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Weevaluate the effect of rotating inspections carried out by China's central government in 2016 to 2017 in response to the country's air pollution crisis on the environmental performance of targeted cities and coal power plants. Using a staggered difference-indifferences (DID) design, we find that during one-month inspections concentrations of sulfur dioxide (SO2) at coal power plants in targeted cities are on average lower by 25 to 52% compared to not-yet-inspected cities but revert by 54 to 62% on average once scrutiny ends. Following inspections, SO2 pollution increases more quickly at stateowned plants accountable to the central government, compared to state-owned plants accountable to the local (city or below) government. Our results suggest that for most plants SO2 concentration changes during inspections may have been due primarily to the operation of end-of-pipe SO2 removal devices, while following inspections local state-owned plants may have reduced output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how changes in governmental and social influences affect environmental enforcement in Guangzhou city, China, between 2000 and 2006. The paper finds that a form of 'decentered regulation' has developed. Regulatory enforcement is no longer the sole affair of the government and the regulatory bureaucracy, but has been increasingly influenced by societal forces. The transformation over time shows the promises and limits of decentered regulation in Guangzhou's dynamic authoritarian setting. Analyzing a set of longitudinal survey data and qualitative interviews, the paper finds that by 2006, the rise of civil society and its increased support for protecting the environment had a double-edged impact on the enforcement of environmental regulations. The paper demonstrates that on the one hand, by 2006, when government support for enforcement was low, societal forces developed an ability to counterbalance such lack of governmental support and positively influence enforcement. However, it also shows that when government support was high, a concurrent rise in societal support created a negative effect on enforcement. Thus too much societal support can become an enforcement burden. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how configurations of external support factors have evolved alongside governance reform in recent years and how these evolving configurations have affected regulatory enforcement in four counties in Guangdong Province in China. Based on in-depth interviews with leading officials in the local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs), we show that there have been increases in government and societal support for local EPBs in their regulatory work, thanks partly to a number of recent governance reform efforts, but many problems have remained. Based on a questionnaire survey of enforcement officials, we examine how the perceptions of government and societal support are related to EPB officials’ self-perception of effectiveness. It is found that both local government support and societal support have an influence on enforcement officials’ self-assessment of effectiveness, but the relationships varied considerably depending on various dimensions of effectiveness and the patterns of interactions between government and societal support. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article examines the impact of the prevailing state ownership in the Chinese stock market on corporate governance and the financial regulatory system, respectively, as the internal and external monitoring mechanisms to deter corporate fraud and protect investors. In line with the literature that state ownership exaggerates the agency problem, we find that the retained state ownership in privatised firms increases the incidence of regulatory enforcements against fraud. For the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, larger state ownership is associated with a lower incidence of enforcement actions. This is attributed to the mutual political affiliation of the fraudulent SOEs and the regulatory commission. A new regulation ' Solutions for Listed Firm Checks' promulgated in March 2001 has mitigated this effect by empowering the regulatory commission to increase the severity of regulatory conditions. Our evidence confirms the improvement in the regulatory environment and investor protection in the Chinese stock market brought about by the regulatory reform and development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]