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The article discusses the 20th century West Indian intellectual and anti-imperialist leader Frantz Fanon and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a particular focus on the CIA's role in extending leukemia treatment to him just before he died in 1961. It references the former CIA official Oliver Iselin, who oversaw Fanon during his medical treatment, including Iselin's relations with third world nationalists and national liberation movements in Algeria fighting the French colonists.

In 1960-62 French officials considered partitioning Algeria between Europeanand Muslim-majority areas, much later and more seriously than the existing historiography shows. Even supporters of partition, however, remained ambivalent, regarding it as a "foreign" approach to decolonization opposed to French principles of territorial unity and racial equality. Thus they discussed partition by comparing Algeria to foreign models, in particular the partition of the British Mandate of Palestine that led to the creation of the state of Israel. Drawing on the private papers of Prime Minister Michel Debré, the writings of Alain Peyrefitte, and archives from the Ministries of Algerian and Foreign Affairs, this article argues that partition plans were failed attempts to deflect colonialism by looking sideways. To do so, the supporters of partition made use of comparison, a long-standing tool of the colonial administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rachid Akbal is a French-born Algerian playwright, director and actor whose company, ‘Le temps de vivre’, took up residence at the Théâtre de Belleville in Paris in 2012 to perform hisTrilogie Algérienne(three plays with a loosely autobiographical element:Baba la France,Ma mère l'AlgérieandAlger,Terminal 2). On 19 March 2012, to mark the 50th anniversary of the first day of the ceasefire between Algeria and France, Akbal held an open evening at the theatre. The first half offered a run-through of the history between France and Algeria. The second half was a more personal, lyrical narrative of what the date represented for Akbal; unpublished elsewhere, Akbal has given permission for it to be reproduced here. In its hour-long performance, the narration was accompanied by sounds (natural elements, gunfire and sirens, and music), and at the end the lights went up and Akbal took a seat on stage, to begin a half-hour discussion with the audience. In so doing, Akbal created a discreet space of remembrance which allowed interested parties to come together in collective commemoration. Setting theorisations of cultural memory in dialogue with commentaries published during the commemorative period, this article sets up a framework to interrogate the possibilities of personal and collective remembrance offered by Akbal's event, opening these up via publication of the text and analysis of it as a ‘memory space’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the policies that the French government pursued to house repatriates from Algeria in 1962. These initiatives took place in the context of a French society overwhelmed by eight years of war, OAS terrorism that sought to overthrow the established order in metropolitan France, and the arrival of more than 600,000 people during the spring and the summer of 1962, a migration that challenged the social and economic balance of the country. To spare the repatriates the need to settle in shantytowns that would have put them on the fringe of society, the government opened collective housing and other centres d'hébergement. These efforts served the purpose of a policy of integration established through the 26 December 1962 law for people who were paradoxically both migrants and members of the national community. This policy in fact helped facilitate their integration into the metropolitan society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, historians and other scholars have greatly expanded how they approach the study of African decolonization. This article builds upon this growing scholarship by exploring the political and intellectual debates surrounding the use of 'violence' in decolonization. Taking Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana as its setting, it explores the ways in which the armed struggle of the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962) helped transform African perceptions of the political and social processes of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the moral ambiguities surrounding them. It shows how the Algerian presence in the Ghanaian capital of Accra competed with and transformed Nkrumah's own interpretations of decolonization and the possibilities of a pan-African world created through 'nonviolent Positive Action.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses women veterans of the Battle of Algiers, Algeria in 1957, part of the Algerian Revolution of 1954-1962, commenting on colonial and post-colonial identities. It reflects on urban bombers known as mujahidat (women resisters), particularly addressing women who attended French schools in colonial Algeria. The author examines the discourse of the Algerian Front de liberation nationale (FLN) on women, the introduction of the Algerian Family Code, and the Algerian government's refusal to participate in the debate surrounding the torture of FLN activist Louisette Ighilahriz.

The article discusses French policy toward the Algerian Revolution of 1954-1962. It specifically focuses on the period from the election of the Republican Front in France in January 1956 to the so-called “day of the tomatoes” demonstration in Algiers, Algeria on February 6, 1956 and examines the stance of Guy Mollet, French Prime Minister and leader of the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO). The author considers Mollet's appointments of General Georges Catroux and Robert Lacoste to the position of resident-general in Algiers.

During the Algerian war of independence (1954-62), Federal Germany became the theatre of a series of unexplained bombings and shootings that targeted Algerian nationalists and German arms dealers. At the time, these crimes were attributed to the Red Hand, a counter-terrorist organization or parallel secret service with a mission to defeat the enemies of l'Algérie française. This article argues that the attacks on West German territory were executed neither by vigilantes nor by renegade agents. Instead, they were carried out by the French foreign intelligence service SDECE with the full approval of the highest political authorities in Paris. Using the case of Federal Germany as an example, this article seeks to reveal how and why covert action - including state-sanctioned murder - became an integral and important part of the Algerian war, particularly of France's campaign to undermine the Algerian rebels' efforts to procure military and non-military supplies. The article will show that the Red Hand served merely as a cover to detract from the state's resort to such violent and criminal means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, through the military archive of time of Algerian War and through the scholarly works in 1990s on Algerian War, explores the strategy, operations and diplomacy behind the war. Until 1999, The Algerian War (1954-1962) was denied by France, which in fact saw massive fighting, and huge military troops and police involvement. In 1997-98 the revelations from the trial of French bureaucrat Maurice Papon, which exposed the long suppressed scandal of extra legal repression and killings by French state agents, obliged French people to reexamine the continuities between two controversial wars between them--World War-II and the Algerian War. It also makes an answer to the question why, France, in spite of winning the urban Battle of Algiers and even prevailing in the military war as a whole could not avert final defeat.