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This article compares the failed military coups in Ecuador (2000) and Venezuela (2002) with the successful 1999 military putsch in Pakistan in order to identify what factors affect coup outcomes in third-wave democracies. The unity of the armed forces in support of the Pakistani coup, and its division in the two Latin American cases, are critical in explaining the divergent outcomes. In turn, the degree of cohesion within the military in each case was affected by perceptions of domestic support and international reaction to military rule. In Ecuador and Venezuela there was greater public antipathy for military rule and stronger international opposition. This increased the armed forces' perceptions of the costs of governing, fostering divisions within the officer corps that ultimately scuttled the coups. In contrast, the successful coup in Pakistan was largely attributable to the unified military, which was a product of greater domestic and international tolerance of military rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]