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Two years after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Greek economy seems to have overcome the turmoil of the pandemic crisis as well as that of the following energy crisis. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the Greek economy has returned to a sound state, since this was not really the case even before the pandemic. Furthermore, the anemic growth rates of the pre-pandemic period were followed by an equally weak average growth rate (including the impact of the pandemic), as some of the significant fundamental weaknesses of the Greek economy, which had accumulated over time and constituted the real origin of the Greek crisis, have not been properly addressed yet. This paper attempts a complete mapping of the current state of the Greek economy, offering an insight into the external and internal determinants affecting it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationships between Greek macroeconomic variables, examining before and after the euro's introduction as a currency. We conducted an extensive analysis from 1980 to 2019, examining various economic indicators such as government expenditure, unemployment rates, taxation, inflation, and national debt, employing causal and correlation analysis and econometric modeling with and without time-varying effects. The results revealed a significant correlation between the introduction of the euro and a tighter relationship between government spending and unemployment levels, while one more remarkable point was that higher government spending or debt reduction initiatives appeared to positively impact joblessness, particularly in the context of the euro. Our research underscored the correlation between national debt and government spending as increased debt led to reduced government expenditure and vice versa. Unemployment cited an increased impact on government spending right after the euro adoption, and on the other hand, the effect of unemployment on government spending decreased. The debt–government spending nexus was decreasing for many years before the euro adoption, while just before the euro adoption, the relationship between debt and government spending was rather stable. Finally, during the euro adoption, the effect of inflation on tax increased, while the corresponding inflation tax remained stable. Our findings have significant implications for policymakers shaping the economic strategies in Greece as they point out the necessity for stable and balanced approaches that manage government spending and debt to address unemployment effectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27th of July 2022, the European Central Bank (ECB) responding to emerging inflation pressures increased the interest rate of the main refinancing operation to 0.5% up from 0.0% which was the norm for the second half of the previous decade. Since then, the ECB responded to inflationary shocks by increasing interest rates nine more times till 20 September 2023, reaching 4.5%. Following these unprecedented hikes in ECB interest rates, Greek banks responded swiftly by raising their lending interest rates, whereas they kept deposit rates at very low levels with the net interest margin (NIM) being at 2.6% in the first half of 2023 compared to 1.5% in the Euro-area while in November 2023, the Greek NIM was raised further to 4.83%, which was more than twice the corresponding NIM at 2.4% of Euro Area banks. Our dynamic panel VAR analysis study examines whether the oligopolistic structure of the Greek banking industry contributes to this divergence in NIM. This high NIM has induced a staggering increase in net interest income of Greek banks by 59.9% in 2023 compared to 2022 from 2.54 mil euros to 4.07 mil euros. During the same period, Greece reported a negative saving rate at − 4%, as people resorted to their savings to cope with greedflation in consumer goods. We show that successive interest rate hikes by the ECB aimed to reduce inflation have positively contributed to the sustainability of the Greek banking industry by building up stronger capital buffers and accelerating amortization of the deferred tax credits mainly through the channel of NIM. Alas, the high cost of diverging Greek NIM from the rest of the Euro Area hurts credit expansion and fuels existing greedflation by generating its own bankflation. Our study shows that EU policymakers should accelerate the banking union in the Euro Area which would enhance competitive pressures for Greek banks and potentially reduce NIM and tackle bankflation. The regaining of Greece's investment grade gives the impetus to the convergence of Greek NIM to euro area ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper aims to identify how economic evolutions related to health conditions during the Covid-19 pandemic. The research includes an analysis on the evolutions of the health and economic conditions during the Covid-19 health crisis and also on they way they are linked to each other. The investigation is conducted at country level and is exemplified on two European countries, namely Italy and Greece. The methodology employed was based on three types of analyses: descriptive, correlation and comparative analyses that used secondary data from international organizations. Results illustrate that the economic life was affected by the Covid-19 conditions (Covid-19 incidence and the associated restrictions), with inflation being the most affected in both countries. At the same time, international trade was affected differently in the two countries, with Italy being negatively and more intensively affected than Greece, for which the association was positive and rather weak. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article relates to debates about dependency of countries in the global political economy. It conceptualises dependency by drawing on the concept of 'mechanisms of dependency', and builds a synergy with the Comparative Capitalisms (CC) literature (i.e. institutional and third-generation perspectives). The article expands the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) framework by applying the established category of Dependent Market Economy to Greece. Building on financialisation as a mechanism of dependency, the article argues this locked Greece into reliance on external debt, dependent position within the Eurozone, as well as vulnerable situation after reforms demanded by the creditors were implemented. However, due to internal historical-structural issues with its capitalist model, Greece was unable to minimise the negative impact of financialised dependence, and is internally weakly prepared to escape from its peripheral status in the future if external dependence will be removed. The article argues that conceptual synergy between dependency theory and the CC literature is desirable in order to provide a more holistic account of interaction between external and internal factors in the context of dependent capitalist varieties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Greek Economic Outlook report states that headline inflation in Greece was 1.6% in September 2023, below the European Central Bank's target of 2.0%. However, core inflation remained high at 3.9%. Rising food prices were the main driver of inflation, while the housing group had a significant negative contribution. Greece had the third lowest inflation rate in the Eurozone, which had an overall inflation rate of 4.3%. The report provides detailed data on the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) in Greece, including monthly data and annual percentage changes in various categories. It also analyzes external and internal inflationary pressures in the Greek economy, focusing on the impact of the import deflator on GDP and internal demand deflator. The report examines price developments of imported goods and differences between Greece and the euro area. It concludes by discussing the contribution of unit profits and unit labor costs to domestic inflation in Greece, highlighting the positive contribution of unit profits and the negative contribution of unit labor costs. The report suggests that companies have passed on increases in energy costs to product prices, contributing to inflation. [Extracted from the article]

Post World War II, Greece was enjoying, by and large, significant economic growth that was only slightly lower than that of other Western European nations. However, immediately after the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the country faced a sovereign debt crisis. This continuing multifaceted crisis reached the populace as a series of restrictive measures and sudden reforms (what James K. Galbraith (2016) labels "economic policy as moral abomination"), which resulted in a very long recession, high unemployment, massive inequalities and marginalization, increased social exclusion, and huge migration of thousands of well-educated Greeks. Within such economic development context, this contribution provides an overview of Greece's past economic development efforts and challenges (Section 1); discusses important notions of a highly interventionist developmental state framework with "Greek characteristics" as its main focus (Section 2); and offers developmental state-based policy implications, which are deemed necessary for the revival and global repositioning of Greek industrial sectors of high potential and achievability (Section 3). Summary and conclusions end the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Manufacturing productivity in CEE has converged driven by large investments and the catch–up effect. • The Visegrad group converged by investing hugely, mainly in advanced industries. • Other, CEE countries have converged largely due to catch–up effect. • Lately, improving institutions have been an important driver of convergence in CEE. • Low investment and deteriorating institutions hindered convergence in the southern EU countries. This paper shows that CEE countries converge in manufacturing productivity to more developed EU countries, while southern EU countries have failed to converge. Large investments in CEE manufacturing sectors, particularly in the Visegrad group, and the related catch–up effect are the main convergence drivers. We also found that the relative importance of growth drivers varies across the CEE countries and over the time, revealing some regularity and explaining the recent slowdown in convergence pace. In contrast, low manufacturing investments in Portugal, Greece, and Spain, and weak institutions in Italy and Greece caused their lagging behind in productivity growth. The findings stem from robustly estimated growth regressions for a panel of EU countries over the period 1995–2019. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between the interest rate policy of banks and the market concentration of the banking system, and what is the interconnection with international developments and interest rate hikes by central banks? We answer this question by focusing on the Greek banking industry. Following the key interest rate hikes by the European Central Bank, an asymmetric response takes place in Greece and the Eurozone with respect to the pricing of loan and deposit interest rates. In Greece, the interest rate spread between loans and deposits is one of the highest in the Eurozone and hits new record highs. This is because, on the one hand, loan interest rates increased immediately and, on the other hand, banks slightly passed on interest rate rises to deposits. Such an asymmetric behavior could be explained by the --highly concentrated-- Greek banking sector in recent years, highlighting the importance of substantially improving competition in the domestic sector under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The IMF's 2010 Troika lending programme with Greece was unprecedented due to the IMF's controversial internal rule changes, the programme's pivotal effects on eurozone crisis policies and the effect of austerity concepts on Greece. We aim to explain conclusively why the IMF lent to Greece without restructuring, as previous explanations have crucial gaps. We operationalise Ben Clift's theory of IMF behaviour in process-tracing, analysing programme-related text sources. Our exercise is novel as Clift does not aim to explain individual programmes, while the theory warrants further testing. According to our causal mechanism, the IMF used two key analytical lenses formed via bricolage, fiscal space and nonlinear multiple equilibria processes (NLMEP), to analyse the programme context and formulate the programme design. While we find our mechanism too narrow to explain the programme design, our results regarding the role of NLMEP and fiscal space within IMF programme-time economic analysis support the importance of financial contagion as a motivator for monetarily significant IMF participation and why the IMF adhered to austerity despite risking debt stabilisation. However, it seems limitedly useful to assume coherent ideational drivers behind the precise programme design: instead, accepting the key role of ad hoc judgement depicts IMF behaviour accurately. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study identifies socioeconomic, political, and institutional factors that shape extensive budget unbalances in four European Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain), causing significant deficits and a public debt equal to (or above) 120% of their respective Gross Domestic Product at the end of 2020. The regression analysis, run on official statistics, demonstrates that the dynamics of fiscal deficits in these countries are largely heterogeneous. This outcome suggests that the various factors and contexts considered here exert different effects in each country. Political factors played an important role in Greece, being less important in Spain, and having a negligible role in both Italy and Portugal. On the contrary, institutional factors were recognized as particularly important in Greece, Italy, and Portugal. Although important almost everywhere, the magnitude of the impact of economic factors also differed across the four countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely known that both geography and institutions determine the location of an investment. However, little is known about the impact of these factors on entrepreneurs' future business plans. Using a questionnaire survey, this paper examines whether the 'first-' and 'second-nature' geography and institutions affect the plans of entrepreneurs to expand or sell their businesses in Greece. The analysis shows that entrepreneurs intend to expand their businesses when the importance of the country's relative geographical location to the international market increases, but that of localisation economies decreases. There is also evidence that entrepreneurs aim to sell their businesses to domestic investors when sea access, the natural environment, the agglomeration economies, the location of Greece and the local governance are ideal for the business performance in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between 2010 and 2015 Greek banks received capital injections as part of an EU-led rescue package that left the Greek state with large losses on their investments and a debt to repay; in the most acute moments of the crisis the European central bank twice forced the Bank of Greece to assume sole responsibility for any losses on lending to Greek banks, and; in 2015 Greek banks were subject to EU-mandated controls that restricted the transformation of Greek bank deposits into Euros in other forms. Why did European banking infrastructure leave the Greek state facing losses and liabilities alone, while still full members of the EU and Euro Area (EA)? We find that European banking infrastructure is combined-but-not-unified, and that integration requires both. Drawing on Marxist political economy we examine the financial mechanisms in detail and find a scalar split in state provision of banking infrastructure in the EU/EA. At the supranational level, the removal of barriers to cross-border banking and a common rule book. Meanwhile, promises of monetary support, such as deposit guarantees and lending of last resort have largely remained the responsibility of nation states. The combined-but-not-unified structure ensured that when crisis struck, Greece was isolated, yet still fully part of the EU/EA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the effect of Eurosystem asset purchase programmes (APP) on the monthly yields of 10-year sovereign bonds for 11 euro area sovereigns during January–December 2020. The analysis is based on time-varying coefficient methods applied to monthly panel data covering the period 2004m09–2020m12. During 2020, APP contributed to an average decline in yields estimated in the range of 58–76 bps. In December 2020, the effect per EUR trillion ranged between 34 bps in Germany and 159 bps in Greece. Stronger effects generally display diminishing returns. Our findings suggest that a sharp decline in the size of the APP in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis could lead to very sharp increases in bond yields, particularly in peripheral countries. The analysis additionally reveals a differential response to global risks between core and peripheral countries, with the former enjoying safe-haven benefits. Markets' perceptions of risk are found to be significantly affected by credit ratings, which is in line with recent evidence based on constant parameter methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the financial and debt crises in the euro area and the global COVID pandemic, governments supported their economies by increasing borrowing and accumulating debt with ambiguous long-run effects on non-performing loans (NPLs). We empirically investigate the determinants of NPLs using quarterly (2003Q1-2020Q2) aggregate data for Greece and applying the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach. We offer new policy-making relevant evidence by showing that government debt has a significant and positive long-term impact on NPLs irrespective of possible short-term dynamics that appear to provide a temporary relief. Fiscal balance, on the contrary, exerts a negative long-term effect justifying the quest for surpluses post-COVID. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the drivers of research performance of 1431 economists from six European countries. Data from the Scopus database are collected. We compare the relative performance of economists from three northern European countries: Belgium, Denmark and Germany with three from the south: Greece, Italy and Portugal. Relative performance is measured as the deviation from the country average in both citations and papers. The dependent variables take the value of 1 if the productivity of the researcher is above the country average and 0 if it is below. Probit/logit analysis is employed and marginal effects are estimated to examine the significance of factors like the country of their PhD studies, gender and inbreeding at the national level. A US PhD or a German PhD affects negatively the relative productivity of German economists. Inbreeding at the national level (locally trained economists) reduces productivity among Greek, Italian and Portuguese economists. Gender is significant in the case of Denmark, Germany and Italy, but it does not affect productivity in Belgium, Greece and Portugal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study investigates the impact of institutional factors on firms investing in R&D. Design/methodology/approach: The study uses data from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys for the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Italy and Portugal. A model with institutional factors as explanatory variables and firm performance factors as control variables is estimated with weighted least squares heteroscedasticity corrected regression. The reverse causality problem is addressed by using a two-stage least squares regression approach. Findings: The findings indicate that institutional quality has a significant influence on firms' R&D expenditure. The results have several implications in relation to findings of previous research. Research limitations/implications: The inclusion of more countries that were affected by the European economic crisis will probably give more insights about the effect of institutional factors on R&D. Practical implications: Policy makers have to address short-comings in institutional quality, particularly in terms of the labor regulation burden. Policy makers should prioritize anti-corruption measures to foster an environment that would attract more R&D in the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. Originality/value: This study contributes to the growing body of literature investigating the impact of institutional factors on R&D. It focuses on four developed European countries that bore the brunt of the European economic crisis and have to implement their recovery and resilience plans successfully, in order to recover from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on their economic activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the role and the efficiency of the emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) tool in the Euro area which has been used to confront the contagion in the banking sector and the illiquid financial market conditions. We study four European countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, and Ireland), which have received substantial ELA since the 2008 financial crisis. Through Bayesian VAR models, we seek to determine the effectiveness of national central bank lending, which includes the amount of ELA received by the domestic banking sector, an assessment of the direct effect of ELA on banks' liquidity and lending through deposits thus allowing banks to supply loans. In general, we find that the ELA tool was very effective in alleviating financial strains in these countries' central banks. For the Greek case, in particular, our findings indicate that the ELA was influenced not only from any changes in bank deposits but also from changes in the spread between the 10–year Greek and German government bond yields. Finally, the volume of non‐performing loans in Greek banks was declining to capital injections to banks as their capital base was continually being restored through the ELA mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ten years after the outbreak of economic crisis in Greece, it is deemed necessary to redefine the economic and political conditions in Greece and to answer the question of whether Greece has succeeded in overcoming the crisis. For this reason, the main objective of this special issue entitled 'Eurozone and the Greek Economic Crisis in 2020: Current Challenges and Prospects' is to analyze and re-examine the current economic and political conditions in Greece in various policy areas and to determine whether Greece has succeeded in achieving the last decade objectives both politically and economically. In this special issue we follow rather an interdisciplinary approach with a special focus on political economy which gives us the opportunity to examine the issue of the economic crisis in Greece, through a wider field of understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Privatisation is a strategic policy restructuring the relationship between the state and the market, the public and the private, and hence, the political and the economic. It opens non-capitalist spaces to capital accumulation and creates new markets for international competition. Privatisation alters a society's relationship to public goods, services and rights by commodification practices, and turns into a highly controversial reform in economic restructuring. This paper discusses how privatisation gained priority in Greece with the economic crisis. It incorporates the concept of depoliticisation to offer a new perspective on the analysis of the economic plans, programmes and documents that Greece signed with international creditors for the sake of its economic recovery. It claims that depoliticisation functioned as a strategy for putting privatisation policies onto the agenda by simply reproducing the elusive separation between the political and the economic. The paper argues that introducing extensive privatisation policies through internationally agreed-upon documents confirms the attempt to erode the political character of the process in order to (i) present such policies as a technical, economic imperative, (ii) externalise political decisions, and (iii) limit public discontent. The depoliticisation and privatisation processes reinforce each other in widening the state-market divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on the well-established relationship between economic dynamics and political processes, we focus on the most important element of the political process, namely, general (or national) elections, and look into their effects on public finance and total economic output. In this vein, the present study has three objectives: (i) to investigate political budget cycles in Greece during the period known as the 'Third Hellenic Republic' (in Greek, 'Metapolitefsi', hereafter THR) since 1974; (ii) to assess whether national elections affect total economic activity in a stabilizing or destabilizing way; and (iii) to examine the possible effects of the external sector of the economy on the budget balance. The empirical findings of our analysis document how the Greek economy was characterized by sharp political budget cycles in correspondence with the THR, exerting a destabilizing effect on the total output of the economy. Performances of the external sector of the economy have significantly affected budget balances in Greece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes a novel method to assess whether real investment can be nowcasted based on information that is available on the stock market. The stock market index on a daily sampling frequency is assessed as a predictor of gross fixed capital formation on a quarterly sampling frequency. For France, Germany, Greece, and Spain (four representative countries of eurozone), we find significant empirical evidence that the information from the stock market does produce accurate nowcasting values of gross fixed capital formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we examine the success rate of the memorandum in two peripheral eurozone countries (Ireland and Greece) that had significant differences in organisational structures and their development models. For this reason, we measure the quantile dependence between the returns of corporate bond investors and exchange rates employing a novel econometric methodology, the cross‐quantilogram. In Ireland, our key findings exhibit a higher rate of absorbing of structural reforms which contributes to more steady reinforcement of the enterprises, whether the European economy is stronger than the US or not. In contrast, Greece where the structural reforms are more intense, show a similar picture over a period longer than that of Ireland and only when the European economy goes beyond the US economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We test for the contagion effects stemming from the Greek debt crisis in the daily 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads in nine Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries. To this end, we estimate the dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model of Engle (2002) from January 01, 2003 to December 31, 2015. In addition, we calculate and plot the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval for each DCC series. To the best of our knowledge, this approach of Kchaou and Bellalah (2020) has never been used to study the contagion of the subprime and Greek crises between the 10-year sovereign bond yield spreads of the main EMU countries. Consequently, this approach enables us to compare our results with those of previous works based on other methods. It also offers useful insights to policy makers to address the contagion effect through the implementation of adequate measures. Although the Greek spread played the role of a global factor for the majority of countries during the observation period, the results invalidate the existence of contagious episodes resulting from the Hellenic crisis. We justify these findings either by the weakness of the weight of the Greek economy in the euro area or by the effectiveness of the unconventional monetary policies taken by the European Central Bank (ECB), the bailouts for Greece in 2010, 2012 and 2015 and the austerity measures and structural reforms implemented by the governments of EMU countries. Moreover, DCC between Greece and the other countries have shown a downward behavior during the acute phases of Greek crisis, suggesting a disintegration of the Hellenic bond market with those of other euro area countries during periods of financial turmoil. Furthermore, the results indicate that the subprime crisis affected a large part of these markets well before the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. All these findings provide valuable information for international investors, central bankers and policymakers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the export variable in the Eurozone member countries for 2007-2021. First, we analyze the position of the Eurozone in world trade, and then we examine the importance of its exports in its economic activity. We study the export performance and export specialization of the Eurozone member countries. In addition, we focus on the export competitiveness of the Greek economy. The empirical methodology that we follow for the examination of comparative advantages is based on the index of Revealed Comparative Advantage and is carried out in branches of 2-digit classification based on the Standard Classification of International Trade. In this paper, we focus on comparing export performance and export specialization between countries, which demonstrates the significant differences between them, leading to interesting conclusions in the case of Greece. We also draw useful conclusions about the competitiveness of the products of the Greek economy. Finally, examining this period allows us to explore both the effects of the financial crisis and the debt crisis and the impact of the recent health crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the global economy, tourism is one of the most important sectors, having a multiplier effect on the other branches of the national economy. The increase in tourist arrivals and implicitly the receipts from tourism can have a positive effect on nations, especially on the Gross Domestic Product and employment. Tourism is a key sector of the national economy of Greece. This study analyzes the impact of tourism on economic growth and employment in Greece, for the analyzed period 1995-2019. The regression analysis we made shows that there is a strong long-term relationship between tourism development and economic growth, respectively employment in Greece, suggesting that the policy makers in this country need to further promote economic policy measures to support this important sector of the national economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper attempts to weigh into the debate on whether and if so, to what extent the policy response to the pandemic of the EU, most notably among others, the Recovery and Resilience Fund of the Next Generation EU, its conditionality, and the response of the ECB, marks a qualitative change rather than echoing the legacies of the previous crisis by looking into the case of Greece. According to the third-generation comparative capitalism literature, EU economic integration has been favouring export-led growth models over domestic-demand led ones through several channels, which included fiscal rules, financial support conditionality and monetary policy. During the pandemic, there have been apparent shifts in some of these channels. Greece has entered the pandemic with vulnerabilities from previous economic adjustment programmes it had to follow, large enough to warrant 'enhanced surveillance' by the European Commission, as well as challenging fiscal conditionality to secure some preferential treatment by its Eurozone partners/lenders of its public debt, to improve its fragile sustainability. This article assesses the risks that the Greek Recovery and Resilience Plan may face, given the economic, social and political legacies of and the lingering conditionality from the previous crisis. It thus illustrates how the implementation of the EU response to the pandemic in Greece is constrained by the legacy of the previous crisis despite shifts in policy channels through which the EU economic integration has been shaping national capitalisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to provide a robust defence of Modern Monetary Theory's (MMT's) approach to money. It is argued here that, when compared to the commodity variant of the Marxist theory of money, the insights of MMT provide a superior basis from which to develop economic knowledge. In contrast to Lapavitsas and Aguila, the paper provides arguments in support of MMT's approach which is both theoretically sound and provides satisfying explanations which are in accord with the evidence. This article also highlights the significant mischaracterisation of MMT's approach in Lapavitsas and Aguila and shows how the authors' failure to present an accurate picture of the MMT argument results in their critique missing the mark. Effectively, their criticism applies only to an MMT of their own creation. When Lapavitsas and Aguila turn their attention to Greece, they fail to appreciate the value of the insights provided by MMT and their lack of a detailed understanding of monetary operations in the Eurosystem leads them to make several notable errors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper modifies the income determination model to focus on two viable policies that would raise income in Greece with the government facing sizeable interest and debt payments. The usual macroeconomic policy options are unavailable in the Euro Zone with the balanced budget constraint, outside currency and fixed interest rate. On the monetary side, banking policy reform would eliminate bank account restrictions and mandatory purchase of government bonds. On the real side, investment policy reform would streamline the rent seeking bureaucracy. Together these policy reforms lead to income overshooting with a transitory trade surplus raising the money supply. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the interconnections between sovereign debt and the competitiveness of nations in the aftermath of the recent sovereign debt crises in the Eurozone. Further, it identifies new challenges to improving competitiveness. Based on a deductive approach, we analyse secondary data regarding sovereign debt and competitiveness in 28 EU countries for the period from 2006 to 2017. We also look at the recent theoretical developments in the competitiveness of companies, nations, and regions with the goal of identifying the new challenges to Portuguese competitiveness. In the period under analysis, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal had considerable losses in competitiveness and increases in their sovereign debt ratio. Despite benefiting directly from Porter's insights into improving the country's competitiveness, the Portuguese sovereign debt ratio has increased steeply. A previous analysis identified a path; however, there are new challenges such as those associated with EU competitiveness, shared value, and smart connected products. These need to be considered to support the creation of new strategies and policies for a small and open economy. Based on our analysis, we argue that competitiveness-oriented policies must more explicitly consider the negative implications of sovereign debt, and must recognize the new challenges to competitiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The crisis in Greece in the last decade has led to a wide economic transition, raising the question of whether Greece can be understood as a kind of a 'post-growth' society. The article has two aims. First, it examines how the Greek crisis has been discussed within the post-growth debate and focuses on three views: Greece as a post-growth anti-paradigm, Greece as an opportunity for democratic post-growth and austerity in Greece as a path for anti-Keynesian degrowth. Second, the article examines how ideas and projects with a post-growth orientation have influenced specific social initiatives born out of the crisis period in Greece. Some of these initiatives are reviewed (self-organized social and economic collectives, grassroots initiatives for solidarity, solidarity economy actions, etc.). As further discussed in the article, these initiatives were part of a broader 'countermovement' (Polanyi), and they faded together with other forms of labour and social protest, in accordance with events at the central political scene, and especially SYRIZA's adoption of Memoranda politics. It is observed that in the post-Memoranda era in Greece, although past strategies of social reproduction are either unavailable (the pre-crisis finance-led growth model) or no longer equally effective (the familistic social model) and fiscal discipline remains, the search for other alternatives, including social initiatives with a post-growth orientation, did not actually extend as was expected, due to some new growth opportunities, e.g. in the field of tourism. It is finally concluded that, although they constituted an important part of the Greek countermovement, born as responses to the crisis, these social initiatives did not manage to consolidate more permanent structures of social action that could successfully challenge the neoliberal agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares the impact of the Eurozone crisis on the foreign policies of Greece and Portugal from a de-Europeanization perspective. These two Southern European countries were significantly Europeanized in the past and both suffered greatly from the Euro crisis. Focusing on the Troika period and on relations with China, the article shows that both Greece and Portugal's foreign policies towards Beijing went through an important degree of de-Europeanization during the Eurozone crisis. Such effect was, however, more intense and durable in the case of Greece, much driven by domestic politics. These national factors were intimately connected with exogenous drivers, such as EU-level developments and Beijing's agency, both more relevant for illuminating the case of Portugal. Ultimately, the Eurozone crisis strengthened the influence of external actors like China over EU foreign policy-making, working as a complementary driver of de-Europeanization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the Greek sovereign debt crisis in the aftermath of the 2007-8 global financial crisis looking for barriers to, and engines of, growth. The vehicle is a calibrated medium-scale micro-founded macroeconomic model. Departing from 2008, our simulations show that the adopted economic adjustment program (the fiscal austerity mix combined with the fiscal and monetary assistance provided by the EU, ECB and IMF), jointly with the observed deterioration in institutional quality (the degree of protection of property rights) can explain most (around 22% of GDP) of the cumulative loss in GDP in the data (around 26% of GDP) between 2008 and 2016. In particular, the economic adjustment program can explain a fall of around 12%, while the deterioration in property rights accounts for another 10%. Counterfactual simulations, on the other hand, show that this loss could have been around 9% only, if the country had followed a different fiscal policy mix; if the degree of product marker liberalization was closer to that in the core euro zone countries; and, above all, if institutional quality in Greece had simply remained at its pre-crisis level. On the other hand, in the absence of the official fiscal bailouts, the depression would be much deeper, while, the accommodative role played by the quantitative policies of the ECB has been vital to the Greek economy. These results can be useful in the face of the ongoing covid-19 crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: A growing amount of micro-data analyses has highlighted the importance of information trails, such as generated by card transactions, for improving tax compliance. Yet, time series evidence indicating a positive effect of card payments on VAT revenue performance has been scarce. This paper revisits the question of the effect of card payments on VAT revenue by using annual and quarterly panel data for the 19 euro area member states, covering the period 2000–2016. Design/methodology/approach: A panel VECM is employed in order to address endogeneity issues and to account for common stochastic trends, which, is shown to be crucial in revealing the anticipated positive effect of card use on the performance of VAT. Findings: The analysis confirms that a higher share of card payments in private consumption increases VAT revenue and the efficiency of revenue collection. Higher gains are estimated for countries with above average self-employment. Originality/value: The contribution of the paper is twofold. First, to our knowledge it provides the first confirmation of the well-established literature on information trails using aggregate macroeconomic time series in a multi-country setting. Second, it has very timely policy implications, as low-hanging fruit are identified in euro-area economies with much to gain from strengthening the credibility of their fiscal performance, such as Greece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the financial stress interconnectedness among Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS) economies and Germany. Based on market-level financial stress indices, we examine the stress transmission process as well as the causal network relationships in banking sector, bond, money, and stock markets. The period under investigation, 2001–2013, allows to test the effects of the 2007–2009 financial crisis as well as the subsequent European sovereign crisis. Using two alternative techniques for connectedness analysis, our evidence suggests that the peripheral economies of Italy and Spain play a highly significant role in the stress transmission in all markets, especially in the cases of banks and equity markets. Moreover, we visualize our results using network analysis. Contrary to common wisdom, Portugal, Ireland, and mainly Greece do not seem to have an important role in amplifying stress levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article compares and contrasts Modern Monetary Theory and Marxist monetary theory focusing on the relationship of money to commodities, the role of state power in monetary processes, and the significance of global hierarchy for world money. Money is a social relation, as MMT claims, but for Marxist theory capitalist money is specifically a relation of class, both domestically and internationally. The room for state policy is correspondingly constrained, not least because the international monetary system is hierarchical. These issues are placed in historical context by analyzing a politically important plan for Eurozone exit during the Greek crisis of the 2010s. It is shown that regaining monetary sovereignty was a demanding technical problem but also, and more fundamentally, a class issue embedded in relations of international subordination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on blame avoidance suggests that politicians seek to avoid the risk of electoral punishment by means of blame‐shifting. Based on a quantitative content analysis of public responsibility attributions, this article explores public blame‐shifting among Greek and Spanish parties in austerity governments during the eurozone crisis. Arguing that blame avoidance behavior in times of austerity is conditioned by party ideology, the findings suggest that incumbent left‐wing parties are more inclined to shift the blame whereas conservative parties also claim credit. The article then explores how the European character of the crisis influenced the patterns of blame‐shifting. The results show firstly, that external blame‐shifting rose significantly in times of incumbency, when foreign actors appeared to be ideal scapegoats; secondly, external blame‐shifting in the crisis was slightly more common among left‐wing parties. The article contributes to assessing the role of party ideology for blame‐shifting and it helps to understand blame‐shifting in European policy fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

EMU structural asymmetries contributed directly to both procyclical debt-fuelled growth pre-crisis and sharply recessionary adjustment post-crisis. Greece's fiscal and debt crisis represented an 'orthodox' national failure inside EMU, yet the underlying reason for the Euro-Area financial crisis was external imbalances generated by EMU asymmetries. Exclusive reliance on internal devaluation, lack of a Euro-Area countercyclical response, and financial fragmentation, all accentuated the cost of asymmetric adjustment to crisis. The asymmetric EMU institutional framework also necessitated a greater reliance on intergovernmental activism to engineer ad hoc interventions, at the expense of both the Community method and democratic procedure. Financial markets mispriced sovereign risk, failing to counterbalance EMU asymmetries. The Greek crisis prompted the Euro Area to develop stronger policies and institutions and to eschew an extreme existential challenge. EMU is stronger at 20, yet with persisting asymmetries, old and new, and insufficiently equipped to face the next major crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains the sharp divide in European public attitudes toward Grexit? We explore this question using original surveys from four of the largest European economies. We contend that differences in economic self-interest, and the often-mentioned chasm between supporters of mainstream and extremist parties, provide little insight into the public divide over Grexit. Instead, we show that the key factor is the split between the left and the right. We then develop and test a set of theoretical explanations for the prominence of this cleavage. We find that the left-right divide over Grexit is not driven by differences in attitudes on redistribution, levels of empathy, or general European Union support. Instead, left and right voters seem to have different expectations about how a default and exit of a currency-union member would affect the European economy. These expectations likely reflect differences in core beliefs about the consequences of a free-market approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Greek public debt restructuring that took place in 2012 through the twin scheme of the Private Sector Involvement (PSI) and the Official Sector Involvement (OSI) has had a major impact on the institutional structure of the EU economic governance. The retroactive introduction of Collective Action Clauses (CACs) into the Greek legal order that formed the legal basis for restructuring was adopted in art. 12(3) of the ESM Treaty and is now a legal obligation of all Member States. The 2012 intervention was a "workshop" in the fields of European Law, International Economic Law and Public Debt Restructuring Law. The legal structure of the 2012 intervention has successfully undergone multiple judicial reviews (GreekCourts, Courts of other EU Member States, CJEU and EGC, ECtHR, ICSID). The Greek operation of 2012 was by far the largest restructuring ofpublic debt, and at the same time a restructuring that was carried out with legal certainty, despite the involvement of many legal orders. It is therefore a point of reference for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article concerns the changing conditions of fiscal sovereignty within the Eurozone in the context of the evolution of the EU's institutional crisis-management framework during the recent financial crisis. It begins with a method-of-difference approach to compare the dynamics and outcomes of the crisis in the Greek and Hungarian economies, on the basis of their similarly troubled fiscal positions and domestic political environments. On this basis, an argument is made that the outcomes in Greece (i.e. a breakdown in national fiscal sovereignty and severe economic losses) were not an inevitable product of the economic fundamentals, but at least partially attributable to uncertainty about the extent and expedience of financial assistance through the Eurozone's crises management institutions. The European Central Bank's (ECB) 2012 declaration of "unlimited support" for Eurozone governments has done much to calm markets, but has also created an institution with an ambiguous and self-imposed "dual-mandate". This article concludes that the precedent established by the last crisis has created a fraught situation, leaving the Eurozone without viable options that are both economically efficacious and politically legitimate. Relying on either the ECB or the European Stability Mechanism to manage any future crisis could well provoke a backlash among the Eurozone member states as national fiscal sovereignty is eclipsed by ever-deeper ad hoc financial commitments on the part of the institutions of crisis management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the rise of new conflicts of sovereignty especially with regard to popular sovereignty in the EU polity. It asks whether referenda in the national realm are effective tools to enhance popular sovereignty at supranational level. To elucidate this question, we distinguish between embedded and unilateral referenda. Empirically, the paper focuses on the referendum called by the Greek government on the proposed Memorandum of Understanding in 2015. While ambiguous from the outset, the referendum turned out to be of an embedded nature and failed to enhance popular sovereignty. Based on elite interviews and analysis of the discussion in the media, our analysis shows that the referendum was envisaged by the Greek government instrumentally to put pressure on the other negotiating parties and tackle internal party disagreements. This turned out to be a self-defeating strategy ignoring the popular mandate and failing to improve the conditions for financial assistance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exchange rate volatility is said to have negative or positive effects on trade flows, depending on the degree of traders' risk aversion. However, due to changes in their expectations, the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade flows could be asymmetric. We add to this new asymmetry literature by investigating the impact of dollar-euro volatility on the U.S. trade flows with each of the 12 original members of the euro zone in order to identify members that are hurt by volatility. We find that trade flows of the U.S. with all members are affected by volatility asymmetrically in the short run. The short-run asymmetric effects last into long-run asymmetric effects in U.S. exports to nine of the 12 members and in U.S. imports from two members. Additional analysis revealed that increased exchange rate volatility will boost U.S. exports to Greece and U.S. imports from Austria and Portugal. On the other hand, decreased volatility will hurt U.S. exports to Greece and boost its exports to Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal while having no long-run impact on U.S. imports from any partner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]