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This article suggests that variations in the dominant pattern of innovation policy coordination can be analysed and understood effectively by dividing innovation and other complementary socio-economic policies into low-complexity and high-complexity tasks. The effective implementation of these two sets of policy tasks that differ in the extent, nature and intractability of collective action problems confronting the coordination process hinges on the strength of two sociopolitical institutions: bureaucratic organizational structures and interactive governing arrangements. While bureaucratic organizational structures are better suited to delivering low-complexity tasks, interactive governing arrangements are more effective in resolving high-complexity policy problems. They interact differently across political economies to structure the management of coordination challenges and thus give rise to divergent patterns of innovation policy-making. The comparative analysis of innovation policy coordination between Hong Kong and Singapore over the past two decades lends strong support to the central theoretical propositions of the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main argument to be developed in this article posits that fundamental changes and variations in the financial market structure of East Asian economies have been predicated on the emergence and configuration of the dominant coalitions. The coalitions have been forged by private market agents, economic policymakers and political elites who have developed particular interests in financial market changes as a response to economic and political imperatives both at home and abroad. In East Asia, the dominant coalitions that have borne crucially on regulatory rules and market practices have differed in the policy preferences of key actors in the coalitions and the power structures of these coalitions. It is these differences that have exerted divergent shaping influences on financial market development. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The dominant institutions of economic governance vary considerably between countries in both Northeast and Southeast Asia, generating four nationally distinct varieties of political–economic organization in terms of varying state direction of the economy and degree of business co-ordination of economic activities: co-governed, state-led, networked and personalized. In the 1980s, Malaysia and Taiwan represented more the state-led variety of capitalist development, while Japan and Thailand shared many characteristics of the networked form. In the 1990s and 2000s, these four political economies began to change, but to different degrees and in different directions. In particular, Taiwan became more similar to the co-governed variety of capitalism, while the degree of business co-ordination declined significantly in Thailand so that its political economy became more personalized. These contrasting kinds of changes in the four economies can best be explained by shifts in the interest and power configurations of dominant coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Focuses on the long-running debate concerning the changing nature of state-society relations in the development process in East Asia and other developing countries. Concept of the state-market condominium as alternative approach to the political economy of development; State-market condominium approach has been articulated within the national setting of industrial policy management and financial market governance in East Asian industrializing economies.

pragmatic and long-term approach to financial market reform, with greater sensitivity to political risks and constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]