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This paper examines patterns of recentralization in Latin America, which are diverse and are posited to become increasingly important over time. After the fiscal decentralization wave in the region from the 1990s and early 2000s, the future of intergovernmental relations on the continent is likely to be a "reverse wave" of recentralizing change. These recentralizing changes will not be uniform across country contexts, but will differ in extent, nature, and quality. Future studies of intergovernmental relations (including decentralization) in Latin America will require attention to conceptual, theoretical, and empirical advances in the study of recentralization, and this paper works in that vein. The paper theorizes that recentralization can follow multiple different patterns, of which two are highlighted by the cases of Brazil and Venezuela. Brazil shows that where national executives come from conventional institutional backgrounds and furthermore find themselves constrained by the institutional environment (such as democracy, federalism, or constitutional provisions), the form of recentralization is one that builds and rationalizes that institutional environment. Venezuela illustrates an anti-institutional approach to recentralization in which existing institutions are abolished or subjugated to presidential discretion. Both processes may use certain similar recentralizing tactics - most notably institutional layering - but the results differ as a function of executive background, intent, and leverage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are federalism and decentralization similar phenomena? Do they necessarily correlate? Do they have an “elective affinity”? Or can they work in opposition to one another? Specifically, does decentralization to any level of subnational government favor all levels of subnational government, or do municipalities differ from higher levels of subnational government (usually “federal” entities such as states or provinces) in meaningful ways? In this paper, I argue that central governments often use the rhetoric and practice of municipal decentralization as a way to weaken federal units at the intermediate level of government. In a “three-level game”, central governments decentralize to the local level in order to strengthen the center’s position in negotiations with the states/regions/provinces. I demonstrate this by examining three case studies: Brazil, South Africa, and Peru. The causes of such occurrences are eminently political: increases in the electoral strength of opposition parties at the intermediate level are the triggers for municipalization. The paper focuses on an important political point too often overlooked in the literature on intergovernmental relations: most countries of interest have not two, but three interacting levels of government. The salience of each of the three levels of government – central, local, and an intermediate tier alternately called state, provincial, or regional – varies from country to country. Most academic studies of intergovernmental relations, federalism, and decentralization focus on dynamics between two layers of government, a dyadic set of political interactions. These approaches, however much they may simplify certain issues and make certain questions more tractable, often miss out on the crucial ways in which the three levels of government can interact. In particular, scholars have a tendency to lump local governments together with other subnational governments. Implicit assumptions are that what is good for one level of subnational government is good for the other. In fact, however, the preferences of municipalities may conflict with those of intermediate levels of government. Central governments, in many circumstances, find allies in the form of local governments. Decentralization to municipalities may actually run counter to some of the central principles of federalism. This paper will examine this possibility, using three quite different polities as case studies. In examining federal Brazil, quasi-federal South Africa, and unitary Peru, I will show that center-local political links can lead to an “hourglass” structure of government with a missing middle (as argued by Junaid Ahmad), reinforcing the center and localities at the expense of the intermediate layer of government. This case selection demonstrates that the strategic choices made by the center can have effects that are robust across different points on the federal-unitary spectrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions can central governments control or reverse processes of decentralization? Why do some central governments actually push for certain decentralizing moves, when it would seem this concedes power to subnational governments? In this paper I explore developments in intergovernmental relations in Brazil and South Africa since 1994. I conclude that processes of decentralization over the last decade have not always enhanced, but have sometimes actually reduced the autonomy of subnational governments. In both cases, central governments have increasingly worked through bureaucratic channels to earmark the money that flows to the states (estados) and provinces. Central governments in both countries have also recently placed restrictions on the ability of states and provinces to borrow money. The comparison shows that similar changes in intergovernmental relations can occur across countries with different histories and institutions. In limiting or reducing subnational autonomy, strong presidential leverage within governing coalitions was crucial; this leverage can be wielded either in the legislative arena, or within the executive. At the same time, variations across the cases point to an additional causal factor affecting the outcomes in these countries: economic crisis. The Brazilian president’s successful reckoning with a generalized economic crisis gave him leverage that South Africa’s president did not have, and this enabled the more dynamic set of (re)centralizing changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]