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The Multilateral Instrument (MLI) can be regarded as the most innovative and far-reaching development in the area in the area of tax treaties in recent decades. The implementation of the tax treaty related Base Erosions and Profit Shifting (BEPS) measures through the MLI will have major consequences for the global network of bilateral tax treaties. The actual impact of the MLI on tax treaties depends to a large extent on the choices and reservations made by each participating state, especially with regard to provisions that do not reflect BEPS minimum standards. These positions will also influence the impact of the MLI for each state's participating treaty partners. This article examines certain general and procedural aspects of the MLI, including the scope and interpretation of the MLI. This is followed by a discussion of the operation and legal consequences of the compatibility clauses, the reservations and the notification obligations. The focus is then shifted to various procedural aspects related to the final provisions of the MLI, including the entry into effect and timing aspects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some Member States consider the outbound transfer of the companys place of effective management (POM) to a Third State to be a tax-relevant event, levying an immediate exit tax on the unrealised capital gains. Germany is going to tax a deemed liquidation if a domestic company acquires treaty residence in a Third State (paragraph 3 of article 4 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD-MC)). The existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) deals only with the POM transfer to another EU/EEA State. The UK and Ireland apply a similar kind of exit tax when a domestic company becomes a tax resident abroad due to a tax treaty tie-breaker rule. In such a case, the company is deemed to have disposed of and immediately reacquired all of its assets at market value. Based on the CJEU decision in National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/Kantoor Rotterdam (National Grid Indus BV) both Member States have recently updated their tax legislation thereby giving some kind of relief if the POM is shifted to another EU/EEA State. However, the relief is substantially restricted if the migrating company has moved its POM to a Third State. On the occasion of the CJEU judgment in National Grid Indus BV, other Member States (for example, Sweden and Spain) have also amended their exit tax legislation thereby giving relief for the company s POM transfer to another EU/EEA State, but principally not for a Third State migration. This article analyses the corporate exit taxation using as background the company s emigration to a Third State by acquiring treaty residence in that State (article 4, paragraph 3 OECD-MC). The main question is whether or not the exit tax rules of the Member States breach the freedom of establishment in regard to such Third State cases. This question has not previously been analysed in the literature on taxation and is not directly answered by existing case law. Another relevant question is whether primary law may constitute an obligation to give relief from corporate exit tax when the emigrating company acquires treaty residence in a Third State. This article will also discuss the possible implications for the national legislation on exit taxation. To analyse and answer these questions the German deemed company liquidation is utilised in order to provide a basic example. In comparison, the British and Irish exit charge for migrating companies will also be discussed, with consideration being given to cases in which the moving company establishes treaty residence in a Third State. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the role of State aid rules in enforcement of proper transfer pricing techniques in European Union countries. Topics discussed include allowing double non-taxation in the absence of exchange of information during transfer pricing, definition for State aid by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and challenges related to base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) by Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD).

The article offers information on the challenges faced by European Union (EU) Member States in the conclusion of a potential base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) multilateral instrument. It analyses the distribution of competences regarding double taxation conventions (DTCs) between the EU and its Member States. It states that member states have to avoid imposing discrimination and restrictions on the exercise of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) freedoms.

The article concerns on the extent to which European Union law prevents the countries from signing a mutual instrument enforcing base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). Topics discussed include freedom to member states determine their own tax system and to conclude international treaties concerning direct taxation, blocking effect of the existing rules of European Union law, harmonisation measures and proposals for a Common Consolidated Tax Base.

The article offers information on the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) from Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development (OECD) to counter treaty abuse. It discusses whether the derivative benefits provision in the proposed Limitation on Benefits clause is needed. It considers whether the Principal Purpose Test meets the requirements of legal certainty and European Union (EU) approach to tax avoidance.

The article offers information on the compatibility of tax rulings with European Union's State aid law. Topics discussed include investigation of tax rulings under Article 107 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by the European Commission, creating legal certainty for both taxpayers and tax authorities by tax rulings, and criticising tax rulings for serving as tax advantage upon certain taxpayers.

The article offers information on the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) proposals to neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements for tax policies in European Union countries. Topics discussed include compatibility with the non-discrimination provisions in tax treaties and treaty on the functioning of the European Union, compatibility with the interest and royalty directive, and double deductions tax planning.

This article focuses on the division of powers between the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) and national courts, based on a Swedish case concerning the value added taxation of services sold through an intermediary. The role of intermediaries and intermediary services has been frequently discussed from a value added tax (VAT) perspective in Sweden during the past years. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, Sweden has a large degree of Internet users and is active in the creative industry developing software tools used on mobile platforms. Secondly, the Swedish companies developing these applications have carried the costs for double taxation of these services when sold to consumers resident within the EU. Suggestions for clarifications of the provisions partly causing the diverging application that has led to double taxation, has now been suggested at EU level. This article discusses if the changes are likely to solve the reasons for double taxation by addressing a Swedish case, Resolution Interactive. The case was discussed during the IFA Congress in Boston 2012 during the VAT seminar, and serves as an example for highlighting the fine line between interpretation and application where intermediaries are involved in supply of services. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the limitations imposed by the free movement provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the ability of the Member States to prevent tax avoidance and protect national tax bases by law. It highlights developments in the Court of Justice of the European Union's case law. The ability of Member States' tax legislators to prevent tax avoidance and to protect their national tax base is examined.

The article presents an analysis of the limits and obligations imposed on the external action of Member States by the European Union (EU) in the direct tax field. It looks at the existence and nature of EU competence in direct taxation matters, with a particular focus given to the application of the implied powers doctrine. The significance of the general duty of loyalty is discussed, as well as suggests on how to reach a balance between Member States in tax treaty negotiations.

The article focuses on an anti-abuse measure aimed at treaty/directive shopping where non-European Union (EU) citizens look for Member States intermediate companies with favourable tax regimes in order to repatriate dividend, interest and royalty from the EU without levy of source state withholding taxes. It concludes that the legislation constitutes an important benchmark in terms of situations in which Member States are legitimately allowed to deny access to treaty/directive benefits.

The article examines the legal framework for tax treaties in the European Union countries. The European Commission proposed the amendment of the tax treaties of the member states to comply with internal market principles. The structural differences between European law and tax treaties, as well as the decision of the European Court of Justice in tax law case, are also explored.

Examines the interaction between the most favoured nation (MFN) clause and the fundamental freedoms in the European Community Treaty. Rules set by the MFN clause on taxation of resident and foreign taxpayers in state members under the tax treaty; Requirements posed by the tax treaty on distinguishing taxpayers to comply with the principle of free movement of capital; Implication of the MFN clause for tax treaty network in Luxembourg.

I don’t know if it is because of my age, or not using social media much, or because I have spent more than 30 years advising companies that actually manufacture physical goods and sell them to customers, but I don’t really understand the current enthusiasm on the part of the OECD, the EU and governments to investigate ways to change the taxation of the ‘digitalised’ economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports on the signing by the governments of Cyprus and Switzerland on July 25, 2014 of a double taxation agreement based on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and on Capital.

The article discusses the implementation of the income tax treaty signed by Albania with Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2008 which is aimed at preventing double taxation and fiscal evasion. The treaty is expected to help improve economic cooperation between the two countries. Starting January 1, 2013, income taxes, tax on small business activities and property tax in Albania will be placed within the framework of the treaty. The treaty is different from the Model Convention of Convention issued by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in terms of the concept of permanent establishment (PE), interest and royalties and dividends.

The article examines the complexity of Germany's anti-treaty shopping rules. Germany was forced by the European Commission (EC) to change its anti-treaty shopping rules as the EC wanted to ensure the consistency between the rules and the EU guarantee of freedom of establishment and capital movement. The major concern of the EC is the gross receipts test under which a company was assumed to be interposed for treaty shopping purposes if the receipts from active trade do not exceed more than 10 percent of the total gross receipts of the company.

Predicts the impact of the ruling of the World Trade Organization on tax break package of the United States (U.S.) on the trade tensions between the U.S. and the European Union. Details on the ruling; Consequence if the U.S. loses the appeal for the ruling; Impact of the tax treaty on those doing business in the U.S. and Slovenia.