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Background: There are limited comprehensive descriptions of character strengths and virtues specific to the professional identity formation of medical students in the literature. This absence of a satisfactory summation of virtues has stimulated us to attempt a conceptual framework utilizing a tripartite taxonomy. This taxonomy reflects recent interest in and importance of justice and care of the self., Methods: Our taxonomy is grounded within a perennial tradition of medical ethics that focuses on the moral "excellences" or "virtues" that form the character of a good doctor, as acquired over time within a community of practice. Character refers to the whole set of excellences of a practitioner as a member of the medical community., Results: We propose a tripartite taxonomical classification of virtues as Other-Regarding Virtues, Self-Regarding Virtues, and Equal-Regarding Virtues. Though synergistic, each category is readily distinguishable with regard to a fundamental mindset. To thrive, a medical student must develop character strengths that encompass all three categories., Conclusions: Our goal in introducing this tripartite taxonomy is to provide a framework of virtues to contribute to the definition of professional identity. We envision the taxonomy will provide a structure for professional identity formation curriculum development and organize the ever-elusive assessment of professionalism in learners. This taxonomy can also be viewed as an aspirational roadmap for practicing physicians and educators, and as a compass for their daily consciousness. We believe that this taxonomy will enhance the well-being and development of physicians and medical students, and the patients in their care., (© 2024. The Author(s).)

This paper considers the question of virtues appropriate to a corporate actor’s moral character. A model of corporate appetites is developed by analogy with animal appetites; and the pursuit of initially virtuous corporate tendencies to an extreme degree is shown to be morally perilous. The author thus refutes a previous argument which suggested that (1) corporate virtues, unlike human virtues, need not be located on an Aristotelian mean between opposite undesirable extremes because (2) corporations do not have appetites; and (3) corporate virtues must serve the end of sustainable profit. If these disanalogies between corporate and human virtue no longer hold, then the stage is set for us to formulate a more adequate model of good corporate character that would encompass other-regarding virtues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]