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Objects in early childhood education (ECEC) experiences have begun to receive a great deal more attention than ever before. Although much of this attention has emerged recently from new materialism, in this paper we turn to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological concern with the (in)visibility of 'things' to illuminate the presence of objects within infant transitions. Drawing on notions of écart and reversibility, we explore the relational perceptions objects are bestowed with on the lead up to, and first day of, infant transitions. Recognizing the intertwining subjectivities that perceive the object, a series of videos and interviews with teachers and parents across three ECEC sites in Australia and New Zealand provided a rich source of phenomenological insight. Our analysis reveals objects as deeply imbued anchoring links that enable relational possibilities for transitions between home and ECEC service. Visible and yet invisible to adults (parents and/or teachers) who readily engage with objects during earliest transitions, the significance of things facilitates opportunities to forge new relationships, create boundaries and facilitate connections. As such, our paper concludes that objects are far more than mediating tools, or conceptual agents; they provide an explicit route to understanding with potential to play a vital role in supporting effective early transitions when granted visibility within this important phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean for an agreement to have an anticompetitive 'object' under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union? Can the European Commission support an 'object' case by reference to the agreement parties' subjective intention, and if so, how? What exactly is the relationship between an agreement's object and the parties' subjective intention under competition law? This article is the first to bring insights from Australian and New Zealand cases, as well as analytical jurisprudence, to bear on these underexplored yet important questions affecting the European Union and common law jurisdictions around the world. Using Ronald Dworkin's theory of legal interpretation as the analytical basis, this article argues for a 'mixed' conception of the 'object' concept which enables an anticompetitive object to be proven either objectively or subjectively. Anticompetitive subjective intention accordingly provides an independent, alternative basis for competition law liability for agreements; the lack of such intention, meanwhile, does not help exculpate parties who are liable based on their objective purpose to restrict competition. This article also argues that voluntariness and evidentiary limits ought to be imposed on the use of anticompetitive subjective intention in the 'object' analysis of agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates how access to different conceptual attributes from environmental sound input modulates the semantic network. The study showed that all conditions activated a bilateral network of activation in ventral occipitotemporal, superior temporal, parietal, and frontal regions. The researchers found no differential activation for the distinction between living and manmade concepts within the visual perceptual condition.