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In England and Wales, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, (CJA), s. 55(3) introduced into statute 'fear of serious violence' as a ground (or 'a trigger') for loss of control manslaughter. It was intended to take into account the circumstances of women who in self-preservation kill abusive and violent intimate partners. Despite this important reform, a woman who defends herself from a partner's abuse and violence in both manslaughter and self-defence pleadings continues to be assessed with reference to a masculinist interpretation of what is reasonable through the anthropomorphic 'reasonable man/person,' and loss of control still underpins voluntary manslaughter. In Canada, the homicide provisions in the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, were amended in 2012 to reframe the law of self-defence (s. 34) and in 2015 to revise the law of provocation by which culpable homicide can be reduced to manslaughter (s. 232), with neither amendment accounting explicitly for the circumstances of women who kill abusive partners. In both jurisdictions despite revisions to the legal construct of 'loss of control manslaughter' (England and Wales) or the provocation defence (Canada), the common law underpinnings of these defences and jurors' perceptions of what constitutes or what can trigger 'loss of control' continues to inform such pleadings whilst the law on self-defence (with its masculinist requirements and interpretation of proportionality and reasonableness) remains largely inaccessible to the abused woman who defends herself from an intimate partner's violence and abuse. This article explores the legal developments in both jurisdictions and their limitations through an analysis of the substantive law and recent case law. The number of women who kill violent and abusive partners and the legal outcomes, the methods used to kill and the ways in which substantive law and legal actors disadvantage those who use a weapon eschewing women's disproportionate size and strength, are all considered. The article concludes with proposals for further reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In the recent case of R v. Taj, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales upheld the conviction of a defendant who, in a psychotic delusional state, mistook his non-threatening victim to be a terrorist, violently attacking him. The law typically allows honest mistakes (even if unreasonable) as a basis for self-defence (in this case the defence of others). However, because Taj's delusions were found by the court to have been caused by voluntary alcohol consumption, special legal (prior-fault) intoxication rules were applied to block his defence; Taj was convicted and sentenced to 19 years imprisonment for attempted murder., Argument: We focus here on the simple question-what does it mean to be intoxicated? On the facts, Taj did not have drugs active in his system at the time of the attack, but the court nonetheless insisted that Taj's delusional mistake was 'attributable to intoxication'; namely, to drink- and drug-taking in the previous days and weeks. This extended conception of intoxication was questionably distinguished from psychosis induced by withdrawal. Furthermore, the court was unreceptive to evidence of a long-standing, underlying mental health disorder. We argue that the court's expanded view of intoxication is problematic, in that intoxication-induced psychosis cannot be sharply distinguished from other causes such as mental disorders; and even if it could be distinguished, it should not give rise to blame and punishment in the same way as does conduct induced by chemically active intoxicants ('drug-on-board')., Conclusion: The courts' expansion of the definition of intoxication is both legally and forensically problematic, introducing legal vagaries where the clinical science is already vague; and with intoxication frequently interlocking with historic intoxication and secondary or comorbid mental health conditions, the decision risks inappropriately and/or over-criminalizing defendants., (© 2020 Society for the Study of Addiction.)