Search

At the December 1998 Saint-Malo summit, Britain and France promised to set aside past rivalries and work together on African issues. While brief indications were given as to possible areas of bilateral and ‘bi-multi’ cooperation, the terms and scope of this ‘partnership’ were not spelt out. Was this to involve only sporadic collaboration? Or was it to be an institutionalised partnership, such as the Franco-German tandem, or perhaps a more intuitive alliance, such as the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’? These questions are central to this article, which begins by showing how Anglo-French relations in Africa were largely marked by rivalry from the colonial era to the early post-Cold War period. Drawing upon extensive interviews, it demonstrates how, over the last decade or so, closer linkages have developed between the UK and French administrations and how there has been a greater degree of cooperation in response to the key challenges of Africa. It then uses a neo-classical realist framework to explain the readiness or reluctance of Britain and France to collaborate on Africa. It concludes by suggesting that, while there has been progress in ‘deconflictualising’ African policies, cooperation has been, and is likely to remain, limited. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is designed to explore the usefulness of an alternative conceptualization of the foreign assistance policy process. The common assumption is that US foreign aid outputs are rationally determined in response to external stimuli such as US security or economic interests or human need in a country. Yet, consistent with the logic of two-level games, foreign aid policy can become ensnared in domestic politics, especially those of a partisan distinction. In this article, I build an interactive model of foreign policy where external stimuli and domestic partisan differences are coupled to explain foreign assistance behavior toward Africa over the fiscal 1982–2003 period. I find that shifts in party control of the Presidency and the Congress lead to different valuations of the importance of external factors in making economic assistance policy. This interaction of domestic and foreign inputs serves to offer a fundamental reassessment of explanations concerning foreign assistance policy specifically, and foreign policy generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses U.S. foreign policy towards Africa and African countries from 1992-2009. American values and interests are converging on Africa, the article suggests, requiring a U.S. Africa policy that is effectively balanced. Topics include the desire of some for a realistic U.S. foreign policy devoid of grand ideological solutions, the manner in which the U.S. handled instability in West African states vis-à-vis an international campaign against "blood diamonds," and the formation of the U.S. military Africa Command (AFRICOM).