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Incorporating major foreign policy initiatives of leader Xi Jinping, Beijing completed its effort from the past two years with instructions in January on China's new approach to foreign affairs to Chinese foreign policy officials and others concerned. The new approach added authority and momentum to Beijing's emphasis since Xi's summit with US President Joe Biden last November on greater Chinese moderation and restraint as a "responsible" great power pursuing peace and development in dealing with Southeast Asian neighbors and elsewhere. Nevertheless, Beijing remains selective in how it applies moderation, and the record of the past two years shows great swings between moderation and truculence in its approach to foreign affairs, depending on circumstances which remain subject to change. The success of China's regional importance showed in Singapore's Institute of Southeast Asian Studies annual survey of regional elites with China viewed as both the leading economic and political-security power, overshadowing the United States, and the judgment that if forced to choose between them, more respondents would select China than the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study is to conduct a comparative analysis of the "'American " and "Chinese " models ofglobalization in the context ofthe growing competition between the United States and China for global leadership; and to improve understanding of the differences between these models of globalization, which will allow for more accurate forecasting of further development of international relations and development of effective strategies for different countries. The study also attempts to consider the prospects and future of these models and to point out their shortcomings. The article is based on a comparative analysis of theoretical concepts and empirical data, including official documents, scientific publications, and statistical data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Eisenhower administration used nuclear weapons to deter Chinese shelling of the Quemoy islands. Zhao claims that the oblique nuclear threats had no effect on Beijing's decisions and operations and instead created problems for the Eisenhower administration by generating widespread opposition at home and abroad. Based on recently declassified U.S. and Chinese materials, this article examines U.S. and Chinese leaders' perspectives on nuclear weapons during the crisis and other features of U.S.-China relations in the late 1950s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dawn of the Sino-US peer competition has broken, denoting a new status quo of instability as Beijing and Washington vie for influence. As leader of the rules-based international order (RIO), Washington under the Trump administration nevertheless adopted an "America first" posture, which triggered a transatlantic discord. Simultaneously, Beijing, having signalled discontent with existing settlements, has sought to alter international arrangements to cement its leadership role. Europe has been identified as a significant theatre for the emerging competition, with Germany and the UK recognized as essential target states for Beijing's efforts, yet are simultaneously major stakeholders in the US-led RIO. As such, this article sets out to operationalize a European narrative of hedging. The article poses the questions, how does the transatlantic discord and Beijing's leadership ambitions impact the hedging strategies of Germany and the UK, and why do such coping behaviors differ in various indices? Utilizing key signals from policy practitioners, policy elites' rhetoric and national strategies, it is contended that while the UK is struggling to formulate a coherent foreign policy and now finds itself aligned with US foreign policy narratives, Germany is unlikely to signal its wishes to become strategically independent, if the US and EU foreign policy imperatives accord with Berlin's political and economic interests. These two case studies reveal that both European powers are decidedly wary about Beijing's signals and intentions, and are likely to retain closer alignment with Washington, foregoing strategic independence and illustrating the temporary nature of the transatlantic discord. Both will not, however, wish to relinquish Beijing, so long as attractive economic benefits can be attained, resulting in an inexplicit strategic hedge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

PM 2.5 , generated via both direct emission and secondary formation, can have varying environmental impacts due to different physical and chemical properties of its components. However, traditional methods to quantify different PM 2.5 components are often based on online or offline observations and numerical models, which are generally high economic cost- or labor-intensive. In this study, we develop a new method, named Multi-Tracer Estimation Algorithm (MTEA), to identify the primary and secondary components from routine observation of PM 2.5. By comparing with long-term and short-term measurements of aerosol chemical components in China and the United States, it is proven that MTEA can successfully capture the magnitude and variation of the primary PM 2.5 (PPM) and secondary PM 2.5 (SPM). Applying MTEA to the China National Air Quality Network, we find that (1) SPM accounted for 63.5 % of the PM 2.5 in cities in southern China on average during 2014–2018, while the proportion dropped to 57.1 % in the north of China, and at the same time the secondary proportion in regional background regions was ∼ 19 % higher than that in populous regions; (2) the summertime secondary PM 2.5 proportion presented a slight but consistent increasing trend (from 58.5 % to 59.2 %) in most populous cities, mainly because of the recent increase in O 3 pollution in China; (3) the secondary PM 2.5 proportion in Beijing significantly increased by 34 % during the COVID-19 lockdown, which might be the main reason for the observed unexpected PM pollution in this special period; and finally, (4) SPM and O 3 showed similar positive correlations in the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei (BTH) and Yangtze River Delta (YRD) regions, but the correlations between total PM 2.5 and O 3 in these two regions, as determined from PPM levels, were quite different. In general, MTEA is a promising tool for efficiently estimating PPM and SPM, and has huge potential for future PM mitigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the last few years, and especially since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, growing number of Middle East scholars and analysts have been closely observing an escalation of tensions between China and the United States and their impact beyond bilateral ties. Considering the major differences of focus and approach among these observers, this article aims to review systematically such Middle Eastern perspectives, both globally and regionally, on the emerging Sino-US rivalry. Certain Middle East analysts regard Beijing and Washington as largely "homogeneous" extra-regional powers competing in international politics, economy, and technology. Many others emphasise their "heterogeneity," arguing that the essence of Sino-US confrontation lies in the clash of two models. Most Middle East scholars note that, in contrast to Washington's waning influence, Beijing's growing presence in the region during the past decade has rendered the Middle East a "new battleground" for the two great powers. Although China and the United States still have shared interests in certain regional affairs, most intellectuals focus on and collectively identify five domains across the Middle East wherein Beijing and Washington are locked in asymmetric competition. In light of both the opportunities and challenges that the emerging Sino-US rivalry engenders, Middle Eastern observers raise various policy suggestions, and debate on whether regional players should proactively take advantage of this great power competition, cautiously hedge against strategic uncertainty and risk, or constructively help reduce hostility between the United States and the People's Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study analyzes American defense and security strategy towards China and assesses its policy impact on security on the Korean Peninsula and the Asia-Pacific region more generally. The rapid rise of the People's Republic of China as a geopolitical power and its aggressive foreign policy has considerably heightened fears among U.S. policymakers that China poses a threat. The intensifying strategic rivalry and distrust between Washington and Beijing since the inauguration of President Donald J. Trump in 2017 is leading to worsened relations between the two countries. This trend is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, and it is also expected that the American grand strategy will view China as the new global adversary, drawing down the "War on Terror" in the process. China is indeed fast emerging as the target of sustained deterrence, and this shift in American strategic thinking will likely continue even after the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections. Intensifying Sino-American geopolitical competition is resulting in a new Cold War posture, reflecting in turn a lack of strategic dialogue. As a result, the risk of Sino-American military conflict in geopolitical hotspots around the world (including the Korean Peninsula) is rapidly increasing, and countries in the region are worried about being entangled in a Great Power conflict between the two countries. In the meantime, the United States is soliciting countries in the region to join an "anti-Beijing" grouping of sorts, seeking to integrate pre-existing alliances (e.g., the ROK-U.S. Alliance) into this new grouping. Beijing, for its part, is attempting to weaken those traditional alliances with Washington, through measures such as economic coercion. Seoul is bearing the brunt of such sustained pressure from Beijing and is being pressured by both countries to "pick" one side over the other. Practically speaking, rather than pick sides, Seoul ought to chart a middle course, proceeding with "strategic confidence" that draws on a clear delineation of national interest and backing of the South Korean public. In particular, it would behoove Seoul to provide opportunities for deliberation on Korean Peninsula security issues, enhancing the prospects for meaningful strategic dialogue between Washington and Beijing. Concurrently, Seoul would also benefit from vigilant monitoring of the changing balance of power between United States and China, utilizing insights drawn from keen monitoring to further enhance its defense capabilities. In so doing, it is expected that Seoul will enhance its strategic value and military deterrence capabilities. Concurrently, by way of proactive military-to-military diplomatic engagement with neighboring countries, cooperative deterrence capabilities also would have to be significantly enhanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While much has been written about US–China strategic rivalry, no study to the authors' knowledge has conducted an empirical analysis of this rivalry. This article fills this gap by investigating whether and how this rivalry affects a country's response to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The findings of this article indicate that certain aspects of bilateral strategic ties indeed have strong effects on a country's reaction to the Chinese bank. More specifically, shorter distance to higher a level of partnership with, and more arms purchase from Beijing lead to faster accession to the AIIB, while the shorter distance to Washington results in slower accession, controlling for other factors. In addition, economically developed countries appear to be consistently more eager to join the Beijing-led bank than economically underdeveloped countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the foreign relations between China and Israel and discusses its future aspects. Topics discussed include confrontation between China and the U.S. over materials and geopolitical achievements, growth of economic and commercial relations between China and Israel after opening of embassies in Beijing, China and Tel Aviv, Israel and provision of a range of weapons including electronic components for tank communication, optical equipment, and missiles to China by Israel.

The author discusses his response to the commentary on his book "The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power." He states that the second paragraph indicates how the future of Asia will be developed by Beijing, China and Washington as well as the share of both governments on equal responsibility to establish a relationship between them which is peaceful and stable. He says that the book addressed the choices of the U.S. on China since they have less attention than the choices of China.

The author discusses the analysis of Hugh White on the U.S.-China relationship in his book "The China Choice." She states that the call of White for Washington to share its power with Beijing, China as well as his suggestion that this must get the form of a regional concert seem to be taken with universal enthusiasm. She mentions that the book sets out a significant alternative strategy towards the rising China.

In spite of rhetorical flourishes concerning world harmony, from US vantages the 2008 Beijing Olympics represented an episode in the ‘clash of civilisations’ between an American-led ‘Occident’ and China's ‘Confucian’ civilisation. The US media and public tend to see the Olympics through Samuel Huntington's combative interpretation of world affairs rather than as a pacific transnational partnership. The Chinese tendency to count medals to guarantee China's triumph indicates that many Chinese shared in that habit. Americans often see globalisation as an opportunity for Americanisation. Seeking through sport the cultural transformation of China and the rest of the world represents an old habit in US culture. From American viewpoints, the inclusion of new action sports in the Olympics has multiplied opportunities for Americanising the globe. In the Olympic debut of BMX cycling, Americans perceived that in spite of Chinese successes in Beijing the Olympics ultimately spurred the extension of US hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We examine the effect events in the Arab world have on PRC policy. We analyze Beijing's measures to improve its foreign policy efforts in the region. Special attention is given to trends in Chinese-American relations, and to the prospects for Chinese-Russian cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In March 2008, Tibet erupted in the biggest challenge to Chinese rule since 1959. While Beijing and Dharamsala engaged in their familiar battle of representations, pundits speculated on the causes of the uprising, ranging from conspiracy theories to informed policy analysis. Applying the framework of the insecurity dilemma, this article argues that Tibetan identity insecurity on account of the post-1989 hard-line Chinese policies was the chief cause of the uprising. Largely peaceful protests and occasionally violent riots in Tibet have been integral to Tibetan efforts to mitigate their societal insecurities provoked by Chinese migration, 'assimilationist' policies and 'cultural imperialism'. However, Tibetan protests and riots heighten Chinese insecurities and harden Beijing's policies both inside Tibet and towards the Dalai Lama. This paper reveals the dynamic cycle of hard-line Chinese policies provoking Tibetan uprisings; the resulting hardening in Chinese policies feeds back into Tibetan insecurities and protests. The 2008 uprising was the most recent cycle in the long-running saga of the Sino-Tibetan insecurity dilemma. The article warns that unless the Tibetans and the Chinese find a way to break out of the insecurity dilemma, Tibet could explode into another frenzy of violence and counter-violence in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2008 Beijing Olympics were widely regarded as China's 'coming out party', a belief strengthened by the extravagance and efficiency of the games. China was open about the image it wished to convey to the world, dubbing its games as the 'humanistic Olympics', 'green Olympics' and 'technological Olympics'. Now, one year after the 2008 Olympics, this paper wishes to examine the extent to which China's Olympics were successful as a public-relations campaign in the United States by focusing on the images of China portrayed in the American media before, during and after the Olympics to detect any significant trends. The analysis focuses on editorial boards of widely circulated newspapers, representing the nine major divisions of the United States, and the three largest cable news networks: Fox News, CNN and MSNBC. Finally, there is an assessment of public opinion polls gauging amity towards China. The results indicate that overall, US media images of China became increasingly negative directly before, during and after the Olympics. US public opinion of China correspondingly became more negative. To conclude, there is a reflection upon the implications of these findings on US-Sino relations and the image China wishes to impart to the American media and public. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a rising power in the international system, China is discovering that, like many states before it, the ascendancy to great power status sometimes entails significant terrorism risks. Recent attacks against Chinese nationals (or commercial interests) in Africa, Central Asia, and South Asia appear to reflect this trend. In addition, since the early 1990s, China has endured a series of violent attacks emanating from (or associated with) its restive northwest Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Beijing's search for energy security and its associated commercial activities in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Central Asia suggests that terrorism risks for China may increase in the future. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and U.S.-Chinese counterterrorism cooperation prior to and during the 2008 Olympic Games, Washington and Beijing have discovered they have many common interests in countering the global threat of terrorism. However, for long-term cooperation to be sustained, the two countries must overcome or manage various disagreements on issues related to terrorism and the larger challenges associated with geopolitical competition. If these differences can be mitigated or resolved, China and the United States may be ideally positioned to establish a powerful and long-term bulwark against international terrorism and the instability that it promotes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Big-time sport increasingly becomes a hostage of big-time politics." The author examines the attempts of certain forces in the West to use the preparations for the 29th Olympic Games in Beijing for bringing pressure to bear on the People's Republic of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article describes U.S.-China relations for the third quarter of 2008. It says that the attendance of U.S. President George W. Bush at the Beijing Olympic Games boosted the existing close cooperation between the two countries. It is noted that the agreements made in the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) which addressed several issues including food security, loans for acquiring medical equipment, promotion of digital television and agricultural cooperation were eclipsed by the heated U.S. presidential campaign.

Should the high growth rate of China's economy be sustained in the coming decades, ascending China will change the power configuration in Northeast Asia. Whether intended or not, there definition of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1990s is seen by Beijing as a measure to enhance America's managerial capacity for possible competition with China over influence in Asia. Relocation of the U.S. forces on the Korean peninsula is likely to exacerbate Beijing's concerns over America's potential encirclement of China through the U.S. alliance network. An interesting finding from in-depth interviews conducted in Beijing tells us, however, that Beijing intends to accept the rearrangement of America's alliances. As long as China's bilateral relations with the U.S. are good, the state of the U.S. alliances in the region would not be a matter of serious concern to Beijing. The two redefinitions, when completed, are highly likely to lead Beijing to choose its preferred stance between either opposing America's two alliances or jumping on the bandwagon as a security partner on the network. Opposing the powerful security cooperation network would not serve China's interests, especially during the time when it should concentrate its efforts on economic growth and domestic unity. The remaining and probably more rational choice before Beijing would be in joining the security cooperation network by trying to transform the two bilateral alliances into a regional security regime such as the ARF or Europe's OSCE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Beijing has become aware of the United States' strategy of containment against it. As a result, Beijing's primary goal in its relations with the United States has been breaking out from the latter's containment. To achieve this end, Beijing has intensified its relations with Washington politically and economically, while cementing its relations with Asia-Pacific countries to prevent them from leaning closer to the United States. This strategy has so far achieved notable results. Presently, the realists in the United States who oppose efforts to isolate or contain mainland China have obviously won the upper hand in policymaking decisions regarding mainland Chinese affairs. Moreover, Beijing-Washington relations have improved since the latter half of 1996, and mutual visits by Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton will soon take place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]