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This article was submitted in late 2021, and became dated after Russia’s demonstrative preparation as well as start of an open, large-scale invasion of Ukraine early 2022. We nevertheless publish this commentary here in order to document the debate about the events leading to the escalation. No adaptations to the original 2021 article were made after the outbreak of high-intensity war on 24 February 2022. Avoiding a larger military escalation in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict is an important aim. Yet, historical experience suggests that concessions Ukraine or its Western partners toward Russian revanchist aspirations in Donbas may not help achieve it. On the contrary, Western softness, and Ukrainian weakness vis-à-vis the Kremlin will lead to further confrontation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the concept of offensive coercive diplomacy, this article examines Russia's strategy in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine and addresses the question of why Russia has failed to achieve its objectives. Through an analysis of notions such as "status quo" (in terms of who overturned it) and international law (in terms of who violated it), I attempt to show that Russia's actions in Eastern Ukraine qualify as offensive coercion. Backed up by force, Russia demanded that Ukraine implement a decentralization process and grant a part of Eastern Ukraine (Donbas) special status. Knowing that Russia's aim is to use Donbas as an instrument to control its political future, Ukraine refused to acquiesce to Russia's demand without restoring its sovereignty in Eastern Ukraine. With both sides refusing to budge, the crisis turned into a zero-sum game. This article seeks to contribute to research on coercive diplomacy by focusing on offensive coercion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]