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Against the background of recent developments in Hungary, the article discusses the question whether the European Union ought to play a role in protecting liberal democracy in Member States. First, it is argued that the EU has the authority to do so, both in a broad normative sense and in a narrower legal sense (though the latter is more likely to be disputed). The article then asks whether the EU has the capacity to establish a supranational militant democracy; here it is argued that at the moment both appropriate legal instruments and plausible political strategies are missing. To remedy this situation, the article proposes a new democracy watchdog, analogous to, but more powerful than, the Venice Commission. Finally, it is asked whether EU interventions would provoke a nationalist backlash. There is insufficient evidence to decide this question, but the danger of such a backlash probably tend to be overestimated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented which discusses the development of the European Union (EU) from 1945 through the 1980s, contending the process of European integration was Machiavellian in nature. The role that the creation of the EU played in delegating political power in Europe to unelected institutions, including in regard to the status of democracy in EU countries, is discussed. The constitutional impact of the EU on its member states, including in regard to public debt levels, is also discussed.

An essay is presented that examines the democracy within the European Union (EU). The author argues that it is legitimate for EU to interfere in the domestic politics of individual member states to protect liberal democracy. Some concerns about EU interventions include the absence of single, fully agreed-upon model of European liberal democracy and only smaller and powerless member states would be subjected to interference.

The article discusses political and economic crises faced by the European Union (EU), with particular focus given to their detrimental effect on political unity and individual freedoms. The future of the Euro currency is commented on, and regional and national tensions which were exacerbated by the 2008 global financial crisis are examined. The challenges faced by anti-democratic movements and national government actions in eastern European EU nations including Romania and Hungary are also commented on.

Especially since the failure of the European Constitutional Treaty, the idea of a European constitutional patriotism has become subject to ever more intense criticism. This article argues that many of the criticisms of the idea of a European constitutional patriotism have been based on philosophical misunderstandings (both of the notion of constitutional patriotism as such, and of the role it could play in Europe) or rely on implausible empirical claims. Accordingly, the normative idea of constitutional patriotism is first clarified; second, the article discusses some of the most common normative and empirical traps when trying to ‘transfer’ constitutional patriotism from a domestic nation-state context to the supranational level, as well as the tendency to overburden constitutional patriotism with expectations of solidarity and deliberative democracy; third, an EU-specific post-sovereign, pluralist version of constitutional patriotism is defended against critics who see even such a vision as insufficiently sensitive to value pluralism and cultural diversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]