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The relationship between tax policy and environment is a hot topic of widespread concern. Clarifying the mechanism between them is of great significance to promote the coordinated development of economy and environment. This study constructs a theoretical framework based on the multi-sector model of general equilibrium theory to investigate the effect of tax competition on environmental pollution. It is theoretically supported that such an effect exists and is affected by environmental protection investment (EI), that is, there is a threshold effect derived from EI. The theoretical finding is confirmed by an empirical study employing the spatial panel threshold model and using China's provincial panel data from 2007 to 2019. The empirical result shows that the threshold effect of EI is significant since that lower tax competition (i.e., higher tax collection and management efficiency) tends to reduce environmental pollution when EI is below the threshold value and vice versa. In addition, we find that the effect of tax competition is regionally heterogeneous. Finally, several policy recommendations are proposed based on the theoretical and empirical results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The transition to a green, sustainable economy is largely reliant on corporate investment in the realm of environmental protection. Utilizing the adoption of the third phase of the Golden Tax Project (GTPIII) in China as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper examines how corporate environmental investment changes in response to greater tax enforcement. Our results reveal that tougher tax enforcement significantly lowers corporate environmental investment. Such an effect is stronger for firms faced by high financial constraints and those operating in non-heavy-polluting industries. Moreover, the mechanism analysis indicates that the higher tax burden induced by greater tax enforcement is the potential channel. Overall, this paper shows that stricter tax enforcement could potentially result in adverse spillover effects on corporate environmental investment, which warrants attention in tax collection practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The optimization and upgrading of industrial structure is the driving force to build a new development pattern and improve the quality and efficiency of economic development. China's "pressure-type" fiscal incentives (PTFIs) are an important perspective from which the law of industrial structure change can be analyzed. Based on the dynamic panel data of 285 cities in China and the behavioral characteristics of local governments, this paper explores the effects of PTFIs on industrial restructuring using the GMM estimation method. It is found that PTFIs are conducive to improving the "quantity" of industrial structure upgrading (ISU), but not conducive to improving the "quality" of ISU or the rationalization of industrial structure (RIS). Mechanism identification reveals that, with PTFIs, local governments influence industrial restructuring mainly by "expanding financial resources with land" (EFRWL) and increasing the intensity of tax collection and management (ITCM). Further discussion reveals that a higher degree of fiscal decentralization and environmental regulation can effectively alleviate the negative impact of PTFIs on industrial restructuring. Accordingly, this paper puts forward some policy recommendations to promote the balanced development of industrial structure, such as improving the institutional conditions and standardizing the behavior of local governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax collection and management is an important factor affecting corporate pollution emissions, but currently, few studies systematically and rigorously identify its effects. Based on China's tax collection and management reform and a microenterprise database, this paper uses a regression discontinuity design model to empirically analyze the impact of tax collection and management reform on environmental pollution and the mechanism of this impact. This study found that the tax collection and management reforms have significantly increased environmental pollution. On average, the environmental pollution of enterprises affected by the reform has increased by approximately 10.8%. This effect is more pronounced in companies with high innovation capabilities and financing constraints, companies in underdeveloped areas, zombie companies, large-scale companies, and non-labor-intensive companies. The impact mechanism analysis shows that tax collection and management reforms increase the tax burden and costs of enterprises and reduce enterprise operating performance, thereby exacerbating environmental pollution. The findings of this article help clarify the impact of government taxation decisions on environmental pollution decisions and have enlightening significance for improving taxation system design and reducing environmental pollution in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The government has issued a series of environmental laws and regulations to solve ecological problems, regulate environmental pollution, and drive enterprises to carry out green innovations. This paper constructs a theoretical framework of environmental protection subsidies, environmental tax collection, and enterprise green innovation by taking the China A-share manufacturing listed enterprises as a research sample. Further, we explore the contingency impact of the market-expected performance gap and market competition on the enterprise green innovation. The empirical results show that there is a linear positive driving relationship between environmental protection subsidies and enterprise green innovation. The relationship between environmental tax collection and enterprise green innovation is a U-shaped relationship that first inhibits and then promotes. The market expectation performance gap moderates between environmental subsidy and enterprise green innovation. Market competition plays a reinforcing role in environmental subsidy, environmental tax collection, and enterprise green innovation. These research findings are conducive to providing theoretical support and reference for the government to encourage enterprises to actively carry out green innovation in practice, thereby helping to promote green development in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through this document, it was possible to analyze the main characteristics of the volume of scientific production regarding the study of the variables Tax Collection and Microenterprises. A bibliometric analysis was proposed to analyze details such as Year of Publication, Country of Origin of the publication, Area of Knowledge in which the published research is carried out and the Type of Publication most frequently used by the authors of each document published in high-impact journals indexed in the Scopus database during the period between 2017 and 2022. Among the main findings, it was possible to determine that, for the execution of the different research methodologies, the report of 43 scientific documents related to the study of income taxes in microenterprises at a global level was achieved. The maximum number of publications made in a year was 14 papers submitted in 2022. The country of origin of the institutions that reported the highest number of records in Scopus was China with 13 documents. The area of knowledge with the greatest influence at the time of executing the research projects that resulted in scientific publications was Social Sciences with 17 documents. Finally, the type of publication most frequently used to publicize findings from the analysis of the aforementioned variables was Journal Articles, which represented 65% of the total scientific production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fiscal arrangements have significant influences on the use of land in China. The tax collection reform in 2002 stipulates that firms establish after the reform are levied by the state tax bureau while those established before the reform continue to be levied by local tax bureaus. The reform divided similar firms into two groups by the date of establishment and created a discontinuity in the tax enforcement for those firms established around the date of the reform. Based on the land transaction data on a parcel basis, we used the regression discontinuity design to study the impact of reform on industrial land prices. We found that the reform has resulted in significant discontinuities in land prices. The firms levied by the state tax authority receive lower land prices relative to the same type of firms that are levied by local tax authorities. The intuition is that tax collection reform has brought an exogenous constraint on local governments' ability to engage in tax competition. As a countermeasure, local governments use low-cost land as another way to attract investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax is the main source of national and regional income, and the efficiency of tax collection and administration is of great significance to the sustainable development. In order to improve the efficiency of tax collection and administration in the less developed regions of western China due to the slow economic development, the low volume of tax revenue, and the high cost of tax collection and administration, this study extends the two-stage DEA model to the case of asymmetric two-stage efficiency values and analyzes the tax collection and administration efficiency of Yunnan Province by the improved model. The results show that the average value of tax collection and administration efficiency of Yunnan Province in 2020 is 0.944, and the overall efficiency values of tax collection and administration in most of the states and cities are within the range of 0.8–1.0. The overall tax collection and administration efficiency of Yunnan Province is relatively ineffective and can be improved. This study also makes relevant suggestions on how to improve the efficiency of organizations to promote the sustainable development of regions and the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering the bargaining power of enterprises, this paper distinguishes between "Offering Bribes Voluntarily" (OBV) and "Offering Bribes under Pressure from Environmental Inspectors" (NOBV). An evolutionary game model between environmental inspectors and enterprises is constructed to study the corruption of environmental inspectors in the process of environmental tax collection under the system of upward accountability. At the same time, numerical simulations are carried out using China's pollution discharge data and pollution discharge fee collection standards in 2017. The results show that when enterprises have different bargaining powers, there are differences in the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) in the process of environmental tax collection. Enterprises with weak bargaining power may adopt "OBV" strategy. Under the system of upward accountability, it is difficult for the public to form adequate supervision over polluting enterprises and environmental inspectors. Only with the power of the upper-level government can the public's supervisory role be brought into play. High audit costs and environmental tax rates may be objective incentives for environmental inspectors' corruption and enterprises' bribery. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using data from China Annual Survey of Industrial Firms and addressing potential endogeneity problem, we find that corporate tax burden in China is procyclical during recessions and countercyclical during booms. The cyclicality is stronger for enterprises whose corporate income taxes are levied by Local Tax Bureau (LTB). Procyclicality of corporate tax burden during recessions is larger for enterprises located in county, non‐state‐owned enterprises (non‐SOEs), non‐high‐tech enterprises and large‐medium enterprises. Furthermore, tax quotas and growth targets of local governments enhance procyclicality during recessions and the countercyclicality of corporate tax burden during booms. Tax collection and government spending are important channels through which tax quotas and growth targets affect the cyclicality of corporate tax burden, respectively. This paper provides important policy implications for China during economic recessions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax effort is a measure of a government’s effort to collect taxes. This study explores what impacts both vertical and horizontal incentives have on local governments’ tax efforts in China. For consistency with the literature, we first include typical economic and institutional factors in our analysis. We find that the effects of economic factors on local tax efforts are significant, but the effects of institutional factors tend to be weak. Fiscal decentralization, as a vertical incentive, has a significantly positive effect on tax efforts at the provincial level. Meanwhile, fiscal interaction, as a horizontal incentive, is also taken into account in a spatial specification to explain tax competition among local governments. The results show that local tax effort in China also depends on the horizontal incentive. Hence, to improve local tax effort, the central government should let the locals have more autonomy in collecting taxes and evaluate local tax effort by referring to tax collection in adjacent provinces simultaneously. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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Local governments play dual, but conflicting, roles in China's tax system. That is, they are both tax collectors and controlling shareholders of firms subject to tax payments. We investigate how local governments balance their tax collection and tax avoidance incentives. We find that the conflicts between central and local governments arising from the 2002 tax sharing reform have led to more tax avoidance by local governmentcontrolled firms, particularly when the local government's ownership percentage of the firms is higher than the tax sharing ratio. We also find evidence that the overall level of tax avoidance by local government-controlled firms in a region is positively associated with local fiscal deficits. As a high level of government ownership of corporations and intergovernmental tax sharing are common phenomena in many transitional economies, this study offers valuable insights into how the dual roles played by local governments affect tax policy enforcement in these economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lawsuits against the government form a part of the regular functioning of legal systems in democratic countries, and responding to such lawsuits constitutes an unavoidable part of governance. However, in the context of authoritarian regimes, administrative litigation has been viewed as a distinctively valuable institution for promoting the rule of law and individual rights. Moreover, the judiciary is portrayed as the keystone to this institution and to the rule of law in general: the more powerful and competent is the judiciary, the more it is able to "constrain government" through judicial review. Through empirical and comparative analyses of over two decades of administrative litigation in China against one of the state's essential branches, tax collection, I challenge the utility of this normative conception of administrative litigation. Using conceptual tools that apply across legal systems and regulatory areas, I show that while litigant behavior as well as the regulatory environment offer useful explanations of litigation patterns such as case volume and the plaintiff win rate, the relevance of judicial quality is barely discernible. This highlights the intuitive idea that judicial review can operate only when a private party brings suit, and whether and when they will do so cannot be taken for granted. In countries with weak legal systems, the rule of law may fail in certain basic ways that even a competent and well-subsidized judiciary cannot remedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central leaders in China adopted a tax assignment system and centralized taxation in 1994 with the goal of increasing central tax revenues. By setting up the National Tax Bureau, the central leaders intended to leave central tax collection undisturbed by local influences. However, informal practices at the local level revealed that the local governments colluded with the central tax bureaucrats stationed in their regions at the expense of central interests. The need to develop local economies, an important task assigned to local governments, is one important reason behind local interference in central tax collection. This study finds that the central government coped with this problem by changing the incentives of the provincial party secretaries through linking central tax collection in a jurisdiction with their chance of promotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper documents the coinage during the Jiajing reign (1522-1566) with the objective of showing why the Ming government issued copper cash, but instead ultimately used silver bullion as its unit of account. Throughout the long reign of forty-five years, the Jiajing government attempted to establish a single form of legal money. As early as 1527, when the government cast the Jiajing coins, it considered the money as merely one of many forms of legal tender. Besides the Jiajing coin, the government also accepted tax remittances paid in various kinds of coins produced in different reigns and dynasties. This policy brought into play Gresham's law of "bad money driving out the good." Inferior coins from earlier dynasties and outlaws prevailed. As a solution, in 1552 the Jiajing emperor ordered that taxpayers should pay the government with only Jiajing coins. However, the effort to drive those inferior private coins, now in the shape of Jiajing coins, out of market was still in vain. In 1565, at last, the government gave up collecting tax payment in copper cash. It accepted silver bullion originally paid in coins. From then onwards, silver bullion played a prime role in the fiscal policy of the Ming government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Qing metropolitan and provincial officials did not have dedicated administrative funding, a fact that led to rampant malpractice. To rectify this situation, the court decided in the Yongzheng reign that all extra silver collected by officials in charge of taxes must be handed to the state treasury and that the government would pay officials a fixed amount of money as a grant in order to keep them honest. However, after the reigns of Xianfeng and Tongzhi, officials' unrestrained spending on social activities and administration and a myriad of perquisites under various names resulted in corruption in official circles and financial chaos. At the turn of the Guangxu and Xuantong reigns, a uniform standard for public expenditure was put on the agenda with a view to reforming officialdom and putting the country's financial affairs in order. But the vague concept of "public expenditure" led directly to a distortion of this institutional approach, so that it became an opportunity for officials to appropriate public funds for private use. The uniform standard for public expenditure was not put into actual practice before the demise of the Qing dynasty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking the system of levying taxes in the form of cloth as an example, Chen Yinque argued for the research finding that some Nanchao systems were adopted by the Tang Dynasty. The historical documents (like Chen Ziang's proposal to Empress Wu Zetian, the documents on governmental spending in the third year of the Yifeng Reign, and the documents of the financial department in the fourth year of the Yifeng Reign) reveal that the system of paying tax by cloth instead of grain in the Nanchao period was still in operation in the Jianghuai region of the Tang Dynasty. Before the 25th year of the Kaiyuan Reign, the tax grain collected by the government from people in the Jianghuai region was usually purchased in the vicinity of the eastern capital at the expense of the tax cloth or money. However, with the rise of the status of the Jianghuai region in the tax system and the development of Hedi ((These characters cannot be represented into ASCII text)) system along the border, the central government tended to receive tax cloth directly in the reign of Empress Wu Zetian. And in the reign of Tang Xuanzong, as a result of the further development of commodity economy and scale enlargement of Hedi and regional administrative affairs, there was an increasing demand in the central government for tax cloth that had once been regarded as an expedient. The policy of Hedi was carried out widely in the capital region, and finally confirmed the system of levying taxes in the form of cloth by issuing laws in the 25th year of the Kaiyuan Reign. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior to spending considerable resources on putting together a meaningful due diligence process, it is imperative for businesspersons to ask some major questions regarding the decision under consideration. What, explicitly, does the company hope to achieve with the transaction? What is the end game and what are the alternatives? Why is the deal better than a greenfield operation or some other business arrangement? If the transaction is to be a joint venture, will the company merely be paying tuition for a formidable competitor? In the West, the diligence team would typically sit in a war room and pore over piles of documents. This will simply not work in China, as much of the documented information is intended to mislead the tax collector or, in the case of a business, the acquirer. Any meaningful understanding of the target will come from re-creating a representation of the business from scratch using process mapping and modeling techniques based on trusted information. This article is intended to help businesses entering China conduct accurate and meaningful due diligence as they enter a market fraught with pitfalls and cultural nuances with which Westerners may not be familiar. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an analysis of of dynamics of the institutional history of the military garrison system used in the Yu subprefecture of China between the early Ming and early Qing dynasties. The influence of the system on the social structure and local administration of the Qing and Ming periods is discussed. The author looks at how the military garrison system evolved from being instituted in a local setting to influencing the tax-collection and inter-villiage networks of the Yu subprefecture.

The present paper examines the historical evolution of China's rural taxation system from the pre-reform period to the late 1990s. We propose that because of information asymmetry between the upper-level and the lower-level governments, local governments had to be granted some informal tax autonomy to fulfill the upper-level policy mandates. This easily led to excessive local informal taxation on farmers. As market liberalization of the grain sector progressed, the low-cost tax instruments implemented through the traditional approach of implicit taxation gradually eroded. Local governments in agricultural regions had to resort to informal fees collected directly from individual rural households while the more industrialized regions shifted to non-agricultural taxes that are less costly in terms of tax collection. Hence, political tension between farmers and local governments in agriculture-based regions emerged and rural tax reform became necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT: Many developing economies use tax holidays to attract foreign investment by providing a limited period of tax exemptions and reductions for qualified investors. This paper investigates the effect of tax holidays on foreign investors' tax noncompliance behavior in China's developing economy. We measure noncompliance in terms of tax audit adjustments the Chinese tax authorities require in response to avoidance and evasion. The results indicate that a company's tax-holiday position affects noncompliance. Companies are least compliant before entering a tax holiday, and most compliant while in a tax-exemption period. In addition, domestic market-oriented companies, service-oriented companies, and joint ventures are less compliant than export-oriented companies, manufacturing-oriented companies, and wholly foreign-owned enterprises, respectively. Our evidence is relevant to policymakers designing tax incentives to attract foreign investors. Our evidence on noncompliance should also help tax authorities and field auditors plan more effective and efficient tax audits. In addition, the results should provide researchers an interesting perspective to study the effect of tax-rate incentives on corporate tax noncompliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the important aspects of the hsien capital. Establishment of hsien capital for administrative convenience and for tax collection; Asessment of population growth, frontier expansion, sequent occupance and the regional economic development; Influence of cultural factors on the formation of hsien capital.

This article examines the efforts to curb smoking in China which are not working well. China accounts for one-third of the smokers in the world, about 360 million people. One in four will die from tobacco related diseases. The government takes in $30 billion a year in income from taxes and profits related to tobacco production which makes it resistant to curbing smoking rates. Second hand smoking problems are big in China too due to overcrowding and poor ventilation. There is little appreciation in the country for the adverse health effects of smoking and second hand smoking on family.