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Since May 2022, over 21,000 mpox cases have been reported from 29 EU/EEA countries, predominantly among men who have sex with men (MSM). The Netherlands was the fourth most affected country in Europe, with more than 1,200 cases and a crude notification rate of 70.7 per million population. The first national case was reported on 10 May, yet potential prior transmission remains unknown. Insight into prolonged undetected transmission can help to understand the current outbreak dynamics and aid future public health interventions. We performed a retrospective study and phylogenetic analysis to elucidate whether undetected transmission of human mpox virus (hMPXV) occurred before the first reported cases in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In 401 anorectal and ulcer samples from visitors to centres for sexual health in Amsterdam or Rotterdam dating back to 14 February 2022, we identified two new cases, the earliest from 6 May. This coincides with the first cases reported in the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal. We found no evidence of widespread hMPXV transmission in Dutch sexual networks of MSM before May 2022. Likely, the mpox outbreak expanded across Europe within a short period in the spring of 2022 through an international highly intertwined network of sexually active MSM.

Since May 2022, an international monkeypox (MPX) outbreak has been ongoing in more than 50 countries. While most cases are men who have sex with men, transmission is not restricted to this population. In this report, we describe the case of a male child younger than 10 years with MPX in the Netherlands. Despite thorough source tracing, a likely source of infection has not been identified. No secondary cases were identified in close contacts.

We evaluated routine testing with SARS-CoV-2 Delta variant-specific RT-PCR in regional hospital laboratories in addition to centralised national genomic surveillance in the Netherlands during June and July 2021. The increase of the Delta variant detected by RT-PCR correlated well with data from genomic surveillance and was available ca 2 weeks earlier. This rapid identification of the relative abundance and increase of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern may have important benefits for implementation of local public health measures.

Avian influenza viruses are capable of crossing the species barrier and infecting humans. Although evidence of human-to-human transmission of avian influenza viruses to date is limited, evolution of variants toward more-efficient human-to-human transmission could result in a new influenza virus pandemic. In both the avian influenza A(H5N1) and the recently emerging avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses, the polymerase basic 2 protein (PB2) E627K mutation appears to be of key importance for human adaptation. During a large influenza A(H7N7) virus outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003, the A(H7N7) virus isolated from a fatal human case contained the PB2 E627K mutation as well as a hemagglutinin (HA) K416R mutation. In this study, we aimed to investigate whether these mutations occurred in the avian or the human host by Illumina Ultra-Deep sequencing of three previously uninvestigated clinical samples obtained from the fatal case. In addition, we investigated three chicken samples, two of which were obtained from the source farm. Results showed that the PB2 E627K mutation was not present in any of the chicken samples tested. Surprisingly, the avian samples were characterized by the presence of influenza virus defective RNA segments, suggestive for the synthesis of defective interfering viruses during infection in poultry. In the human samples, the PB2 E627K mutation was identified with increasing frequency during infection. Our results strongly suggest that human adaptation marker PB2 E627K has emerged during virus infection of a single human host, emphasizing the importance of reducing human exposure to avian influenza viruses to reduce the likelihood of viral adaptation to humans.

In the first 6 months of the H1N1 swine-origin influenza virus (S-OIV) pandemic, the vast majority of infections were relatively mild. It has been postulated that mutations in the viral genome could result in more virulent viruses, leading to a more severe pandemic. Mutations E627K and D701N in the PB2 protein have previously been identified as determinants of avian and pandemic influenza virus virulence in mammals. These mutations were absent in S-OIVs detected early in the 2009 pandemic. Here, using reverse genetics, mutations E627K, D701N, and E677G were introduced into the prototype S-OIV A/Netherlands/602/2009, and their effects on virus replication, virulence, and transmission were investigated. Mutations E627K and D701N caused increased reporter gene expression driven by the S-OIV polymerase complex. None of the three mutations affected virus replication in vitro . The mutations had no major impact on virus replication in the respiratory tracts of mice and ferrets or on pathogenesis. All three mutant viruses were transmitted via aerosols or respiratory droplets in ferrets. Thus, the impact of key known virulence markers in PB2 in the context of current S-OIVs was surprisingly small. This study does not exclude the possibility of emergence of S-OIVs with other virulence-associated mutations in the future. We conclude that surveillance studies aimed at detecting S-OIVs with increased virulence or transmission should not rely solely on virulence markers identified in the past but should include detailed characterization of virus phenotypes, guided by genetic signatures of viruses detected in severe cases of disease in humans.

The clinical impact of the 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) virus (pdmH1N1) has been relatively low. However, amino acid substitution D222G in the hemagglutinin of pdmH1N1 has been associated with cases of severe disease and fatalities. D222G was introduced in a prototype pdmH1N1 by reverse genetics, and the effect on virus receptor binding, replication, antigenic properties, and pathogenesis and transmission in animal models was investigated. pdmH1N1 with D222G caused ocular disease in mice without further indications of enhanced virulence in mice and ferrets. pdmH1N1 with D222G retained transmissibility via aerosols or respiratory droplets in ferrets and guinea pigs. The virus displayed changes in attachment to human respiratory tissues in vitro , in particular increased binding to macrophages and type II pneumocytes in the alveoli and to tracheal and bronchial submucosal glands. Virus attachment studies further indicated that pdmH1N1 with D222G acquired dual receptor specificity for complex α2,3- and α2,6-linked sialic acids. Molecular dynamics modeling of the hemagglutinin structure provided an explanation for the retention of α2,6 binding. Altered receptor specificity of the virus with D222G thus affected interaction with cells of the human lower respiratory tract, possibly explaining the observed association with enhanced disease in humans.

In the Netherlands, influenza specific antivirals are used for the therapy of influenza in nursing homes and hospitals, for prophylaxis in high risk groups and neuraminidase inhibitors are stockpiled as part of pandemic preparedness plans. To monitor the antiviral susceptibility profile, human influenza virus isolates derived from the Dutch influenza surveillance in 2005-2006 (n = 87), 2006-2007 (n = 58) and 2007-2008 (n = 128) were analyzed with phenotypic assays and sequencing. For adamantanes, a high proportion (>74%) of A(H3N2) viruses had the S31N mutation in M2 protein, while variation in the HA1 region of adamantane-sensitive viruses suggested that adamantane-sensitive variants were reseeded into the Dutch population and re-emerged as drug-sensitive due to M-segment reassortment. For neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir, 98% of types A and B influenza viruses prior to 2007-2008 were sensitive for both, whereas 24% of the A(H1N1) viruses obtained in 2007-2008 were oseltamivir-resistant while retaining sensitivity to zanamivir and adamantanes. Furthermore, oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) or adamantane-resistant A(H3N2) virus infections were not associated with differences in clinical symptoms compared to infections with sensitive variants. Our data show the dynamic nature of emergence of drug-resistant influenza viruses, stressing the need for surveillance of resistance trends as part of influenza monitoring programs.

The factors that cause prolonged human influenza virus respiratory tract infection and determine its clinical impact and the development of drug-resistant viruses are unclear. During a 3-year period, symptomatic influenza virus excretion for 2 weeks was observed among 8 immunocompromised patients and found to be associated with lymphocytopenia at onset (8 of 8 patients) more often than with granulocytopenia (2 of 8 patients) or monocytopenia (2 of 8 patients). Six (75%) of 8 patients developed influenza lower respiratory tract infection (10 episodes), and receipt of oseltamivir treatment was significantly associated with clinical improvement (8 of 8 episodes vs. 0 of 2 untreated episodes; P = .02). Complete viral clearance was strongly correlated with lymphocyte reconstitution (P = .04) but was never observed during the first 2 weeks after oseltamivir treatment. Neuraminidase inhibitor-resistant influenza viruses emerged in 2 (67%) of 3 patients eligible for resistance analysis. In conclusion, prolonged influenza virus infection was associated with lymphocytopenia, influenza lower respiratory tract infection, and frequent development of drug resistance during antiviral therapy. Clinical improvement in influenza lower respiratory tract infection is observed during oseltamivir treatment, but complete viral clearance is dependent on lymphocyte reconstitution, irrespective of receipt of antiviral medication.

Influenza virus-specific CD4 + T-helper cells were cloned that recognized a virus strain isolated in 1981, but that failed to recognize more recent strains. The HLA-DR*1601-restricted epitope recognized was located in the hemagglutinin (HA 99–113 ) and the naturally occurring A → V substitution at position 106 was responsible for abrogating the recognition by HA 99–113 -specific CD4 + T-cells. This amino acid substitution was found in influenza A/H3N2 viruses that circulated between 1999 and 2005 and did not affect recognition by virus-specific antibodies. It was speculated that influenza viruses could evade recognition by virus-specific CD4 + T-cells, at least temporarily.

Notification of 2 imported cases of infection with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in the Netherlands triggered comprehensive monitoring of contacts. Observed low rates of virus transmission and the psychological effect of contact monitoring indicate that thoughtful assessment of close contacts is prudent and must be guided by clinical and epidemiologic risk factors.

Summary Background Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) causes severe lower respiratory tract infection in people. Previous studies suggested dromedary camels were a reservoir for this virus. We tested for the presence of MERS-CoV in dromedary camels from a farm in Qatar linked to two human cases of the infection in October, 2013. Methods We took nose swabs, rectal swabs, and blood samples from all camels on the Qatari farm. We tested swabs with RT-PCR, with amplification targeting the E gene (upE), nucleocapsid ( N ) gene, and open reading frame (ORF) 1a. PCR positive samples were tested by different MERS-CoV specific PCRs and obtained sequences were used for phylogentic analysis together with sequences from the linked human cases and other human cases. We tested serum samples from the camels for IgG immunofluorescence assay, protein microarray, and virus neutralisation assay. Findings We obtained samples from 14 camels on Oct 17, 2013. We detected MERS-CoV in nose swabs from three camels by three independent RT-PCRs and sequencing. The nucleotide sequence of an ORF1a fragment (940 nucleotides) and a 4·2 kb concatenated fragment were very similar to the MERS-CoV from two human cases on the same farm and a MERS-CoV isolate from Hafr-Al-Batin. Eight additional camel nose swabs were positive on one or more RT-PCRs, but could not be confirmed by sequencing. All camels had MERS-CoV spike-binding antibodies that correlated well with the presence of neutralising antibodies to MERS-CoV. Interpretation Our study provides virological confirmation of MERS-CoV in camels and suggests a recent outbreak affecting both human beings and camels. We cannot conclude whether the people on the farm were infected by the camels or vice versa, or if a third source was responsible. Funding European Union projects EMPERIE (contract number 223498), ANTIGONE (contract number 278976), and the VIRGO consortium.

Two Dutch travellers were infected with oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses with an H275Y neuraminidase substitution in early August 2012. Both cases were probably infected during separate holidays at the Catalonian coast (Spain). No epidemiological connection between the two cases was found, and neither of them was treated with oseltamivir before specimen collection. Genetic analysis of the neuraminidase gene revealed the presence of previously described permissive mutations that may increase the likelihood of such strains emerging and spreading widely.

Background: Highly transmissible viruses such as influenza are a potential source of nosocomial infections and thereby cause increased patient morbidity and mortality.Aim: To assess whether influenza virus sequence data can be used to link nosocomial influenza transmission between individuals.Methods: Dutch A(H1N1)pdm09-positive specimens from one hospital (N = 107) were compared with samples from community cases (N = 685). Gene fragments of haemagglutinin, neuraminidase and PB2 were sequenced and subsequently clustered to detect patients infected with identical influenza viruses. The probability of detecting a second patient was calculated for each hospital cluster against the background diversity observed in hospital and community strains. All clusters were further analysed for possible links between patients.Findings: Seventeen A(H1N1)pdm09 hospital clusters were detected of which eight had a low probability of occurrence compared with background diversity (P Conclusion: If a background sequence dataset is available, the detection of hospital sequence clusters that differ from dominant community strains can be used to select clusters requiring further investigation by hospital hygienists before a nosocomial influenza outbreak is epidemiologically suspected. (C) 2012 The Healthcare Infection Society. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Enhanced surveillance of infections due to the pandemic A(H1N1) influenza virus, which included monitoring for antiviral resistance, was carried out in the Netherlands from late April 2009 through late May 2010. More than 1100 instances of infection with the pandemic A(H1N1) influenza virus from 2009 and 2010 [A(H1N1) 2009] distributed across this period were analyzed. Of these, 19 cases of oseltamivir-resistant virus harboring the H275Y mutation in the neuraminidase (NA) were detected. The mean 50% inhibitory concentration (IC50) levels for oseltamivir- and zanamivir-susceptible A(H1N1) 2009 viruses were 1.4-fold and 2-fold, respectively, lower than for the seasonal A(H1N1) influenza viruses from 2007/2008: for oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1)2009 virus the IC50 was 2.9-fold lower. Eighteen of the 19 patients with oseltamivir-resistant virus showed prolonged shedding of the virus and developed resistance while on oseltamivir therapy. Sixteen of these 18 patients had an immunodeficiency, of whom 11 had a hematologic disorder. The two other patients had another underlying disease. Six of the patients who had an underlying disease died; of these, five had received cytostatic or immunosuppressive therapy. No indications for onward transmission of resistant viruses were found. This study showed that the main association for the emergence of cases of oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus was receiving antiviral therapy and having drug-induced immunosuppression or an hematologic disorder. Except for a single case of a resistant virus not linked to oseltamivir therapy, the absence of detection of resistant variants in community specimens and in specimens from contacts of cases with resistant virus suggested that the spread of resistant A(H1N1) 2009 virus was limited. Containment may have been the cumulative result of impaired NA function, successful isolation of the patients, and prophylactic measures to limit exposure. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Background: Rapid and specific molecular tests for identification of the recently identified pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 virus as well as rapid molecular tests to identify antiviral resistant strains are urgently needed. Objectives: We have evaluated the performance of two novel reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reactions (RT-PCRs) targeting specifically hemagglutinin and neuraminidase of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus in combination with a conserved matrix PCR. In addition, we investigated the performance of a novel discrimination RT-PCR for detection of the H275Y resistance mutation in the neuraminidase gene. Study design: Clinical performance of both subtype specific RT-PCR assays was evaluated through analysis of 684 throat swaps collected from individuals meeting the WHO case definition for the novel pandemic influenza virus. Analytical performance was analyzed through testing of 10-fold serial dilutions of RNA derived from the first Dutch sequenced and cultured confirmed case of novel pandemic influenza infection. Specificity and discriminative capacities of the H275Y discrimination assay were performed by testing wild type and recombinant H275Y pandemic influenza. Results: 121 throat swaps collected from April 2009 to July 2009 were positive by at least two out of three RT-PCRs, and negative for the seasonal H3/H1 subtype specific RT-PCR assays. 117 of these were tested positive for all three (Ct-values from 15.1 to 36.8). No oseltamivir resistance was detected. Conclusions: We present a sensitive and specific approach for detection of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 and a rapid RT-PCR assay detecting a primary oseltamivir resistance mutation which can be incorporated easily into clinical virology algorithms. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Introduction of a new influenza virus in humans urges quick analysis of its virological and immunological characteristics to determine the impact on public health and to develop protective measures for the human population. At present, however, the necessity of executing pandemic influenza virus research under biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) high-containment conditions severely hampers timely characterization of such viruses. We tested heat, formalin, Triton X-100, and β-propiolactone treatments for their potencies in inactivating human influenza A(H3N2) and avian A(H7N3) viruses, as well as seasonal and pandemic A(H1N1) virus isolates, while allowing the specimens to retain their virological and immunological properties. Successful heat inactivation coincided with the loss of hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) characteristics, and β-propiolactone inactivation reduced the hemagglutination titer and NA activity of the human influenza virus 10-fold or more. Although Triton X-100 treatment resulted in inconsistent HA activity, the NA activities in culture supernatants were enhanced consistently. Nonetheless, formalin treatment permitted the best retention of HA and NA properties. Triton X-100 treatment proved to be the easiest-to-use influenza virus inactivation protocol for application in combination with phenotypic NA inhibitor susceptibility assays, while formalin treatment preserved B-cell and T-cell epitope antigenicity, allowing the detection of both humoral and cellular immune responses. In conclusion, we demonstrated successful influenza virus characterization using formalin- and Triton X-100-inactivated virus samples. Application of these inactivation protocols limits work under BSL-3 conditions to virus culture, thus enabling more timely determination of public health impact and development of protective measures when a new influenza virus, e.g., pandemic A(H1N1)v virus, is introduced in humans.

Context The sudden emergence and rapid spread of oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses with neuraminidase (NA) gene H274Y amino acid substitution is the hallmark of global seasonal influenza since January 2008. Viruses carrying this mutation are widely presumed to exhibit attenuated pathogenicity, compromised transmission, and reduced lethality. Objective To investigate nosocomial viral transmission in a cluster of patients with influenza A(H1N1) virus infection. Design, Setting, and Patients Descriptive outbreak investigation of 2 hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipients and an elderly patient who developed hospital-acquired influenza A virus infection following exposure to an index patient with community-acquired H274Y-mutated influenza A(H1N1) virus infection in a medical ward at a Dutch university hospital in February 2008. The investigation included a review of the medical records, influenza virus polymerase chain reaction and culture, phenotypic oseltamivir and zanamivir susceptibility determination, and hemagglutinin chain 1 (HA 1 ) gene and NA gene sequence analysis. Main Outcome Measure Phylogenetic relationship of patient cluster influenza A(H1N1) viruses and other 2007-2008 seasonal influenza A(H1N1) viruses. Results Viral HA 1 and NA gene sequence analysis from the 4 patients revealed indistinguishable nucleotide sequences and phylogenetic clustering of H274Y-mutated, oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) virus, confirming nosocomial transmission. Influenza virus pneumonia (3 patients) and attributable mortality (2 patients) during active infection was observed in patients with lymphocytopenia at onset. Conclusion Seasonal oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1) viruses with NA gene H274Y mutation are transmitted and retain significant pathogenicity and lethality in high-risk patients.Published online March 2, 2009 (doi:10.1001/jama.2009.297).

The recently identified human infections with avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses in China raise important questions regarding possible source and risk to humans. Sequence comparison with an influenza A(H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 and an A(H7N1) epidemic in Italy in 1999–2000 suggests that widespread circulation of A(H7N9) viruses must have occurred in China. The emergence of human adaptation marker PB2 E627K in human A(H7N9) cases parallels that of the fatal A(H7N7) human case in the Netherlands.