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Using a comparative federalist approach, the main objective of this article is to understand how horizontal coordination in federal political systems is likely to materialize. Starting from the notion of ‘shared rule’, the article argues that ‘non-centralization’ may occur in a given policy area when the loss of resources at the constituent unit level is not compensated with an equivalent increase in federal powers. In the meantime, horizontal interdependence as well as vertical independence are facilitated through different incentives. The combination of these two factors leads to horizontal coordination where federal actors come to play a different role. The analytical framework advanced in the article is applied to two different cases, the Canadian inter-provincial trade, and the EU’s economic governance framework. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on how the European Union (EU) has responded to climate change adaptation and mitigation and how a similar approach can be taken by the government in British Columbia. The authors explain that most mitigation efforts around the world have failed to reverse global warming, causing a great need for adaptation policies. They discuss the importance of trans-municipal efforts to address climate change, explore how local and federal governments in the EU are working together on this issue, and analyze policy programs implemented by the British Columbia Ministry of Environment.

Despite not having explicit authority to legislate on matters local in nature, in 2000 the federal government launched the National Homelessness Initiative (NHI). I argue that this federal program, in many critical aspects, mirrors a governance model developed in the European Union called the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a model developed in an institutional context whereby the European Commission has no formal authority to coerce member states into coordinating social policy, but nonetheless uses “soft” or voluntary mechanisms to work toward this goal. Vancouver and Toronto are examined more closely to demonstrate how the flexibility of the OMC-style model manifests itself in practice, and the implications for governance, accountability, and effectiveness. I conclude that while the issue of homelessness is principally plagued by insufficient and unstable funding, further application of principles in the OMC model—uniquely applied to the Canadian context—holds promise for improving governance, coordination, and effectiveness of the public policy response to homelessness. Application of the OMC model thus calls for more attention from Canadian federalism scholars and policy-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]