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Several countries have pursued nuclear programs for various reasons, including energy security, environmental benefits, and technological progress. China is no exception, having pursued civilian nuclear programs since the 1970s. Existing studies depict China's nuclear policymaking as a contested bureaucratic struggle based on fragmented authoritarianism. This study, however, reveals an increasingly centralizing tendency in China's nuclear policymaking since the mid‐2000s. The central government has begun to undergird China's transition to an exporting country of nuclear technology through many policy instruments, seeing its technology as a global brand. China's accelerated promotion of the nuclear sector based on such centralization contrasts with its neighboring governments' shift away from the top–down, government‐dominant mode of policymaking to a more pluralistic and deliberative one in the post‐Fukushima era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2016 seemed to mark a critical juncture in China’s non-profit sector as the government passed several laws and regulations, including the Charity Law. This study examines this development as part of the historical evolution of legal regimes governing NGOs, and considers the contexts of these recent legal changes. By doing so, this paper aims to infer the implications for the governance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China. Compared to previous laws and regulations, those introduced by Xi Jinping’s administration suggest the party-state’s heightened willingness to acknowledge the numerical growth and diversification of NGOs and their contributions to Chinese society. However, the new laws and regulations also indicate the government’s willingness to adopt a more explicit divide-and-rule approach to NGOs. On the one hand, the government aims to actively incorporate those NGOs that it considers useful and innocuous into an increasingly institutionalized system of social governance and rule of law. On the other, the government is likely to apply the policy of outright rejection and repression to those it identifies as threatening the party-state’s authority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transboundary rivers have remained one of the sources of contention and cooperation among states in international politics. The Mekong is one such river along which China and five Southeast Asian countries have organized their political, economic, and social lives. Studies examining the water politics of this river have argued that the lack of a comprehensive institution to govern this regional common pool resource and the growing power asymmetry between China, an upstream riparian state, and its Southeast Asian neighbors dampen the prospect for an effective governance of the river. Particularly, the economic rise of China and its concomitant increase in demand for energy and water resources has raised concerns about the negative impacts that this would have on the downstream countries. Examination of recent developments regarding the Mekong River suggests, however, that China has adopted a more collaborative approach by engaging in joint development projects and exchanging information and technology via existing sub-regional and regional multilateral bodies since the early 2000s. The study concludes that this growing evidence of cooperation should be taken into consideration for a more comprehensive understanding of China's policy towards the Mekong River. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article employs the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), a set of concepts developed to account for policymaking primarily in the United States, to analyze factors that led China to downsize its latest big hydropower project, on the Nu River. The ACF helps us identify two conflicting coalitions based on their policy beliefs and the resources they mobilized to translate their beliefs into policy change, which the ACF also helps us explain. Conflict between state agencies contributed to the rise of a societally based environmental coalition to oppose a state-centered development coalition, and struggle and strategic learning between these coalitions led to interventions by the premier and a scaling down of the project from 13 dams to four. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since it was first introduced in the late 1990s, the concept of deliberative democracy has had policy appeal for both Chinese policymakers and scholars. The Chinese government has recently introduced various deliberative institutions in a top-down manner to address diverse governance challenges. Deliberation at the level of civil society, however, has remained largely limited under the Chinese authoritarian regime setting. This paper illustrates how Chinese civil society actors have increasingly exerted bottom-up pressure to attain a greater degree of deliberation, transparency, and accountability in policymaking, by using the case of a series of anti-dam campaigns conducted by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) over the past decade. Throughout their campaigns, ENGOs have urged both the central and local governments to adopt more participatory and transparent policymaking and examine the potential social and environmental impacts of large dams. They have done so particularly by invoking the very laws and policies that the government has recently introduced. This study suggests that future research on deliberative democracy in China should pay greater attention to non-state actors and their roles in practicing and promoting bottom-up deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision-making process underlying large dam construction in China used to be dominated either by powerful leaders or by bureaucratic departments pursuing parochial organizational interests. This article asks whether such state-centric explanations can be applied to China’s more contemporary hydropower development. Reconstructing the events surrounding the Nu River hydropower development project from 2003 to 2009, this study demonstrates that a wide array of nonstate actors, including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international entities, emerged as new sources of policy input and influence. They advocated the careful consideration of environmental and social impacts of large dams and public participation in policymaking. To achieve these goals, nonstate actors formed networks based on shared beliefs and preferences and engaged in rights-based activism. This study concludes nonstate actors, their preferences, and their strategies should be given more attention for a complete understanding of the evolving nature of Chinese policymaking, particularly in the domain of hydropower development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]