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As a response to mass mobilizations against the political and social status quo, a multiparty agreement activated a process to replace the constitution in Chile, three decades after the country's transition to democracy. I argue that this process has three features that are not only desirable on normative grounds but also shared by successful episodes of constitutional replacement in democratic regimes: the drafting of the new text in an assembly bound by preexisting rules, inclusive mechanisms of representation and decision making, and direct citizen involvement. These features, in interaction with the popular repudiation of the elite-biased institutions inherited from the Pinochet era, might lead to a new constitutional arrangement that deepens democratization by expanding citizen rights, strengthening executive constraints, and removing restrictions on majority rule. Yet the realization of the full democratic potential of this constitutional change depends on the still uncertain ability of constitution makers to compromise on a text that is not only seen as legitimate among ordinary citizens but also promotes coherent goals, effective institutions, and good governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay provides information about constitutional law and constitutional reform in Chile. The author comments on the history of politics and government in Chile, democratization and democracy, and citizenship. Other topics include constitutions, the role of constituent assemblies and legislators, and elections. The essay compares Chilean constitutions with those of other Latin American countries including Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador.