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This paper examines whether constitutional interpretations of the proper roles of the executive and the legislative branches influence Congress members' voting decisions on use of force votes. Specifically, the authors examine the hypothesis that some members are presidentialists--those whose constitutional interpretations favor the executive--and others are congressionalists--those whose constitutional interpretations defend congressional prerogatives. We examined members of Congress who served continuously in either the US House of Representatives or the US Senate from 1990-1999. We identified possible congressionalists and presidentialists using all roll call votes of resolutions to authorize the use of force, and examined floor speeches in the Congressional Record to see how these members explained their votes. We conclude some members of Congress do take constitutional interpretations into account when casting these votes, and justify their actions based upon their reading of the Constitution. Thus, they shape congressional debate and voting outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the use of the War Powers Resolution from 1973 to 2001 in the United States. Challenging of increasingly unilateral exercise of presidential power in matters of war and peace; Aim of bringing about collective judgment; Renewal of participation of Congress in matters of military conflict; Withdrawal of military forces in the absence of congressional authorization.

Deals with the shift in the constitutional balance, the appropriation by the Presidency of powers reserved by the constitution and by long historical practice to Congress. Information on Arthur M. Schlesinger's book `Imperial Presidency'; Constitutional choices within the war powers debate; Implications of a structural approach of the Constitution; Conclusion.