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This study examines the Japanese-American alliance and its implications for multilateral cooperation in East Asia through neorealist and neoliberalist perspectives. For neorealists, the US-Japan alliance serves as a mechanism for maintaining regional stability by deterring potential aggressors, particularly in the face of growing Chinese influence and the North Korean threat. It is a manifestation of power politics, as it strengthens the security capabilities of both nations, indirectly influencing the balance of power in East Asia. However, neorealism highlights the potential for alliance dynamics to create security dilemmas, potentially exacerbating tensions in the region. Neoliberals in return underscores the alliance’s capacity to promote multilateral cooperation in East Asia. In addition to provide a stable security environment, it serves as a foundation upon which broader regional security setup and cooperative initiatives can be built, fostering trust and collaboration among regional states. This setup will be neoliberalist in shape but neorealist in essence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article poses the question of why, after having consistently pursued an isolationist strategy of avoiding security ties with partners other than the US, and having followed the US in opposing regional security multilateralism, did Japan suddenly reverse course and get out in front of the US with its first post-war regional security initiative. This article addresses this question by tracing the internal debates, policy process and motivations that drove Japan to reverse its position, a process that transformed Japan into the leading champion of regional security multilateralism in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) made its annual fact-finding visit to Taipei, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo from October 13–27 to discuss the current troubled security environment in East Asia with officials, scholars, and think tanks. This report highlights the findings of this mission and puts forth a number of policy recommendations for official consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on significant changes to Japan's defense policies under the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who is behind the initiative for the country's return as a "first-tier" power and the vision for a U.S. - Japan "Alliance of Hope." Topics discussed include efforts to reform the geographical and substantive scope of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) before the Abe administration, changes made in the country's security policy since Abe's return in 2012 including the National Security Strategy and an updated National Defense Program Guidelines and the truth behind concerns over Japan's return to militarism and threat to regional peace and stability under Abe's leadership.

The international order in East Asia has been anchored on four pillars. The first pillar is the 1952 San Francisco peace treaty between the United States and Japan. The US-Japan mutual defense treaty was signed and Japan became demilitarized and its foreign policy was oriented toward the United States. Japan adopted the 'peace' constitution. The second is the US-China Shanghai Communiqué of 1972. In this document, Nixon and Mao agreed that neither of their countries nor any power should seek hegemony in the Asia- Pacific region. The third pillar is the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration. China recognized the US-Japan military alliance and Japan, in turn, recognized China as the sole legitimate government. The last is the 1965 ROK-Japan treaty to normalize bilateral relations. Japan recognized the ROK as the sole legitimate government representing the Korean people and nullified the treaties that led to Japan's forceful annexation of Korea in 1910. In the 2010s, tensions and disputes between the United States and China and between China and Japan are undermining the four pillars of order. The United States, China, and Japan are now engaged in a dangerous power game to create a new international order in this turbulent region. China's foreign policy toward East Asia will be predicated on three strategies. China will resort to soft balancing in dealing with the United States, unilateralism with Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, and multilateralism vis-à-vis the remaining countries in East Asia. 'The Asianization of China' would be a solution for future peace and prosperity in this region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the early 20th century, East Asia's international relations had undergone profound changes that the biggest feature was the rise of Japan. Japan was the perpetrator of all of the large - scale war in East Asia since it pursued the mainland policy of aggression and expansion. In nearly half a century, the main contradiction in East Asia was Japan's continued aggression against China. Then, the US - led powers established the Washington System in order to constraint Japan to dominate the East Asian. However, Japan's objective of its East Asian policy was that Japan tried to establish a Japan- led East Asian New Order so Japan hunched an all - out war of aggression China and tried to break completely Washington System on the Anglo - American war to establish a Japan - led "New Order in Greater East Asia". At last, Japan's policy ultimately ended in failure because China and the international community were unanimous opposition and resistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's opinion on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which took effect in January 1960. The purpose of the treaty is discussed, noting that the U.S. is responsible to come to Japan's defense if they are attacked by another country. The author feels that the treaty will be ratified due to events in East Asia and circumstances surrounding the status of U.S. military forces. Additional events discussed include the election of Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio and the minority power of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party.

The article discusses concerns within the government of Japan regarding the goal of global nuclear disarmament set by U.S. President Barack Obama. Japan's reliance on the U.S. nuclear capability for its defense and its regional influence is discussed, as are the uneasy relations between Japan and its neighbors in East Asia, including the nuclear-armed North Korea. Also discussed is the possibility that Japan might opt to pursue its own nuclear weapons capability, and the implications of such a move for regional security.

Japan has pursued a grand strategy of creating an East Asian maritime order with a special emphasis on situating a U.S.-Japan-China trilateral arrangement, based on cooperative security, at the core of an East Asian maritime regime. The United States and China have slowly adopted some of this Japanese strategy. This article examines the lessons East Asia has learned from several maritime security initiatives-America's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), Japan's ReCAAP, and Southeast Asia's MALSINDO-that were applied to the anti-piracy operations off the Somali coast and the Gulf of Aden. Despite the influence of Japan's strategy for maritime security, paradoxically it has responded more slowly in its deployment to the Gulf of Aden, contributing to the traditional image of Japan as a reactive state. The institutional design of maritime regimes in the Gulf of Aden and in East Asia is thus incrementally unfolding; maritime cooperation is taking place in an ad hoc, bottom-up manner with very uncertain outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past decade, the US-Japan alliance has been strengthened and subtly but substantively transformed. In response to a range of domestic changes and new international challenges, a relationship that was becoming frayed in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War has been rejuvenated and re-tooled with significant consequences far East Asia's strategic setting. This article provides a critical analysis of this process with two ends in mind. First, it provides a systematic overview of the changes, their sources and what they mean for the alliance partners and their security interests. It argues that the US-Japan alliance now has two distinct functions, one relating to regional stability and the other focusing on shared global strategic aims. The alliance is in good health, but its continued vitality will require careful management. Second, it assesses the regional consequences of this change and argues that while alliance enhancement has been intended to promote mutual and regional security there is reason to doubt whether the latter goal has been served through the enhancement process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the regional security agenda in East Asia. It notes the involvement of the U.S. in the process of change and dialogue on security issues in the region. It mentions the increasing concern over the long-term growth of China's economic power, indicating its defence modernization. It also cites the significant contribution of U.S. military presence and political engagement to regional stability and sustainment of Japan's acceptability. Moreover, it highlights the U.S.-Japan alliance which is aimed at promoting economic cooperation and maintenance of international peace and security.

We compare the association between educational attainment and housework participation among single and married women in Japan and the US. Using the cross-sectional time-use diaries from the 2006 American Time Use Survey (ATUS) and the 2006 Japanese Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities (STULA) and unconditional quantile regressions (UQR), we test whether educational attainment is associated with less time spent on housework in Japan compared to the US. We find that this assumption stands only for American women and non-married Japanese women. However, married Japanese women are unlikely to reduce participation in housework with an increase in their educational level. Married Japanese women are more likely to do more housework proportionately to the level of their education. The findings reveal the presence of a marriage penalty among highly educated Japanese women. In Japan, the institute of marriage places higher expectations regarding women's housework participation on married women with higher levels of education, thereby penalising Japanese women with higher educational attainments. Our findings illustrate that the tenets of the resource-based and gender-centred frameworks developed based on the empirical findings in Western countries cannot always directly apply to the patterns observed in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regular convening of East Asian summits and rising concerns about the American dollar have heightened interest in Asian cooperation. Japan will necessarily play a central role in regional endeavors, and the United States must at least acquiesce if regional coordination is to progress. Among American accounts, the most theoretically elaborate and systematically comparative analysis is A World of Regions, while Remapping East Asia provides the most authoritative overview of recent developments. Japanese-language studies of East Asian regionalism agree that regional cooperation is far less institutionalized and rule-based in East Asia than in Europe, but they include a wider range of opinion about the desirability and feasibility of cooperation. Skeptics on the right warn that efforts to create a regional community would weaken the United States–Japan alliance, undermine universal values, and cede regional leadership to China. Optimists on the left counter that regional cooperation holds out the only hope for ameliorating nationalist conflicts. Most numerous are centrists arguing for active cooperation on economics and the environment, but only cautious moves on politics and security. Despite their caution, Japanese authors convey a sense that changes to the American-led global and regional order are occurring and likely will continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]