capable of shaping the global agenda with respect to the G-20 in a way that is both more inclusive and connected with existing institutions, especially the United Nations. Through this initiative, this group has effectively recalibrated the existing narrative about small states, the G-20, and global governance-shifting it from the paradigm of efficiency to one of legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]