1. Uma análise juseconômica dos desincentivos à prática de insider trading no Brasil.
- Author
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Amin Ferraz, Daniel and Ali Mahmoud Otman, Samira Mohamad
- Subjects
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INSIDER trading in securities , *ECONOMIC crime , *EXPECTED returns , *PUNISHMENT , *JURISPRUDENCE , *CRIME , *RETRIBUTION , *SECURITIES fraud - Abstract
The common notion that the use of privileged information (insider trading) is a crime without punishment, and, therefore, pays off, has been spread in Brazil. Even the increase in administrative convictions does not seem to repel its occurrence, despite the enforcement of fines higher than the expected gain from committing the crime. This paper aims to identify the Brazilian structure of disincentives to insider trading, and to verify if it is enough to repel its occurrence. Through an analysis of rules concerning the subject and of the CVM's sanctioning activity (and corresponding judicialization of cases), the STJ's jurisprudence on the matter and a doctrinal research, this paper demonstrates, under the Economic Theory of Crime, that setting high fines regarding the gains obtained by insider trading is not enough to discourage that practice due to low probability of punishment of its perpetrators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2021
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