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The article focuses on the prevalence of concept of polycentrism, which is gradually being accepted by various countries in Europe. The fact of polycentrism was first established by Tito in 1948, and the word was coined by Palmiro Togliatti, that very remarkable man and thinker who, until his death in 1964, had for many years headed the Italian Communist Party. One of the slowest in the West to accept "polycentrism" was the French Communist Party which, under the leadership of Maurice Thorez, remained firmly subservient to the concept. But Thorez died in 1964, and his successor, Juan Waldeck-Rochet, has moved the French party (second in size only to the Italian in the countries of the capitalist West) more and more toward polycentrism.

The article discusses the Russian invasion in the Czechoslovakia in 1968, including issues such as Czech public opinion of the invasion, political resistance to Russian foreign policies, and Soviet party leadership. Czech President Ludvík Svoboda and politicians Alexander Dubcek are mentioned, as well as communist public opinion in Europe and liberalism in Czechoslovakia.

This can, obviously, be only a preliminary report on those three or rather, four weeks that shook not only France but the whole of Europe, and after which nothing will ever be the same again. The financial and economic consequences are at the moment totally unpredictable, except for the now general conviction that, after the steep rise in wages following the de facto general strike, which at the peak involved as many as 10 million wage earners. France's competitive power within the European Common Market has been thrown out of gear. Only a few weeks ago, the prestige of the French franc was such that unlimited sums could be taken out of the country, and when a panic seized the bourgeoisie, hundreds dashed in their cars to Switzerland, with trunks filled with 500-franc banknotes.

This article focuses on the unification of Western Europe. There is no doubt about it that Western Europe is "unified" only by the Atlantic Pact and anti-communism. If there was no united Western Europe, it was the fault of the British Labor Party, which was the most powerful "Third Force" party in Europe and could have taken the lead. Instead, it did nothing about Europe and was concerned only about two things: the success of its economic experiment within Great Britain and its relations with the U.S. Everything now suggests that, far from supporting the Third Force, the U.S. is supporting the right. Yet at least until recently the Labor Party persisted in believing in some invisible leftward trend in the U.S., and thought that real Social Democracy would materialize much sooner in the U.S. than, say, in Italy.

This article focuses on the ideological crisis faced by Western Europe, and the threatened disappearance of the so-called Third Force. The "Third Force" has been much discussed as an ideological, a political, and a military concept. There was a time-about three or four years ago when one frequently heard it said that Western Europe, under the inspiration of the Labor Party of Great Britain, would develop a social and ideological system of its own which would be different from both American capitalism and Soviet communism. The military, or geographical, Third Force was the brain-child of French political thinkers. But, long before the signing of the Atlantic Pact, which finally turned Western Europe into part of the American military sphere, this concept of the Third Force went up in smoke.

The article presents information on leader of Yugoslav Communist Party and Prime Minister of Yugoslavia Marshal Tito. There is much pro-Russian feeling in the country. A blatant switch-over to the West is psychologically impossible for Tito as well as for the Yugoslav people. Russians, clearly, are very unlikely to make peace with Tito now. Russians on the other hand, have their own great problem, as long as Tito is in power, the threat of Titoism spreading throughout Europe. Here, of course, the whole Yugoslav mentality is entirely different from the Russian. The Russian line has been to forget about the Soviet war record and self-glorification.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization experts, preparing for the worst, have drawn up a time-table for the re-armament of West Germany. The decision on the re-armament of West Germany seems final. Much depends, of course, on Germany's own reactions, and on its willingness to take account of the influence of the neutralization-for-unification idea on German opinion. To the Russians, there is of course a certain danger in advertising neutralization as a remedy for all ills. Poles in London can also ask whether the Russians will agree to the neutralization of Poland and all the other countries of Eastern Europe.

The German militarists are delighted with the Republican victory. Defense Commissioner Blank is openly planning to provide 40 German generals and 22,000 "democratic-minded" German officers for the European army--the possibility that France will not ratify the army no longer causes him much concern. Herr Ramcke, a former major general of air-borne troops, glorifies war criminals, and Nazi songs of revenge are resounding more and more loudly throughout Germany. To most Frenchmen any intensive drive to rearm Europe today means simply the rearmament of Germany.

The article focuses on the debate on the inclusion of Germany in the European army. The debate focused on the difficult problems France has had to face since the war. Not in all its long history had France been called upon to make a surrender like the one at present. The debate also discussed the suffering of the French soldiers in Buchenwald, concentration camp in Germany, during World War II. The critics of the European army showed the greatest conviction and self-assurance, the government spokesmen were defensive, dwelling continually on the "lesser evil."

Ever since 1940, if not before, it has been customary in the English-speaking world to regard the French as "feeble." Yet a question arises whether there is any evidence that if France were an island it would not have on its battle for survival, or that Paris would not have "taken it" as well as London, England did. On the other hand, if there had been no channel, however, it should be skipped. In 1940, the French were the victims both of their geography and of their bad foreign policy. Their geography they cannot change, but in their foreign policy they are trying not to repeat errors of the inter-war period. France today is a relatively small power on the western tip of what is left of a "democratic" Europe.

This article focuses on the reaction in Europe on the outcome of the recently held government elections in Great Britain. As things are, the confusion and uncertainty of the British political scene will be shared by Western Europe until the next election, or until the new British government demonstrates that it has enough drive to fire the imagination of the British people. Already the capitalist press of the world has united to ascribe the "failure" of British socialism. The Conservatives, insisted that they were for the welfare state and full employment and were only against further nationalization.

It is informed that after the diplomatic exchanges between V.M. Molotov, foreign minister of Soviet Union and ambassador Bedell Smith, it was hoped that there would be no war. Another reason why the Soviets think that there will be no war is that Europe is now clearly split into two blocs, neither of which wants to make any move that will entail serious risks. Further friction may arise on some secondary question like Austria or Berlin, but in the main, the map of Europe is considered to have been drawn and accepted by both sides.

Every Russian knows that he can buy more with a given number of rubles today than before, and for the same amount of work his wages are the same as they were. So rubles have become valuable, and everybody wants to earn as many as possible. The urge to earn more rubles will undoubtedly produce very valuable results this year in industry and agriculture alike. In terms of world politics the most important economic fact will be the enormous output of food by Russia in 1948. This is not only a vitally important factor in the transition from socialism to communism within Russia but is also likely to have immediate international effects. Inconsequence of Russia's economic revival countries of Eastern and Central Europe will if necessary be able to rely on Soviet aid to fill any food deficit, especially in grain.