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The article focuses on the Georgian-Russian conflict and the missteps taken by both sides during the military conflict over South Ossetia. Russian forces cut Georgia's main east-west highway in two places between Tbilisi and the port city of Poti. But they did not reach the economically critical oil pipeline that runs from Tbilisi to the Black Sea oil terminal at Supsa, nor did attempted bombing damage the conduit. Early reports indicate that pipelines running through Tbilisi from the Caspian Sea oil fields were targeted unsuccessfully by the Russians.

The article reports on the emergence of cyberwar as an official part of warfare based on the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. A strategic economic impact was created by cyberattacks orchestrated from Russia based on new studies. According to an information technology veteran, the Russians conducted a cyber-attack in Georgia that was well-coordinated with the actions of Russian troops on the ground.

The article reports that as many as eight aircraft were lost by the Russian forces during the conflict with Georgia, according to the Center for Analysis of Strategy and Technology (CAST). The Russian defense ministry has repeatedly claimed that only four were destroyed. It outlines some of the aircraft lost by Russia during the battle, including Sukhoi Su-25 "Frogfoot" ground-attack aircraft and a Tupolev Tu-22M3 "Backfire C" bomber. A U.S. intelligence analyst explains why he is skeptical about the figures released by CAST.

The article explores Georgia's relative success against the Russian air force and the failure of Syria's Russian-made air defenses against the Israeli air force. U.S. analysts suggest that the simplicity of the Georgian air defenses, with far less dependence on networking, made it tougher to knock out or blind major parts of the system. The exploitability of Russian-designed and -built defenses was demonstrated in 2007 when the Israeli air force totally shut down Syrian air defenses prior to bombing a suspected nuclear site.

The article analyzes the military blunders committed by Russian armed forces in their war against Georgia. Senior Russian military officials, both active and recently retired, are loudly criticizing early setbacks in Georgia which included problems in air defense suppression, intelligence analysis and warnings, air attack planning and speed of response. They also point to the deployment of older T-62 and T-72 tanks and outdated armored personnel carriers for the initial push into East Ossetia that were about an equal match for the Georgian armor.