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This paper provides a rigorous theoretical and empirical analysis of the effect of logrolling between interest groups on social welfare in a non-democratic political system. In particular, we focus on China, where bureaucratic interest groups are separate vertical organizations reaching down from Beijing to the provinces and cities. The key question in this paper is: what are the effects of the logrolling of parochial interest groups on state policies and social welfare in autocracies? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. The theory predicts a specific distortion in resource allocation because of logrolling, while the empirical results confirm the theoretical prediction. We find policy outcomes under logrolling are characterized by excessive spending on all the interest groups’ preferred goods and insufficient spending on public goods. We test the existence of logrolling between the Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Health in China. Our result shows logrolling between the two ministries lead to inefficiencies in social security and health care policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

'Best practice' in policymaking and institution-building for the deployment of grid-connected renewable energy (GCRE) can be found scattered throughout reports and policy papers of major international actors and in the discourse of policymakers and businesspeople. This article collects and systematizes a 'best practice' model and portrays it as a sector-specific description of a liberal market economy (LME). Also, the article provides a comparison of China's policies and institutions for GCRE with 'best practice,' finding that China's approach coincides with the latter only imperfectly. Divergences of the Chinese approach to GCRE as compared with the model can be explained, at least partially, in that 'best practice' pertains to LMEs, and given that China is arguably not an LME. Hence, the particularities of China's approach to GCRE should be understood not as obstacles to renewables but as examples of regulatory and institutional diversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: To critically review the structure of tobacco control policy making in China, examine conflicts of interest within this structure, and consider how these affected the introduction of on-pack warnings. Methods: Government policy documents and warning labels were obtained and critically reviewed. Results: Few differences exist between the on-pack warnings formerly used in China and those introduced ostensibly to meet Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) obligations. Comparison with tobacco manufactured for export or overseas consumption shows the new Chinese domestic on-pack warnings are demonstrably inferior to those required internationally. The inherent conflict of interest in the Chinese tobacco control agency structure, which must meet commercial and public health objectives, undermined the introduction of new health warnings. Conclusions To promote more effective tobacco control policies, the conflict of interest inhibiting the public health function of the State Tobacco Monopoly Administration (STMA) must be removed. Specifically, the public health function must be separated from oversight of commercial production, and packaging must be redesigned with pictorial warnings and messages compliant with Article 11 of the FCTC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]