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Given that the two institutional arrangements of government regulation and market allocation cannot effectively solve the conflict between individual and collective interests in the process of water pollution control, this work presents a useful attempt on the third institutional arrangement of environmental governance—social governance—to overcome the dilemma. Based on common pool resource theory and multi-person prisoner game analysis framework, it incorporates environmental damage function, spatial network structure, and strategy update based on a learning mechanism into the analysis framework. In addition, it constructs a set of spatial cooperative evolution game models of basin water pollution social governance, so as to test the guarantee effect of the spontaneous collective action conditions of basin polluters on the long-term survival of the new system. This work adopts the Monte Carlo numerical simulation method to conduct the simulation experiment research. The experimental results show it is possible to successfully form collective actions entirely dependent on emitters, which yet requires a large initial scale of cooperation, that is, a majority of the emitter group autonomously abides by credible commitments. In this process, transparent full information and active organizational mobilization have a positive effect on the collective action development. The organic combination can better guide emitters to abide by credible commitments to achieve the optimal collective interests. The study results can provide a theoretical and practical reference for the social governance mechanism at a large-scale basin.

The equitable allocation of water governance responsibilities is very important yet difficult to achieve, particularly for a basin which involves many stakeholders and policymakers. In this study, the environmental Gini coefficient model was applied to evaluate the inequality of water governance responsibility allocation, and an environmental Gini coefficient optimisation model was built to achieve an optimal adjustment. To illustrate the application of the environmental Gini coefficient, the heavily polluted transboundary Taihu Lake Basin in China, was chosen as a case study. The results show that the original environmental Gini coefficient of the chemical oxygen demand (COD) was greater than 0.2, indicating that the allocation of water governance responsibilities in Taihu Lake Basin was unequal. Of seven decision-making units, three were found to be inequality factors and were adjusted to reduce the water pollutant emissions and to increase the water governance inputs. After the adjustment, the environmental Gini coefficient of the COD was less than 0.2 and the reduction rate was 27.63%. The adjustment process provides clear guidance for policymakers to develop appropriate policies and improve the equality of water governance responsibility allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]