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Using Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, this article analyzes the specific ways refused asylum seekers use agency to find employment, despite a legal framework that prevents them working. It is based on a total of 34 semi-structured interviews conducted in Paris. Three points are to be noted. Firstly, there is a hierarchy in the type of jobs available: the most popular jobs can be accessed by borrowing the identity of a third person with regular status, while people who cannot use this means are confined to jobs on the more precarious fringes of the job market. Secondly, our research highlights the existence of an informal labor market that asylum seekers can approach, sometimes even before their asylum application is filed. It is also a space for discussion, advice, and contact with other undocumented job seekers, accessible in specific locations or via the Internet. Thirdly, any long-term prospects are hindered by the precariousness of a person's migration status: although French legislation officially makes regularization possible, under certain conditions, for people who can justify working without ID, our research reveals a series of obstacles on the ground that make this prospect unlikely. In addition to analyzing the current institutional situation, this research focuses on migrant agency, which is crucial to understanding the hidden aspects of migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the extent to which short supply chains affect the structuration of agri‐food sectors economically and politically. To do so, it first presents a theoretical framework drawing on regulationist economics and constructivist political science which guides research to examine the entire range of actors, processes, institutions and power relations which structure agri‐food sectors. It then applies this framework to the case of foie gras in South‐West France to target the relationship between 'short' and 'long' supply chains. Based on thirty interviews with farmers and public officials, it finds that a commonly heard discourse that both chains 'complement each other' masks the political domination of 'the long' over 'the short'. Through tracing this domination across two policy issues, namely product labelling and 'biosecurity' hygiene measures, and the way actors have worked politically to deal with them, the article demonstrates that this power asymmetry has been the principal cause of policy outcomes and, therefore, institutional reproduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does French-language sociology deal with aging? This is the question posed by this contribution, which explores articles published within the past fifteen years in various French-language scientific journals. Through a systematic review of the scientific literature, we analyze the evolution of topics in the sociology of aging through five well-known French-language journals of sociology. Three of them are generalist journals ( Revue française de sociologie, Revue suisse de sociologie, Recherches sociologiques et anthropologiques), from France, Switzerland, and Belgium respectively. The remaining two journals, both from France, are specifically devoted to the study of aging (Gérontologie et société, Retraite et société). The results invite further exploration of the influence of the national contexts in which French-speaking European sociologies are structured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We respond to the call for a more balanced view of agency (Tourish, 2014: 88) by presenting an account of the forced resignation of Jean-Marie Messier as CEO of the major French company, Vivendi Universal, in 2002. Messier’s ousting arose from a struggle for board control involving an exercise of power that was influenced strongly by kinship relationships, interlocking directorships, and business alliances; and by the interplay between a nouveau riche (Messier), an influential old guard shareholder family (the Bronfmans), and an established elite (of prominent representatives of French business). Collusion between the French business establishment and the Bronfman family created a coalition of interest and a locus of control that managerial and agency theories explain inadequately. We highlight the potential for a reading of class relationships in terms of structuration to foster better understanding of the complexities involved when the board of a major corporation decides to support, or withdraw support for, their CEO. We highlight several context-specific structures and mechanisms that were influential in determining corporate control and CEO agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]