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Since the launching of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Chinese leaders have sought to diffuse this ambitious overseas infrastructure drive into the Central and Eastern European bloc. From the literature on policy diffusion, we refer here to a process whereby a dominant actor (China) has vigorously promoted a particular strand of its own domestic development policy in other emerging economies. Our focus is on the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, all EU members since 2004. We draw on Etel Solingen's (2012. Of dominoes and firewalls: the domestic, regional, and global politics of international diffusion. International Studies Quarterly, 56 (4), 631–644) seminal framework on policy diffusion, which considers the stimulus, the medium, political agents, and outcomes. It is the dearth of BRI loans and China-backed infrastructure projects in this sub-region that we seek to explain. Our main finding is that China has been its own biggest firewall in the diffusion of BRI into Central Europe. China needs to formulate policies that surpass the pursuit of its own economic interests and devise approaches that resonate with the more developed status of these three Central European countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the emergence of a rich literature on the rise of China in Latin America (LAC) since 2000, we are still grappling with this phenomenon. In this article we seek to theorize this expanding South-South relationship from two vantage points. First, from the perspective of China, we argue that, by necessity, the PRC has had to internationalize its development strategy in order to compensate for its serious natural resource deficit, feed the world's largest domestic population, and fuel the soon-to-be largest economy in the world. LAC has been just one slice of China's ‘go out’ strategy. Our second perspective probes the effect of China's entry into the region. Through the lens of development economics, we identify three separate political economy scenarios that have been accentuated within those countries that have the strongest economic ties with China. We rely on measures of institutional performance and macro-economic trends to illustrate the variable effects of China on LAC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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One of the most prominent trends in Latin America in the 2000s has been the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) across the Pacific basin. Beginning with the path-breaking Chile-Korea FTA in 2004 up to the Costa Rica-Singapore FTA in 2013, the past decade has seen the negotiation of twenty-two cross-Pacific accords. China, too, has jumped on to the cross-Pacific FTA bandwagon, including its negotiation of separate bilateral FTAs with Chile (2006), Peru (2009), and Costa Rica (2011). This paper analyzes the origins, content, and preliminary outcomes of these three China-Latin America FTAs. The findings are threefold: 1) in contrast with other cross-Pacific FTAs, which include at least one developed country, the three FTAs analyzed in this paper constitute "south-south" FTAs; yet' in contrast with other south-south FTAs, these three China-Latin America accords approximate WTO+ standards vis-a-vis the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its new trade agenda (services, investment, and intellectual property rights); 2) although the motives for negotiating these developingdeveloping country accords varied, on the part of China and the countries themselves, this did not disrupt the march toward WTO+ status; and 3) while all three of these FTAs elude standard theoretical explanations for the negotiation of bilateral FTAs, the three Latin American countries do share similar reform trajectories and institutional affinities, which sheds light on the decision and capacity of each to negotiate a bilateral FTA with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The three most prominent trends in South America in the 2000s have been: 1) the rapid expansion of trade and borrowing ties with China; 2) the collapse of both regional and multilateral trade negotiating venues since 2006; and, 3) the quick recovery of most South American countries from the 2008-10 global financial crisis. This paper analyzes the ways in which these three trends have converged and shaped the choice of development strategy in Chile and Peru, which have the strongest trade ties with China in the entire Latin American region when measured as a percent of GDP. Indeed, both countries have sought to stake out their own paths by negotiating separate bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with China and the US. Yet, although making these respective policy choices may well represent the most viable way forward for small emerging market countries which have consolidated macroeconomic reforms and are prepared to take their economic strategy to the next level, the political implications of this development path have already become more complicated than expected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of economic development have yet to fully explain the remarkable ascendance of China in the global economy. From the standpoint of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), China's reform trajectory looks nothing like the market-based policies adopted in varying degrees in the early 1990s. Rather, China's transformation has been a lesson in experimentation with various policy combinations. This raises key questions concerning how the LAC region can best contend with China's growing presence in its markets. Whereas Mexico and Central America face stiff competition from China in low and intermediate technology-based industries (textiles, electronics, auto parts), South America has experienced vibrant growth since 2002 led by raw material exports to China, but at the expense of manufacturing exports. This article analyzes new patterns of complementarity and competition in the China–LAC relationship, and it highlights the need for a more targeted competition policy on the part of the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Early-onset scoliosis (EOS), defined by an onset age of scoliosis less than 10 years, conveys significant health risk to affected children. Identification of the molecular aetiology underlying patients with EOS could provide valuable information for both clinical management and prenatal screening., Methods: In this study, we consecutively recruited a cohort of 447 Chinese patients with operative EOS. We performed exome sequencing (ES) screening on these individuals and their available family members (totaling 670 subjects). Another cohort of 13 patients with idiopathic early-onset scoliosis (IEOS) from the USA who underwent ES was also recruited., Results: After ES data processing and variant interpretation, we detected molecular diagnostic variants in 92 out of 447 (20.6%) Chinese patients with EOS, including 8 patients with molecular confirmation of their clinical diagnosis and 84 patients with molecular diagnoses of previously unrecognised diseases underlying scoliosis. One out of 13 patients with IEOS from the US cohort was molecularly diagnosed. The age at presentation, the number of organ systems involved and the Cobb angle were the three top features predictive of a molecular diagnosis., Conclusion: ES enabled the molecular diagnosis/classification of patients with EOS. Specific clinical features/feature pairs are able to indicate the likelihood of gaining a molecular diagnosis through ES., Competing Interests: Competing interests: JRL has stock ownership in 23andMe, is a paid consultant for Regeneron Pharmaceuticals and Novartis and is a coinventor on multiple US and European patents related to molecular diagnostics for inherited neuropathies, eye diseases and bacterial genomic fingerprinting. The Department of Molecular and Human Genetics at Baylor College of Medicine derives revenue from the chromosomal microarray analysis (by comparative genomic hybridisation microarray and/or single-nucleotide polymorphism arrays), clinical exome sequencing and whole-genome sequencing offered in the Baylor Genetics Laboratory (http://bmgl.com)., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)