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Despite widespread criticisms, governments around the world have adopted Value for Money (VfM) analysis as a key metric in gauging the prospective value of infrastructure projects. This paper examines the institutional processes through which VfM is rendered defensible as a form of valuation. Drawing on a case study of Infrastructure Ontario in Canada, the paper demonstrates that this involves strategies for partitioning space and time, including boundary work, objectification, phasing and outsourcing. We argue that the institution of delays and distances ultimately fosters the displacement of subjectivity in the valuation process while entrenching distinctively financialized understandings of value. Moreover, we demonstrate that this is driven not so much by the organization's desire to control the future but by a defensive orientation that sets out to ward off potential critiques that may arise from project failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problem, research strategy, and findings: Delivering improved public services at lower cost, also known formally as value for money (VfM), is often the main rationale for procuring large infrastructure projects through public–private partnerships (PPPs). However, it is unclear whether the ex ante assessments of PPPs account for key planning concerns, including limitations on community consultation, contractual lock-ins that curtail public flexibility to make future plans, and a political preference for PPPs that may influence the way that projects are structured and evaluated. This set of questions is examined for 28 infrastructure PPPs delivered in Ontario, Canada, and interviews with18 senior political, government, and private-sector participants in the province's PPP industry. We find that transferring of construction risks from government to the private-sector partners drives VfM results, and may overvalue the extent to which planning related risks can be transferred. Takeaway for practice: PPP contract structures should permit more transparency during the project planning process and preserve the flexibility of governments to control key planning tasks such as user fees, service coordination and facility expansion. Strategies might include: the unbundling of construction and operation phases of the PPP in all but the most unique situations, the use of competitive dialogue tendering to deepen public–private collaboration earlier in the planning process, and the inclusion of contract rebalancing terms to better share rather than transfer project risks. Research support: This research was funded through a Standard Research Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Application Number: 110998). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]