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Today, many far-right parties maintain youth wings, providing opportunities to mobilise members and future party leaders. However, they are often neglected in the study of the far right's organisation. This article explores the development of the 'Young Alternative' and its ambivalent relationship with the 'Alternative for Germany'. Theoretically, it argues that far-right youth wings can act as important drivers of radicalisation. It also tries to understand conflicts between far-right youth organisations and parties by discussing the interactions between organisational development and radicalisation. Empirically, it opens the 'black box' of the German case by drawing on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including semi-structured interviews with high-ranking 'Young Alternative' members, (social) media communication and official documents of the 'Young Alternative', 'Alternative for Germany' and intelligence services. Overall, the article underlines the importance of far-right youth wings as part of the broader party organisation and offers substantial theoretical and empirical research perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leadership has long been acknowledged as a crucial feature of social movement activity. Theorisation has delved into the types of leadership and, more recently, the activities performed by leaders. However, comparative research on leadership and detection of any changes over time is scant. Our paper attends to these tasks by looking at the activities of two German-speaking far-right leaders. For many years, Christian Worch was one of the most active and influential neo-Nazi leaders in Germany, communicating much of his activity and strategy in the mid-2000s through a regular circular (Rundbriefe). Similarly, Martin Sellner, both as leader of the Identitarian movement and independent activist, today exercises an outsized role in the German-speaking far-right scene, including through his regular publications in the magazines Compact and Sezession. Our paper uses data of Worch’s and Sellner’s writings, scraped from webpages and gathered from archives, in a mixed-methods comparative design to identify the tasks performed by these leaders, and how frequently. Quantitative text analysis techniques guide the qualitative evaluation of leaders’ activities and reveal shifts – and continuities – in far-right movement leadership. The paper thereby contributes to scholarship on an important aspect of contemporary far-right movements as well as broader social movement literature on the topic of leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay relates the resurgence of contemporary far-right1 politics to a distinctive querpolitics (a transverse or diagonal politics) of socially, politically, and ideologically heterogeneous assembly. This calls for a reconceptualization of the global far right beyond homogeneous understandings of ideological beliefs. Instead of ideologically aligned fellow travelers bound together by their common consent to a system of thick beliefs, far-right political formations are located within messy and fissured socio-political fields. They assemble a varied and contradictory collection of individual, transactional actors with divergent interests. Moreover, the far right is often embedded in mainstream circuits of political and social life that are distinct from and often even opposed to overtly extremist positions. I elaborate on these points through a discussion of far-right politics in Germany and India. If the former is notable as a historically significant case, the latter is where the world's largest far-right political movement is presently located. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how a preexisting far-right social movement organization responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the case of the Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident (PEGIDA) in Germany. We show that PEGIDA quickly adapted its previous immigration-related collective action frame, now predominantly portraying itself as a defender of democracy, constitutionality, and civil rights, while accusing the German government of installing a 'Corona dictatorship'. In addition to improving our understanding of the development of a key far-right social movement organization during the pandemic, our article contributes to the study of far-right ideology more broadly. Examining a critical case of far-right activism, our analysis of PEGIDA underscores the need to review the conventional scholarly distinction between radical and extreme right ideology based on formal pro- and anti-democracy stances. While claiming to espouse the idea of democracy, activists sharply attacked democratic institutions and their main representatives as 'totalitarian' or 'dictatorial' – a key extremist feature of contemporary far-right discourse particularly visible during the pandemic. Indeed, PEGIDA's discursive shift during the pandemic seems to be in line with broader developments of far-right ideology in the protest arena and in party politics, where formal support of democracy goes together with a rhetoric of delegitimization of contemporary democratic institutions and their representatives. Methodologically, we draw from original empirical data collected with the tools of (virtual) ethnography and protest event analysis that we analyze through a frame-analytical lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do far-right actors and issues structure public debates and become mainstream over time? Previous research has shown that far-right actors are central actors in political conflicts in Western Europe, partly due to their dominance in struggles on cultural issues. The entrenchment of the far right substantially depends on their networks and public visibility. However, we still lack a long-term understanding of public debates about far-right actors and their discursive interconnections across issues. In this paper, we deliver the first longitudinal analysis of the evolution and structure of far-right discourse networks and the diffusion of far-right ideas in public debates since the 1990s. Methodologically, this paper innovates by combining discourse network analysis with automated text analysis to investigate how the relations between far-right actors and issues are represented in mass media. We analyze more than 500,000 newspaper articles in six different mass media outlets in Germany. The results show that far-right actors have gained more public visibility since the 1990s. The study demonstrates that the mass media debates have introduced and amplified cultural issues "owned" by the far right. Far-right discourse networks in mass media have grown, discursive interactions have intensified and discourse networks have become more centralized. Our results indicate that the discursive mainstreaming of the far right evolved in the context of the "refugee crisis" in 2015, and was linked to the AfD's institutional access. Overall, the study aids in developing a better understanding of the success of the far right and the crucial role of public debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policy responses to the coronavirus pandemic met with strong resistance. Examining the case study of the Querdenken protest movement in Germany, this article analyses collective action at the time of the pandemic. Ample discussion space will be devoted to the analysis of the collective action frame and the radicalisation process of the protest movement. Particular attention will be paid to the development of the Querdenken organisational network and the factors that influenced the transformation of the movement's collective action. Finally, the process of institutionalization of the protest movement will be analyzed. The findings of this study provide an in-depth overview of the collective action of a protest movement, which, in action and interaction, elaborates and redefines social problems and their solutions, then goals and means, within a framework of practices and repertoires of action that change in the course of mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with how the rise of far-right politics is normalized in local participatory processes. Starting with the observation that emerging accounts in planning scholarship scandalize the far right as an extrinsic threat to planning paradigms, I set out to challenge this line of thought, arguing that planning is no neutral safeguard of liberal democracy. I do so by drawing on social sciences literature on the issue of normalization, which captures how far-right ideologies are subsumed into the mainstream, i.e. how formerly tabooed topics of far-right discourse become 'normal', shifting the boundaries of the 'sayable'. To understand how normalization occurs within participatory processes, I mobilize the work of political theorist Olson, who theorizes how racism is ingrained in liberal democracy through the idea of 'white democracy' – thus potentially enabling the legitimization of far-right contestations. Engaging a conversation with conceptual models of participation in planning, I analyse how 'white democracy' manifests in two of the most central approaches to participation, communicative and agonistic planning perspectives. This is illustrated through the case of local citizens dialogues in Germany. Concluding this literature-based analysis, I propose three analytical and practical shifts to challenge the normalization of far-right contestations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western Europe has recently experienced increasing protest mobilisation by right-wing populist movements. Although these movements are receiving increasing scholarly attention, systematic data on protest activities is limited. In this research note, original data is used to describe the protest activity of Germany's Pegida movement across space and time and to explore the city-level determinants of protest mobilisation. The protest dataset records 373 events with more than 337,000 participants in major cities between 2014 and 2017. The data documents the involvement of right extremists during the protests and illustrates the movement's nativist and anti-elitist orientation. The correlational analysis of the determinants of protest activity shows that protests are less likely in cities with a large foreign-born population and lower income levels. Moreover, protests correlate with vote shares for the right-wing populist party AfD, underlining the party-movement linkage and the local entrenchment of right-wing ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Journal of Social Work is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The far right is on the rise across Europe. In Germany, the political party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has had striking success in several elections, establishing itself in parliaments across the country. Although Christianity comes up in the programmes and the politics of this party, theologians in Germany have been hesitant to engage the rise of the far right. In this review, I present two publications that put an end to this hesitation. Although I cannot cover each and every chapter, I aim to showcase the key concerns and the key concepts of both publications in order to stress the contrast between them. Both theologically and politically, the stakes are high. The question of how to respond to the rise of the far right, I suggest, cuts to the core of the conceptualization of the identity of Christianity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Araucaria is the property of Araucaria-Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofia, Politica y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the possibility of unintended side effects, experiments in civil society like urban gardens, sustainable housing projects, ecovillages, and so forth are associated with transformative capacities in light of an increasingly serious social-ecological crisis. The tide of the political far right, however, demonstrates that outcomes of civil society engagement undermining emancipatory sustainability are hardly just unintended effects. Therefore, I analyze the role of experimental ecopolitics for the far right by means of the example of völkisch settlers in Germany, which are diverse far-right actors practicing a strategy of rural community building. After discussing whether these practices can be understood as ecopolitical experimentation, I reflect on its tensions with far-right climate-change denialism and its relevance for future scenarios of climate politics. I suggest that despite ideological differences, far-right environmentalism of everyday corresponds with characteristic elements of experimental practices of non-far-right experimentation. Representing far-right politics beyond anti-environmentalism and denial, far-right experimentation might provide bridge building and enable potential cooptation of non-far-right experiments and participatory sustainability governance. Further, it represents an agenda of exclusive authoritarian sustainability and ethno-securitization of climate change that—as recent COVID-19 protests have indicated—has a potential for social resonance far beyond the organized far right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the backdrop of multiple European crises and the end of the 'liberal consensus' on European integration, this article explores the increasing politicisation of 'Europe' by the populist far right. As a case study, it focuses on how key far-right actors in Germany deploy a term from the country's intellectual history, namely the notion of the Abendland ('Occident'), to construct 'Europe' and 'European civilisation' according to an exclusionary and populist political agenda. Drawing from the toolboxes of conceptual history and ethnography, the interpretive analysis traces the long-term semiotic shifts of the concepts of Abendland and 'Europe' in the context of post-war democratisation, European integration and social liberalisation. Applying a rhetorical lens to original empirical material, the article explains how contemporary far-right players strategically 'redescribe' the Abendland to mobilise it in the struggle over the meaning of 'Europe'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why is far-right rhetoric so dangerous? In recent years, scholars and policy makers alike have striven to unpack the black box of extremists' online communication and the rise of far-right violence. Particularly the role of social media in spreading hate speech and fostering radicalization has caught a lot of attention; however, there has been little success in pinning down the drivers of violence. Drawing on the concept of dangerous speech, we take a step back from the violent effects of far-right online communication. Instead, we examine its logical functioning to illuminate the upstream processes that constitute hate and legitimize violence. More concretely, we study how far-right narratives employed on social media mobilize emotions that prepare for the acceptance or even use of violence. Analyzing the argumentative structures of two anti-immigration campaigns in Germany, we find a network of narratives where narratives of imperilment— supported by narratives of conspiracy and inequality—converge into a greater story of national threat and awakening. By constructing a situation of collective self-defense, violence becomes a logical option, even if violent action is not explicitly proposed. Counter-narrative efforts should thus not only focus on hate speech but also address the myths of victimhood, which are constitutive of (violent) palingenetic fantasies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the far-right’s foreign policy outlook? Although International Relations scholarship has provided important insights into the foreign policy preferences of far-right actors, it has predominantly analysed these political actors under the label of populism and focused on the effects of populism on foreign policy positions. Consequently, we lack a clear understanding of the impact of far-right ideology on foreign policy beliefs and preferences. This article provides a theorization of far-right foreign policy by deriving its key characteristics from far-right ideology. It tests this theoretical framework through a comparative analysis of the foreign policy preferences of the populist radical-right Alternative for Germany and the extreme-right, Neo-Nazi National Democratic Party of Germany. The comparative analysis of primary textual data reveals a shared far-right foreign policy outlook characterized by (1) ultra-nationalism, (2) group-based enmity, (3) authoritarianism, (4) revisionism and reactionism and (5) producerist-nationalistic economic positions, but also some important variations in the pursuit of these positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper reflects on the externalisation of violence in media discourses about migration in Germany. I discuss in how far news media build discursive bridges to masculist and far-right groups. To this end, I draw on some of the findings of my research project 'Genderism' in Media Debate. Thematic cycles from 2006 to 2016. Soldierly masculinity is seen as hegemonic in the far right. By means of an alleged crisis of masculinity and victimisation of men, this is linked to masculist concepts. The far right as well as masculists accuse women, especially feminists, of being to blame for the effeminacy of men. This crisis of masculinity is considered a problem, to which soldierly masculinity is offered as a solution. The findings of the mentioned genderism-project show that news media discuss the crisis of masculinity, as well as the blaming of feminists. Yet, they do not take up far-right concepts directly. Masculist views can be regarded as the central pillar of a discursive bridge between news media and far-right concepts of masculinity. I argue that the notion of a discursive bridge only works with masculist views as intermediary between news media and the far right. Thus, masculism is a crucial ideology to link far-right views regarding discourses in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay analyses the use of the term "gender madness" and "lost manliness" in the discourse of the right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AFD). It draws on analyses of public statements, policy papers, manifestos and public speeches. It argues that the "gender" theme constitutes a discoursive cluster that is used link otherwise eclectic policies. Furthermore, it is utilised to articulate certain folkish and ethno-nationalist ideas while at the same time helping to avoid open references to extremist language. By presenting itself as the custodian of traditional heterosexuality and family values the AFD creates yet another dimension of the populist dichotomy of "us" versus "them". This is underpinned by a sophisticated media strategy that seeks create an image of authenticity and immediacy between party and supporters. On the whole, the piece analyses and explains the central importance of "anti-genderism" in the discourse of the populist right in Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the Pegida movement from Germany, arguing that Pegida has to be seen as a special form of a populist right movement. Besides sharing the basic characteristics of such a movement, it also displays attributes from other forms of right-wing activism. The additional forms of right-wing activism identified as influential for Pegida were autonomous nationalism and ethnopluralism. These forms of activism contributed to the movement on different levels and their combination accounts for the special, hybrid form of Pegida. This analysis builds upon social movement theory and is based upon primary data collected in interviews with participants and from the official Facebook website of the movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Two Homelands / Dve Domovini is the property of Scientific Research Centre of Slovenian Academy of Sciences & Arts and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Right-wing populists have emerged and endured in democracies globally, threatening democracy through their attacks on liberal institutions. Beyond these proximate threats, relatively little is known about how right-wing populists impact public opinion. This article addresses this gap, exploring change in democratic satisfaction among non-populist voters in two recent elections with right-wing populist success: the 2016 Brexit referendum in the U.K. and the 2017 election of the far-right, populist Alternative für Deutschland in Germany. Leveraging high quality panel data, we reveal democratic satisfaction among the mainstream electorate declines after right-wing populists win. Conversely right-wing populist voters appear to be no more or less satisfied in democracy regardless of the election outcome. In addition, we find mainstream variation in democratic satisfaction is not due to an election loss generally, but right-wing populist success specifically. These findings hence demonstrate the threat that right-wing populism poses to democratic support even among its opponents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article puts the 1999 German Nationality Act into a comparative European perspective. By applying a common measure of the relative restrictiveness or inclusiveness of a country's citizenship policy to the countries of the EU-15 at two different time periods, it provides an analysis of change both within and across countries. From this perspective, Germany has clearly moved "up" from having the single most restrictive law before the 1999 reform to a more moderate policy today. Yet Germany's major "liberalizing change" was also tempered by a significant "restrictive backlash." The German case therefore provides support for a broader theoretical argument about the potential for mobilized anti-immigrant public opinion to nullify the liberalization that often occurs within the realm of elite politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to explain the variation in the electoral success of far-right parties in Germany and Austria over the past several decades. It argues that the reaction of existing political parties, the tabloid press and civil society to right-wing populism has been different in the two states, and that these differences help explain the divergent development of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the German Republicans (REPs). The article explores how the strategies of mainstream political forces affect the coalition markets, party organizations, political recruitment and perceived legitimacy of right-wing populist parties. It concludes by surveying recent developments concerning the far right in Austria and eastern Germany. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the 1990s, in the aftermath of a series of brutal attacks on foreigners and asylum-seekers, seventeen neo-Nazi organizations have been banned in Germany. In addition, public events such as the yearly marches in honour of Rudolf Hess have been prohibited. It is for this reason that some members of the neo-Nazi movement have turned to the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany), which, under a new leadership, has opened its ranks to neo-Nazi skinheads. Another part of the violent far right has developed new organizational modes of operation, without central, rigid or formal structures. Small, locally based groups--the so-called freie Kameradschaften (free fellowships) have been set up and are operating mainly at a local or regional level. Co-operation between them is ­guaranteed by regular meetings and by longstanding contacts between their leaders. If the freie Kameradschaften are analysed as a social movement, one can identify numerous groupuscules within the German neo-Nazi scene that contribute, each in its own specific way, to its continuity, development and diversification. One of the more relevant of these groupuscules is the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland (Northern Germany Action Bureau), whose ideology is openly neo-Nazi. Its main field of activity is its Internet website, from which it appeals to its supporters to take part in neo-Nazi demonstrations and virtually organized campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]