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The construction sector in Colombia is fundamental to provide the infrastructure necessary for the progress of society. It also responds favorably to changes in economic dynamics by creating jobs, moving raw materials, stimulating and developing other economic sectors. These tasks are sustained by business performance, which is considered the fundamental pillar of market economies. Likewise, business management is directly related to innovation, by applying new productive activities in employment, trade and service formulations. However, Colombian business park is mostly composed of micro and small enterprises, which exhibit limitations in their organizational structure. This limits their performance in direct participation in complex state construction projects in a changing economic environment dependent on international market phenomena. Therefore, this research analysed the economic environment of the building subsector, through the formulation of a methodology to select and characterize the companies of the building construction subsector in Boyacá. In addition, business capabilities were identified through the estimation of financial and organizational statements when compared with a representative sample of public bids for building construction. The above exposed the complex conditions in housing construction as a leader in the building subsector. In addition, 95.83% of the companies in Boyacá do not have the conditions to participate in public procurement due to organizational limitations that characterize the Colombian business park. These phenomena, together with the effects of the recent economic crises, have affected the economic growth of the building activity, despite institutional efforts to encourage production through investment in construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This document analyzes and assesses the new PPP legal model adopted in Colombia in 2012 using the framework of the governmental program Fourth Generation of Road Concessions (4G). The principal objective is to establish whether the new model responds to or reflects the principal criticisms, problems, risks and recommendations collected throughout 20 years of concession experiences and disclosed in economic studies. Such concerns are mainly dominated by costly and increasing renegotiations, delays in the provision of roads, high rates of litigation and a cumulative gap in transport infrastructures. This paper uses economic theories such as the principal-agent problem and game theory to expose the solutions to previous mistakes presented in the new PPP model and reveal the potential risks that remain for the model in relation to implementation that could lead to the failure of the 4G Program. Overall, it aims to provide recommendations for the minimization of misleading information and the breaking down of a transcendental central government program of public works provision for the competitiveness of Colombia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public bidding is a common mechanism used by states to promote competition in public procurement. However, the competition generated by public bidding may be blocked by two anticompetitive practices: collusion and corruption. Two different problems with a common effect: that the public contract will not be awarded on the basis of merit or efficiency, thereby affecting competitiveness. This paper analyzes the tools available for the Colombian competition agency for fighting collusion and corruption in public bids. We highlight the importance of strategic assistance to public agencies by the competition office at the moment of designing and executing the bidding process, in accordance with international recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]