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The dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands is generally analysed as a Sino-Japanese competition over material and strategic interests, regional preponderance, and nationalistic symbolism. Yet, such explanations cannot fully explain the endurance of the conflict and overlook its origin in the period leading up to the UN's derecognition of Taiwan's sovereignty in 1971. Drawing on the concept of ontological security, defined as 'security of the self', we contend that it was the looming loss of its sovereign self that prompted Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) to assert itself as the true defender of Chinese interests by laying claim to the islands. This caused anxiety in China (People's Republic of China, PRC), which had to follow suit in order to secure its own sovereign self. China thus inherited the conflict with Japan when it took over the 'true China' mantle upon its entry to the UN in 1971. Extant explanations overlook the important factor of inter-Chinese competition over sovereign selfhood. In developing this argument, the article makes two contributions. First, it draws attention to a much-overlooked early phase of the dispute, and shows how the same dynamics of ROC–PRC status competition continue to inform the dispute between China and Japan today. Second, it contributes to the literature on ontological security by conceptualising the 'self' as sovereign state personhood, thereby further clarifying the distinction between self and identity, and highlighting the relational effects of ontological security-seeking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a translation of an article that reconsiders the controversy surrounding the Satō Eisaku Cabinet's China policy from 1970 to 1972. Previous studies have not focused sufficiently on how top officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs discussed China policy during this era. Based on recently declassified but still fragmentary Japanese diplomatic documents, this article, by carefully organizing these fragments and then comparing them with previously published secondary sources and declassified US diplomatic documents, uncovers historical facts of central importance for understanding Japan's postwar foreign policy. In particular, this article finds that the Foreign Ministry failed to formulate a strategic response to the drastic transformation of the international situation in the early 1970s, thereby indicating that discord within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party was not the only reason for Japan's delayed and reactive response. It also finds that the Ministry decided to establish diplomatic relations with China and severe relations with Taiwan as early as immediately after the Taiwanese government was expelled from the U.N. in October 1971, even though Japan waited for nearly another year before acting. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article provides the first comparative overview in English of Japanese colonial banks before World War II with an emphasis on their roles as banks of issue in Taiwan, Korea and Northeast China. It discusses at length similarities and differences in these banks’ note circulation patterns, in their note-reserve requirements and their actual application, and in their geographical spread and respective colonial mandates. There was some variation in Japanese bank note issuance in the colonial setting of Korea and Taiwan, in ‘Manchukuo’ and in those parts of China that remained nominally sovereign. But all Japanese colonial banks seem, in one way or another, to have astutely adjusted the spread of their note issue in order to control for flagging demand due to nationalist boycotts, or to conversely cash in on demand spurts for notes resulting from crises in the indigenous financial sector. The banks of issue under review here were theoretically subject to a 100 per cent reserve requirement, but the make-up of their metallic bullion reserve and the degree of their notes’ convertibility were very dissimilar, reflecting varying local conditions. Both in terms of reserve ratios, and note denominations—the banks prudently followed charter obligations that were devised by the Japanese Treasury but, at the same time, were reminiscent of the obligations that British overseas banks also had to abide by. Thus, the findings discussed here shed light on the inception and adaptability of Japanese colonial policy in the lead-up to the Pacific War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent naval ship visits and exchanges of goodwill between China and Japan suggest an improvement in the two countries' bilateral relationship, which had been steadily deteriorating since the late 1990s. In the longer term, however, Sino-Japanese relations will likely be tested or constrained by five key sets of issues: (1) territorial and resource disputes, (2) nationalism and issues of mutual antipathy, (3) Taiwan's political status, (4) the rapid rise of China's military power, and (5) the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The manner in which these issues are managed or resolved will likely play a major role in shaping the Sino-Japanese relationship and thus the overall geopolitical environment in East Asia. A key complicating factor in the relationship, however, is the persistence of divergent worldviews: Chinese leaders appear to be more consistently persuaded by realist notions of international politics, whereas Japanese leaders tend to favor liberal-institutionalist values. The two countries may use these different lenses to view the same incident or issue, potentially creating misunderstanding and miscalculation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The East China Sea is one of the last unexplored high-potential resource areas located near large markets. But the development of oil and gas in much of the area has been prevented for decades by conflicting claims to boundaries and islets in the area by China, Taiwan, and Japan. Competition between China and Japan for gas resources in the East China Sea is intensifying and hampering improved relations. However, conflict is not inevitable. A compromise--joint development--is motivated by the realization that a positive China-Japan relationship is simply too important to be destroyed by these disputes. Although both agree in principle on joint development, the two sides have different interpretations of what joint development means or implies, and what area should be jointly developed. The article spells out three basic agreements in principle that are necessary before details of any solution can be negotiated. The alternative to a solution is continued mutual suspicion, unstable relations, unmanaged and undeveloped resources, and an increasing frequency and intensity of incidents, fueling nationalist sentiments and resultant political conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the policies of the Japanese government toward the Ryukyu Islands and the Taiwanese aboriginal territories in the 1870s, during the Meiji period. The author expresses his disagreement with various historians that the Japanese occupation of these areas was intended as aggression toward China. He instead proposes that the Japanese government sought to elevate its national security and role in the international community. He remarks on the influence of these expansionist policies on the Sino-Japanese War beginning in 1894.