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Copyright of Zbornik Radova Pravnog Fakulteta u Nisu is the property of Law Faculty in Nis and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article scrutinizes the compatibility of the interest limitation rule the European Union (EU) legislature included in its anti-tax avoidance directive adopted on 12 July 2016 with the proportionality principle. Under its settled case law concerning domestic interest limitation rules restricting a fundamental freedom for purposes of combating tax avoidance practices, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) holds that such measures do not comply with the principle of proportionality if they, amongst others, either do not provide the taxpayer with an opportunity to substantiate the commercial reasons for not entering into an arm’s length loan arrangement, or restrict the deductibility of more interest than an arm’s length interest. As the rule does neither adhere to the counterevidence rule nor to the arm’s length principle, it is questionable whether its status as secondary EU law suffices for purposes of disregarding the aforementioned limitations set by the ECJ. Amongst others, the author takes the view that on the basis of ECJ case law, the interest limitation rule may be considered incompatible with the proportionality principle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 28 January 2016, the European Commission made public a package of measures aimed to tackle tax avoidance and abusive practices in the European internal market. The package includes a detailed proposal for a new European Union (EU) Anti-avoidance Directive addressing six main issues: deductibility of interest; exit taxation; switch-over clause; General Anti-avoidance Rule (GAAR); Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) rules; and hybrid mismatches. This article provides a critical analysis of the Proposal for a Directive taking into consideration some of the implications of its implementation at stake. The final aim of this work is to contribute some elements that can improve the future debate on these matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis of the general anti-avoidance tax rule in five countries of the European Union (United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, Sweden and France) shows clearly the frailty and weakness of the theoretical and jurisprudential constructions designed to fight this international problem. The research also displays a high degree of judicial discretionary, a worrying level of legal uncertainty -- as a result of the introduction of tax rules linked to vague and imprecise concepts -- and an inefficiency in the revenue collection unacceptable. Furthermore, the article analyses the structure and function of the common general anti-avoidance rule (EU-GAAR) approved by the European Parliament, its scope and the problems that it's possible interaction with another anti-avoidance rules (introduced by the domestic law, community law and conventional law) could generate. The author considers that the labyrinth which derives from the principle of non-discrimination on which the ECJ is trapped is also the labyrinth on which is trapped the cross-border application of the Member States GAAR's and SAAR's. The adoption of an EU-GAAR not solves the problem and only increases the chaotic juxtaposition of ineffective anti-avoidance rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on judicial approaches adopted by Great Britain and European Union (EU) to address treaty shopping. Topics discussed include proposals made by Great Britain government regarding the introduction of domestic legislation intended to deny treaty benefits, general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) enacted in Great Britain to address tax treaties and tax legislative measures adopted by EU. It mentions the limitation-on-benefits (LOB) provisions of tax treaties.

Offshore tax evasion is a global problem that requires a global solution. Nevertheless, the United States unilaterally responded to the offshore tax evasion problem by enacting the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. FATCA requires foreign banks to report information about financial accounts held by U.S. taxpayers directly to the Internal Revenue Service and imposes a thirty percent withholding tax on certain U.S. payments to any bank that will not cooperate. Yet, U.S. banks were not required to report any information on nonresident account holders (except for Canadians) to anyone. FATCA garnered worldwide attention. The European Union expressed its concerns to the U.S. Treasury about the compliance burden on the financial industry and the conflict with EU Member States' laws on privacy and data protection. Treasury is resolving these issues by negotiating bilateral agreements known as Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) that will require reciprocity on the part of the United States in the exchange of information. These IGAs are furthering the movement toward global transparency as most FATCA partner jurisdictions intend to require reporting on all nonresident accounts rather than just U.S. accounts. This could lead to the development of a multilateral platform for the exchange of information that is critical to combating offshore tax evasion. This Article urges the United States to adopt the regulations and legislation that are necessary before the United States can provide its FATCA partners with the same information that they have been asked to give the U.S. government. The United States should play a leadership role in furthering global transparency and take the steps required to no longer function as a tax haven for tax evaders from other countries. The IGA with Mexico that entered into force on January 1, 2013, is an appropriate vehicle for the United States to demonstrate this renewed commitment to the exchange of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Research Papers of the Wroclaw University of Economics / Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wroclawiu is the property of Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wroclawiu and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Penal y Criminologia is the property of Editorial UNED and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses a case before the European Court of Justice (ECJ/EuGH), decided on February 26, 2013, which addressed the applicability of the principle of ne bis in idem (double jeopardy) established in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to national law. The case involved charges of tax evasion prosecuted before a criminal court in Sweden.