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The reverse zoonotic events that introduced the 2009 pandemic influenza virus into pigs have drastically increased the diversity of swine influenza viruses in Europe. The pandemic potential of these novel reassortments is still unclear, necessitating enhanced surveillance of European pigs with additional focus on risk assessment of these new viruses. In this study, four European swine influenza viruses were assessed for their zoonotic potential. Two of the four viruses were enzootic viruses of subtype H1N2 (with avian-like H1) and H3N2, and two were new reassortants, one with avian-like H1 and human-like N2 and one with 2009 pandemic H1 and swine-like N2. All viruses replicated to high titres in nasal wash and nasal turbinate samples from inoculated ferrets and transmitted efficiently by direct contact. Only the H3N2 virus transmitted to naïve ferrets via the airborne route. Growth kinetics using a differentiated human bronchial epithelial cell line showed that all four viruses were able to replicate to high titres. Further, the viruses revealed preferential binding to the 2,6-α-silalylated glycans and investigation of the antiviral susceptibility of the viruses revealed that all were sensitive to neuraminidase inhibitors. These findings suggested that these viruses have the potential to infect humans and further underline the need for continued surveillance as well as biological characterization of new influenza A viruses.

The 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus (pH1N1) was derived through reassortment of North American triple reassortant and Eurasian avian-like swine influenza viruses (SIVs). To date, when, how and where the pH1N1 arose is not understood. To investigate viral reassortment, we coinfected cell cultures and a group of pigs with or without preexisting immunity with a Eurasian H1N1 virus, A/Swine/Spain/53207/2004 (SP04), and a North American triple reassortant H1N1 virus, A/Swine/Kansas/77778/2007 (KS07). The infected pigs were cohoused with one or two groups of contact animals to investigate viral transmission. In coinfected MDCK or PK15 continuous cell lines with KS07 and SP04 viruses, more than 20 different reassortant viruses were found. In pigs without or with preexisting immunity (immunized with commercial inactivated swine influenza vaccines) and coinfected with both viruses, six or seven reassortant viruses, as well as the parental viruses, were identified in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid samples from the lungs. Interestingly, only one or two viruses transmitted to and were detected in contact animals. No reassortant containing a gene constellation similar to that of pH1N1 virus was found in either coinfected cells or pigs, indicating that the reassortment event that resulted in the generation of this virus is a rare event that likely involved specific viral strains and/or a favorable, not-yet-understood environment. IMPORTANCE The 2009 pandemic-like H1N1 virus could not be reproduced either in cell cultures or in pigs coinfected with North American triple reassortant H1N1 and Eurasian H1N1 swine influenza viruses. This finding suggests that the generation of the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus by reassortment was a rare event that likely involved specific viral strains and unknown factors. Different reassortant viruses were detected in coinfected pigs with and without preexisting immunity, indicating that host immunity plays a relevant role in driving viral reassortment of influenza A virus.

The novel H1N1 influenza virus that emerged in humans in Mexico in early 2009 and transmitted efficiently in the human population with global spread has been declared a pandemic strain. Here we review influenza infections in swine since 1918 and the introduction of different avian and human influenza virus genes into swine influenza viruses of North America and Eurasia. These introductions often result in viruses of increased fitness for pigs that occasionally transmit to humans. The novel virus affecting humans is derived from a North American swine influenza virus that has acquired two gene segments [Neuraminidase (NA) and Matrix (M)] from the European swine lineages. This reassortant appears to have increased fitness in humans. The potential for increased virulence in humans and of further reassortment between the novel H1N1 influenza virus and oseltamivir resistant seasonal H1N1 or with highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza stresses the need for urgent pandemic planning.

Migratory waterfowl of the world are the natural reservoirs of influenza viruses of all known subtypes. However, it is unknown whether these waterfowl perpetuate highly pathogenic (HP) H5 and H7 avian influenza viruses. Here we report influenza virus surveillance from 2001 to 2006 in wild ducks in Alberta, Canada, and in shorebirds and gulls at Delaware Bay (New Jersey), United States, and examine the frequency of exchange of influenza viruses between the Eurasian and American virus clades, or superfamilies. Influenza viruses belonging to each of the subtypes H1 through H13 and N1 through N9 were detected in these waterfowl, but H14 and H15 were not found. Viruses of the HP Asian H5N1 subtypes were not detected, and serologic studies in adult mallard ducks provided no evidence of their circulation. The recently described H16 subtype of influenza viruses was detected in American shorebirds and gulls but not in ducks. We also found an unusual cluster of H7N3 influenza viruses in shorebirds and gulls that was able to replicate well in chickens and kill chicken embryos. Genetic analysis of 6,767 avian influenza gene segments and 248 complete avian influenza viruses supported the notion that the exchange of entire influenza viruses between the Eurasian and American clades does not occur frequently. Overall, the available evidence does not support the perpetuation of HP H5N1 influenza in migratory birds and suggests that the introduction of HP Asian H5N1 to the Americas by migratory birds is likely to be a rare event.

From February 2000 through September 2001, a limited number of H6N2 influenza viruses were isolated from chickens in California. This report describes the genetic characterization of nine of these H6N2 viruses. All of the viruses analyzed had phylogenetically similar hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase molecules that suggested the viruses shared a recent common ancestor. The analysis of the HA sequence of these viruses with all available H6 viruses from different hosts and locations showed that these genes do not separate into well-defined North American and Eurasian lineages. The neuraminidase genes of the California viruses contain an 18 amino acid deletion, a possible adaptation to growth in chickens. Analysis of the remaining gene segments of the California viruses revealed that three distinct genotypes of H6N2 viruses were present.