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Why do voters in developed democracies support right-wing populist parties? Existing research focuses on economic and cultural vulnerability as driving this phenomenon. We hypothesize that perceptions of personal health vulnerability might have a similar influence on voters. To test this argument, we analyzed all waves of the European Social Survey (2002–2020). Our findings suggest that voters with worse self-reported health were significantly more likely to vote for right-wing populist parties. The relationship persists even after accounting for measures of cultural and economic vulnerability, as well as voters' satisfaction with both their personal lives and their country's health system. The influence of health on support for right-wing populist parties appears to be greater than that of income and self-reported economic insecurity, while less than that of gender and attitudes about immigrants. Our findings suggest that policies affecting public health could shape not only health outcomes but also the political landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using new scaling methods and a comprehensive public opinion dataset, we develop the first survey-based time-series–cross-sectional measures of policy ideology in European mass publics. Our dataset covers 27 countries and 36 years and contains nearly 2.7 million survey responses to 109 unique issue questions. Estimating an ordinal group-level IRT model in each of four issue domains, we obtain biennial estimates of the absolute economic conservatism, relative economic conservatism, social conservatism, and immigration conservatism of men and women in three age categories in each country. Aggregating the group-level estimates yields estimates of the average conservatism in national publics in each biennium between 1981–82 and 2015–16. The four measures exhibit contrasting cross-sectional cleavages and distinct temporal dynamics, illustrating the multidimensionality of mass ideology in Europe. Subjecting our measures to a series of validation tests, we show that the constructs they measure are distinct and substantively important and that they perform as well as or better than one-dimensional proxies for mass conservatism (left–right self-placement and median voter scores). We foresee many uses for these scores by scholars of public opinion, electoral behavior, representation, and policy feedback. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous studies show that ruling parties paid a political price for the recent economic crisis. Yet the degree to which the most-affected households held the government accountable for their personal economic misfortune during the crisis remains an open question. Survey data from 21 countries in Europe and Central Asia show that individuals whose income was adversely affected by the crisis, who had to curtail spending to make ends meet, or who tried to increase their income were more likely to disapprove of incumbent governments than were those who were less directly affected. Panel data from the Netherlands confirms that drops in income during the crisis led to lower levels of government support. While politicians were held accountable for the crisis generally, households that suffered economic pain held their governments accountable for their losses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although public support for political authorities, institutions, and even regimes is affected by the delivery of positive economic outcomes, we know that judgments on authorities are also made on the basis of several other aspects that fall into the general theme of “procedural fairness.” So far, most of the literature examining satisfaction with democracy has, from this point of view, focused on the direct effects of both economic and procedural fairness indicators or evaluations. This study takes as its starting point a large number of studies in social psychology showing that procedural fairness moderates the effects of outcome favorability in the explanation of citizens’ reactions to authorities. It expands those findings to the macro-political level, using representative samples of European populations in twenty-nine countries. It reveals that the general depiction of satisfaction with the way democracies work in practice as a fundamentally “performance-driven attitude” needs to qualified: economic evaluations matter, but they do not matter in the same way in all contexts and for all people, with procedural fairness playing a relevant moderating role in this respect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe is experiencing rapidly accelerating poverty and social exclusion, following half a decade of financial crisis and austerity politics. The key problem behind Europe's malaise, in our view, is the economic disenfranchisement of large parts of its population in the winner-takes-all-society. This article proposes that we examine the contribution of republican political theory as a distinctive approach that provides us with the conceptual and normative resources to reclaim what we call the political economy of democracy, the constellation of political and economic institutions aimed at promoting broad economic sovereignty and individuals’ capacities to govern their own lives. This article identifies three key ideas that together constitute a distinctively republican approach to political economy: (1) establish an economic floor; (2) impose an economic ceiling to counter excess economic inequality; and (3) democratize the governance and regulation of the main economic institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The electoral consequences of the Great Recession are analysed in this article by combining insights from economic voting theories and the literature on party system change. Taking cues from these two theoretical perspectives, the impact of the Great Recession on the stability and change of Western, Central and Eastern European party systems is assessed. The article starts from the premise that, in order to fully assess the impact of the contemporary crisis, classic economic voting hypotheses focused on incumbent parties need to be combined with accounts of long-term party system change provided by realignment and dealignment theories. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset of election results and economic and political indicators in 30 European democracies. The results indicate that during the Great Recession economic strain was associated with sizable losses for incumbent parties and an increasing destabilisation of Western European party systems, while its impact was significantly weaker in Central and Eastern European countries, where political rather than economic failures appeared to be more relevant. In line with the realignment perspective, the results also reveal that in Western Europe populist radical right, radical left and non-mainstream parties benefited the most from the economic hardship, while support for mainstream parties decreased further. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a country comparative case based methodology that combines the methods of Cluster Analysis and Qualitative Comparative Analysis, this article examines whether there is any quantitative evidence that countries which are members of the euro currency have experienced a convergence of the outputs and outcome of the European welfare state for euro member countries. The analysis concludes there is little evidence of a holistic euro based convergence of either welfare outputs or outcome. It is argued that outputs such as full employment, equity of health care provision, poverty reduction and educational attainment might reasonably be expected to converge in the longer term, but only if the euro crisis results in a much more planned and coordinated interventionist policy approach to the macro political economy. An outcome, however, such as subjective well-being, is potentially influenced by other historical and cultural factors and is only partially determined by macro political economic policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the social and political conditions in Europe, contending that the definitions of the political left and right have been called into question by anti-establishment radicalism. An overview of radical political parties in the European Parliament, including the Greek political party Golden Dawn, the Austria political party the Freedom Party of Austria and the Hungarian political party Jobbik, is provided. European economic conditions' impact on politics, including in regard to unemployment and stagnant wages, are discussed.

The article discusses the European political left and social democracy from the 1970s through the mid 2010s, including the impact of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis on the left. An overview of neoliberalism in Europe, including in regard to the blame received by European social democratic parties for the Sovereign Debt Crisis is provided. An overview of the role that economic conditions in Europe play in politics on the continent, including regard to British Labor Party chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown's praise of the British economy, is also provided.

Orthodox integration scholarship failed to identify the factors leading to the euro area (EA) economic and financial crisis because of weaknesses that Horkheimer identified in ‘traditional’ theory: disciplinary splits and a tendency to idealize from particular instrumental perspectives. By contrast, critical political economy offered a plausible and coherent elucidation of the emergent properties and limits of finance-led capitalism and their concrete manifestation in the EA. This contribution both reviews state-of-the-art critical political economy research on the EA crisis and makes a distinct contribution to it. In addressing the puzzle of why not only the Economic and Monetary Union persists despite morbid symptoms but why crisis management is extending and deepening a discredited finance-led capitalism, the contribution synthesizes theories of transnational class formation and inter-state relations, and proposes that Europe is caught in an ordoliberal iron cage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper uses a new age period cohort model to show that among cohorts born between 1935 and 1975, cohorts born around 1950 are significantly above the income trend in most countries. However, such inequalities between generations are much stronger in conservative, continental European welfare states, compared to social democratic and liberal welfare states. As we show, this is because conservative welfare states expose some cohorts to high youth unemployment and make lifetime earnings dependent on a favorable entry into the labor market. We thus demonstrate that conservative welfare states have put the burden of adjustment to the post-1975 economic slowdown on birth cohorts that could not get stable jobs before 1975, while similar cohort inequalities are much weaker in liberal and social democratic welfare states. In these latter two welfare regimes, the burden of adjustment to the post-1975 economic slowdown was not put on the shoulders of some cohorts relative to others. Our analysis is the first to show which welfare regimes are more conducive to such inequalities between cohorts and what mechanisms lead to these material cohort inequalities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates the levels of owner influence in 211 different print and broadcast outlets in 32 different European media markets. Drawing on the literature from industrial organization, it sets out reasons why we should expect greater levels of influence where ownership of individual outlets is concentrated, where it is concentrated in the hands of individuals or families and where ownership groups own multiple outlets in the same media market. Conversely, we should expect lower levels of influence where ownership is dispersed between transnational companies. The article uses original data on the ownership structures of these outlets and combines it with reliable expert judgements as to the level of owner influence in each of the outlets. These hypotheses are tested and confirmed in a multilevel regression model of owner influence. The findings are relevant for policy on ownership limits in the media and for the debate over transnational versus local control of media. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses political and social turmoil in Greece as of 2014. Topics include efforts to prosecute corrupt political and business leaders, political violence surrounding the far right Golden Dawn political party, and Greece's fiscal and economic crisis involving public debt that began in 2009. Also addressed are the social impact of government austerity measures, internal devaluation that lowered the minimum wage, and the prospects of liberal or center left politicians in 2014.

The article analyzes the potential for far right political parties to gain ground in May 2014 elections for the European Union's (EU's) European Parliament (EP). Parties noted include the French National Front (FN), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), and the Golden Dawn party in Greece. Other topics include the economic impact of the Great Recession in 2008 on far right parties, differences between extreme and radical political parties, and the notion of second-order election cycles.

In the 1990s, anti-globalization movements began contesting the effects of neoliberal policies and their social consequences, organizing several protests in Seattle (1999), Genoa (2001), New York (2002), targeting institutions such as the G-8 group or the World Trade Organization (WTO). After the financial crisis of 2008 in the United States, other social movements of resistance to capitalism began to protest in the streets of the U.S. and Europe, among which are the Indignados (Spain), Occupy Wall Street (USA) and Geração à Rasca (Portugal). The purpose of this article is to perform a theoretical analysis, based on contemporary social science authors, of the social movements that emerged after the financial crisis of 2008, placing them in the context of contemporary capitalism. It concludes that, despite the increased incidence of such social movements worldwide, the present context of economic recession still causes high unemployment rates in the countries most affected by the crisis, the environment remains threatened and most political parties suffer a big crisis of representation within civil society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the idea that intervention in the labour market through the suspension of labour rights and freedoms, fear and a fall in purchasing power all played a key role in achieving political and economic objectives in the regimes of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin. However, in each of these cases, the success of this policy was not as had been expected. These European experiences were essential for the configuration of the labour framework in the Franco dictatorship. The iron-fisted control of the labour market came to Spain through legal texts and institutions that were in many cases a blatant copy of those applied in Italy and Germany. In spite of the ideological distance between them, we can also find some common traits with Stalin's labour policies. The results obtained were even worse for Spain, and the negative effects on the economy were more serious, due to the greater longevity of the Spanish dictatorship. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the effects of organizational memory on decision making with particular reference to British foreign policy regarding trade with Bulgaria in the years immediately preceding the Second World War. It argues that British policy, in conjunction with that of other Allied powers, pushed Bulgaria into a state of economic dependence on Nazi Germany. Bulgaria desired neutrality but eventually had to succumb to the pressures of its economic lifeline and join the war on the side of the Axis powers. These British policies were heavily influenced by the institutional memory of Bulgaria as an enemy from the First World War. The particulars of the organizational structure of the British Foreign Office meant little change in policy would occur right up to the beginning of the war, in spite of the recognized strategic importance of Bulgaria becoming an Allied partner or, at least, remaining neutral. This structure also contributed to an ongoing cultural bias that further reinforced rigidity in British policy development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the issues on political economy and austerity in Europe. It states that former Prime Minister Andreas George Papandreou has proposed a legislative act for the Greek society to own and take responsibility for austerity. It says that the conflict against austerity is a battle for the basic supply of human needs, clothing, and housing. It adds that anti-austerity identifies a political task of reconstituting capitalism in the workers' interest.

The article provides comments on the controversies involving Germany's Bundesbank and Great Britain's Bank of England. Topics discussed include pressure on European nations to modernize their financial institutions due to the proposed single currency in the region, the need for the Bundesbank to surrender some power to Europe and the Bank of England's need to regain some power over the use to which money it nominally controls is actually put.