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Abstract: The present article argues that the current crisis of the European Union (EU) is much deeper and more profound than many EU officials and analysts care to admit. Taking the so‐called sovereign debt crisis and the refugee crisis as illustrative case studies it is argued that the crisis needs to be reframed as a Complex Adaptive System which is self‐organizing in a deeply incoherent manner and which current EU policies are not only not addressing but exacerbating. As an alternative, the article suggests using Adaptive Action as a framework to identify the conditions which sustain the current dysfunctionality of the European Union and makes concrete suggestions on how these conditions can be altered. Areas of further research are also identified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State responses to the global financial and European sovereign debt crisis have been dominated by a paradigm of austerity. This paradigm has called for the reduction of public expenditure on the basis that recent economic crises were caused by excessive public spending and debt. In contrast to explanations of austerity’s persistence that focus on the role of powerful actors or institutions, this article will highlight the role of discourse and argumentation. To do so, the article presents a political claims analysis of public debates on austerity in the mass media in the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland between 2010 and 2013. In doing so, the article contributes to broader discussions on the resilience of neoliberalism since the global financial and European sovereign debt crises by calling for a greater appreciation of the variegated nature of austerity’s application in different national contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines determinants of sovereign bond spreads (in relation to Germany) of the peripheral euro area countries in the period 2007Q3-2015Q3. The study indicates that the introduction of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) by the ECB in the third quarter of 2012 led to a change in the sensitivity of the spreads to the developments of certain macroeconomic fundamentals of these economies. In particular, the ratio of public debt to GDP, which significantly and strongly determined the spreads in the period 2007Q3-2012Q2, proved to be insignificant in the period 2012Q3-2015Q3. In addition, the counterfactual analysis carried out shows that the spreads in the analysed countries would have been much higher if the ECB had not decided to introduce this programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Euro crisis is mainly a consequence of the international financial crisis of 2008. Thereby, the term Euro crisis is misleading as there is no currency crisis. First, the article shows some of the birth defects of the Euro. Second, it shows that the increase in public debt was caused by rescue measures for banks and anti-cyclical fiscal policy. Third, we argue that the Euro crisis is not just one crisis (a sovereign debt crisis) but it is a combination of several macroeconomic crises including a growth crisis, a labour market crisis, a public debt crisis, and a current account crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates empirically the behavior of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) when assessing sovereign solvency for European countries. Using probit regressions, I find that even after controlling for macroeconomic factors, CRAs take the business cycle into account. Also, there is a clear case of path dependence in sovereign ratings. Additionally, it turns out that there seems to be a discrepancy between upgrades and downgrades. These results are robust to a number of different specifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The euro crisis is increasingly affecting the political debate in the European Union. Exogenously determined power shifts and institutional changes have been imposed on a number of member states. These measures and the direct intervention of external stakeholders in the key realms of domestic politics pose a serious challenge to both the EU's cohesiveness and its democratic nature. This study looks at how the voting dynamics and the government/opposition-like alignments in the European Parliament are affected by the ongoing crisis. It highlights the balance of partisan and nationally driven factors behind legislators' choices related to the management of the crisis. To capture the impact of the crisis-related debate on the actors' cohesiveness and alignments, two sets of vote-based analyses are conducted. This analysis proves that the main determinant of legislators' alignments in crisis-related debates is membership of the eurozone, while the explanatory potential of factors such as ideology and partisanship appears residual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article deals with the notion "the lender of last resort". First of all, it tackles upon classic interpretations of the LLR and the theories in the basis of the notion. It explores the evolution of the theoretical framework and touches upon practical experience. Basing on the works of the prominent contemporary scientists the article tends to answer the question of the kind of changes that caused the revision of the LLR theory and reasons why the question of the ECB as LLR is important nowadays. The article discusses the problems the EU and the ECB are currently facing, when the question of ECB as a LLR arises. The opinions of the prominent scientist on this topic are analyzed in order to understand the difference between the LLR for banks and for the governments, and the advantages and disadvantages for the EU economic stability. The text highlights main arguments of the scholars, who are in favor and those, who are against the ECB as an LLR both for the banks and for the governments and makes a conclusion on the perspectives of the ECB as an LLR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses several key issues regarding the current European economic and financial Great Crisis, which essentially is a twin sovereign debt and banking crisis. The shift of the recent world financial crisis into a European sovereign debt crisis is tackled by analyzing how via the banking system the financial contagion was extended from the US to Europe. The explanation focuses on the imbalances of European Monetary Union (EMU) countries balance-of-payments. The European crisis has shown that it can spread quickly among closely integrated economies, either through the trade channel or the financial channel, or both. In this context, TARGET2 payment system of EMU countries became crucial, reflecting funding stress in the banking systems of crisis-hit European countries. The paper concludes that, in the medium term, a successful crisis resolution requires more political integration, which should include a fiscal union and a banking union. However, in the short run, a prompt recovery is essential to get out of trouble, and this requires that surplus countries (particularly Germany) expand aggregate demand and let domestic wages and the ensuing inflation rate increase. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is a commonplace that the discipline of economics has contributed to the current crisis, above all, because economic methodologies are charged with fatally inflating debt risk, such that collapse was the inevitable result. But what might be said of the role of law within this constellation? Much ink has been consumed detailing legal shortcomings within regulatory regimes for the financial services. However, a full accounting has yet to be made of the broader fault which may also be attributed to the premises of modern and increasingly post-national law, especially as they coalesce with a broader abdication of political responsibility for crisis. This contribution begins this accounting, investigating the processes by which law has transformed itself into an economic technology within post-national regimes in its contemporary quest for material legitimacy. Above all, in its idolatry of the factual, law has itself become a power locus-especially within the European Union-that similarly pre-empts the politics within which social and economic stability might be defined and achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first ten years of the Economic and Monetary Union were a remarkable success story. Nevertheless, the European financial-cum-sovereign- debt-crisis made it clear that the original design of European economic governance is not feasible any longer. The crisis compelled Europeans to admit that the implicit consent of Maastricht on a triple denial with regard to the single currency area, i.e., (1) no exit, (2) no bail-out, and (3) no default, is no longer tenable. By introducing the concept of the 'impossible trinity of denial', the current paper argues that pursuing these three goals simultaneously is not attainable, and that one of these should be sacrificed in order for the single currency to survive the current crisis. Also, supranational institutions should enjoy more control over crisis resolution in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe in the form of the European Union is seen in China as a major player in global affairs. As a sui generis actor, the EU was seen in general as a progressive force in world affairs in China. Europe's economic might and normative appeals were also widely acknowledged in China, even though the Chinese on occasions complained of the assertive normative diplomacy of the EU and its member states, which was backed by its economic power. However, as Europe encounters a severe sovereign debt crisis, and China continues its fast growth in terms of economic development and international influence, the Chinese leaders, elites and general public are starting to develop a more realistic view of Europe and scaling down some of their wishful thinking about the ever-growing influence of the EU. Yet, at government level, relations with the EU and its member states are still on the top of China's foreign policy agenda. By trying to offer a helping hand to the EU, the Chinese government is hoping that the current crisis might turn into a stimulating factor for a closer relationship between China and the EU/member states on both bilateral and global issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the wars in Vietnam and Iraq to the Arab Spring, recent history is full of examples of how media outlets interact with government processes to shape public opinion and constrain the practical avenues policymakers may take in domestic and international affairs. The recent European financial crisis cedes a unique opportunity to study both how media commentary is formulated and the effects it has on the policy choices of governments in international economic affairs. This work, through analysis of original data drawn from case studies of six media outlets in two countries over the course of the recent sovereign debt crisis, seeks to contribute to the field an understanding of the role that such outlets play in influencing popular perception of international issues during times of crisis. With reference to the literature on the press in political and foreign policy affairs, it is found that outlets are incentivised to inflate particular national or international components of reported affairs based on different economic states of affair. These findings have significant implications for the formulation of policy in the future, particularly in the European Union, where continuing integration of political and economic processes requires a delicate balance of emphasis on international prosperity and sovereign interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European economic integration is an inevitable strategy choice for European countries to improve economic development and geopolitical stability. However, inadequate economic integration in EU results in the disequilibrium internal economic structures and the regions lack of coordination in monetary and fiscal policymaking, which are important reasons for European sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, it is necessary for EU to strengthen fiscal disciplines and to improve closer economic integration as preconditions for solving the debt crisis and improving economic growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The perception of systemic risk in the banking sector deeply changed from the autumn of 2007 onwards. In a context of increasing risk awareness, after a long period of “blind trust” in the virtues and soundness of the financial system, Lehman Brothers’ default, announced on 15 September 2008, represented a major breakdown. Such an exception to the deeply trusted “too big to fail” principle – beyond generating a severe turbulence in the financial markets and stimulating far-reaching analysis on the weaknesses of regulatory schemes – left a durable scar on banking risk perception. The process of normalization which was slowly taking place during the year 2010 and the first months of 2011 quickly stopped and reversed its direction with the explosion of sovereign debt crisis in Europe, showing its intrinsic fragility. Towards the end of 2011, from many points of views, the financial markets were neighboring the extremes registered in the autumn of 2008. What we argue in this paper is that a lasting change in the traditional equilibriums and functioning of the financial system took place in Europe. This change calls for a re-thinking in banking and liquidity management, in pricing models and in monetary policy strategies. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This article considers the likely impact of the global crisis on the prospects for the European project. First, it considers the nature of the current crisis. It argues that it is comparable, in terms of its deep structural character, to the one in the 1930s. The crisis manifested itself first in the financial sector, but was caused by underlying problems of overaccumulation, which explains the succession of speculative booms and busts from the 1980s onward. The article then analyses how the financial crisis transmuted into the current sovereign debt crisis in Europe. It identifies a number of interdependent factors responsible for this: the bailouts of banks following the credit crisis; the stimulus programmes necessitated by the danger of a deep economic recession; the structural problems of the European Monetary Union leading to the accumulation of debt in the peripheral members; and finally the catalytic action of speculation in the financial markets. Finally, the article discusses responses to the debt crisis, outlining the contours of two alternatives (muddling through and Europeanisation), their implications, and some of the conditions for success. The conclusion is rather pessimistic: chances that an effective, timely and sustainable solution will be realised do not seem high. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio is reaching unsustainable levels. But why should the debt load of such a small country cause such outsized tremors in global financial markets? Greek debt may be relatively small, but a sufficient amount is held by a few major banks in Europe to cause disruptions to the credit system. This effect is magnified because other banks from around the world are exposed to these European banks, making the problem global. In this article we examine the exposure of banks around the world to Greek debt, and call for swift and decisive action by policymakers to head off a global banking crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globalisation and the emergence of economic players such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) have led to predictions that US hegemony will quickly decline as a new world order emerges. With the European Union (EU) also facing a downgrading of its own status - as economic, political and cultural power shifts from west to east - now is the time to ensure the Union has a strategy in place to remain an influential global actor despite its lack of natural resources and member state sovereign debt arising from the 2008/9 economic crisis. Only concerted efforts at institutional future-proofing (or widening and deepening plus) by the EU and a global vision for the supranational body will ensure its survival and prosperity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Only a decade ago, slow growth and high unemployment plagued Germany, but the "sick man of Europe" has now moved to outperform the Eurozone average growth since the second quarter of 2010. This confirms Germany's recovery and its status as the growth engine of the continent. This surely is a success story. While Germany (also Austria and the Netherlands) is prospering, the peripheral countries in the Eurozone are confronted with a severe sovereign debt crisis. Starting in Greece, it soon spread to countries such as Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. In the course of the debate, Germany was blamed for the imbalances in Europe. In short, German export performance and the sustained pressure for moderate wage increases have provided German exporters with the competitive advantage to dominate trade and capital flows within the Eurozone. Thus, Germany is seen as the main beneficiary of the EURO. This argument, however, is vehemently disputed within Germany. Many economists and political leaders reject this argument and point to the flagrant lack of fiscal discipline in many of the peripheral countries. Some prominent economists, such as Hans-Werner Sinn, even disputes that Germany was the main beneficiary of the Eurozone. The paper analyzes the two sides of the controversy, and asks whether we are witnessing a more inwardlooking and Euroskeptic Germany. These issues will be analyzed by first focusing on the role of Germany in resolving the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, and the European Union negotiations for a permanent rescue mechanism. We conclude by discussing some possible explanations for Germany's more assertive and more Euroskeptic position during these negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emerging market economies were major beneficiaries of the economic boom before 2007. More recently, they have become victims of the global financial crisis. Their future development depends, to a large extent, on global economic prospects. Today the global economy and the European economy are much more integrated and interdependent than they were ten or twenty years ago. Every country must recognize its limited economic sovereignty and must be prepared to deal with the consequences of global macroeconomic fluctuations. The statistical data for 2009 provides a mixed picture with respect to the impact of the crisis on various groups of countries and individual economies. On average, Central and Eastern Europe experienced a smaller output decline than the Euro area and the entire EU while the CIS, especially its European part, contracted more dramatically. However, there was a deep differentiation within each country group. Looking globally, richer countries, which are more open to trade and in which the banking sector plays a larger role and which rely more on external financing, suffered more than less sophisticated economies, which are less dependent on trade and credit (especially from external sources). With some exceptions, the previous good growth performance helped rather than handicapped countries in the CEE and CIS regions in the crisis year of 2009. The post-crisis recovery has been rather modest and incomplete. It remains vulnerable to new shocks (like the Greek Fiscal crisis), the danger of sovereign default and other uncertainties. Full post-crisis recovery and increasing potential growth will require far going economic and institutional reforms on both national, regional (e.g., EU) and global levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]