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This paper investigates the relationship between loan-loss provisions (LLPs) and earnings management in the context of the capital adequacy of Euro Area (EA) banks versus non-EA credit institutions. This paper also examines whether LLPs signal managements’ expectations concerning future bank profits to investors. Additionally, this paper traces the role of bank regulations and creditor protection systems in explaining income smoothing. Evidence drawn from the 1996 to 2006 period indicates that LLPs do reflect changes in the expected quality of a bank's loan portfolio for both groups of banks, and that earnings management is an important determinant of LLPs for EA intermediaries, whereas non-EA credit institutions use LLPs to signal private information to outsiders. The paper also finds that higher protection of creditors’ rights significantly reduces the incentives to smooth earnings for EA banks. During the recent financial crisis, EA bank managers are much more concerned with their credit portfolio quality and do not use LLPs for discretionary purposes, whereas LLPs at non-EA banks are used to smooth income more than for the purposes of managing capital ratios or conveying private information about future performance to the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank aggressively lowered interest rates during the recent crisis. Both actions were at odds with an anti-inflationary policy stance: in August 2007, inflation expectations were high, particularly in the United States. To explain these actions, we model an economy with a leveraged and regulated financial sector. We find optional Taylor rules using simulated GMM, and find rules consistent with a pro-inflationary reaction during financial crises and a standard output-inflation mandate for the central bank. Our results support procyclical regulation not because of adequacy concerns, but instead due to the impact on monetary policy. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This paper examines the implications of mandatory IFRS adoption on the accounting quality of banks in twelve EU countries. Specifically, we analyse how the change in the recognition and measurement of banks' main operating accrual item, the loan loss provision, affects income smoothing behaviour and timely loss recognition. We find that the restriction to recognise only incurred losses under IAS 39 significantly reduces income smoothing. This effect is less pronounced in countries with stricter bank supervision, widely dispersed bank ownership and for EU banks cross-listed in the US. This provides additional evidence that institutions matter in shaping financial reporting outcomes. Further, the application of the incurred loss approach results in less timely loan loss recognition implying delayed recognition of future expected losses. In the light of the ongoing financial crisis it is questionable whether this is a desirable financial reporting outcome of mandatory IFRS adoption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Banks within Europe have become larger and more international as Europe has moved towards a unified financial services market, but this trend has been reversed since the crisis. In order to establish the effect of these structural changes on output in Europe, we use a micro data set to investigate the impact of size (as measured by asset size) on banks' net interest margins. We show that larger banks offer lower borrowing costs for firms, which raises sustainable output. We then use NiGEM to look at the impact of banks becoming smaller and moving back into their home territory. We investigate the impacts on output according to country size, showing that the effects are generally larger in small countries, and also larger in economies that are more dependent on bank finance for their business investment decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial stability in Europe has received renewed attention with the advent of EMU. This paper examines whether EU country banking systems are particularly vulnerable to systemic risk. Our approach is to explore episodes of banking sector distress for a large sample of countries, highlighting the experience of the EU. We estimate multivariate probit models linking the likelihood of banking problems to a set of macroeconomic variables and institutional characteristics such as aspects of bank supervision and regulation, restrictions on bank portfolios, and development of the banking system. Given these characteristics, the model predicts a low probability of banking sector distress in EMU countries. JEL classification: G21; E44; F41. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]