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To promote export-oriented industries, the Government of India and the state governments encourage SEZs through financial incentives and regulatory relaxations, including lax land acquisition policies. The author further argues that the market-based pricing mechanisms used to acquire land in these transportation corridor regions undermine the I raison d'être i of these corridors because these mechanisms lead to sharp land value increases that are detrimental to economic development. In this chapter, the author studies the land acquisition process of the Khed Special Economic Zone (SEZ). [Extracted from the article]

Globally, governments at all levels—national to local—are fiscally constrained, especially in the developing countries of the Global South (Africa, Latin and Central America, and the developing countries of Asia). One such country is India, which is also experiencing rapid growth in urban populations and is seeking additional revenues from public finance sources, such as development charges. In India, these charges need to meet the rational nexus principle to be legally robust. Through a review of India's state-level enabling legislation, this article seeks to identify ways in which the enabling legal framework for development charges can promote or hamper the rational nexus principle. Finally, this article provides insights that can help jurisdictions in India, and potentially in other Global South countries, craft or amend enabling legislation so that such legislation can withstand rational nexus principle–related legal challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: While the fast pace of urbanization in India creates a strong demand for serviced urban land, the local governments, the entities responsible for providing this land, face strong opposition to compulsory land acquisition, the traditional method of acquiring land for planned development. Furthermore, poor fiscal health restricts local governments’ ability to provide high-quality infrastructure and services. Land Pooling and Reconstitution (LPR) offers a solution. This paper analyzes the use of LPR in the state of Gujarat, India, highlights the key success factors, suggests reforms that would increase the tool’s effectiveness, and identifies the lessons learned from Gujarat’s experience. Specific lessons include the following: use revenues from the previous LPR projects to fund infrastructure and services in the new projects using a revolving fund mechanism; delink the resolution of land ownership disputes from LPR scheme preparation and approval process; institute extensive grievance redressal process; and develop infrastructure early to garner landowner support for LPR. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Through an in-depth review of the financing structures of two projects developed using land readjustment (LR) in the State of Gujarat, India, this article provides insights into LR’s ability to selffinance urbanization. This ability rests on three intertwined factors. First, a rapid increase in the value of developed urban land enables local governments to generate substantial revenue from the sale of reserved land. Second, the local governments retain the reserved land for a significant amount of time before selling it, thereby benefiting significantly from increases in land prices. Third, a revolving fund system, wherein the revenues from older LR projects fund infrastructure in new projects, helps to finance the up-front infrastructure costs and eliminates the need to sell the land early or to seek loans. Furthermore, by using sensitivity analyses, the article shows that the timely accrual of betterment charges would bolster the revenue stream. Finally, the analyses highlight the concern that more land may be reserved than is required to fund the project and argues for more accurate estimates of the need for land reservation. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]