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Why do states stay revolutionary for so long? The question of why and how some political players of a country successfully pursue a revisionist strife against the status quo has neither theoretically nor empirically received systematic attention. I am using a current policy issue, the crisis regarding Iran, as a single-case study to examine the issue. This article argues that answers are found in the interconnected realms of domestic politics and revolutionary ideas. In particular, in Iranian politics it is both the ideological conservative faction's occupation of key positions within the constitution and their pursuit of revolutionary ideas, which have caused the recurring and large degree of revolutionary zeal. In turn, this has had a significant effect on the extent of the Islamic Republic's socialization to regional and international politics. Most parts of the Iranian polity have been revolutionary rhetorically but pragmatic in most actions and thus aim at accommodation. Nevertheless, a powerful part has indulged in the obstruction of this policy emerging after 1988. Crucially, this constituency only - revolutionary in words and deeds - is of interest here. Therefore, the article tests how the ideological conservative faction in Iran has prevented Iran's socialization to the international system. Regarding Iran, I define revolutionary behavior as the direct outcomes of an unchanged and uncompromising belief (of the radical conservative and fundamentalist factions only) in the illegitimacy of international institutions and the prevailing international system in general. It is precisely this attitude which is reflected in the aforementioned factions' regular dismissal of actions taken by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 'World arrogance' is the term which has been used by these factions since 1979 to mark any of these proceedings. As a matter of fact, these are thinly veiled attacks both on the role of the United States in world politics and, critically, on those moderate Iranian factions which strive for cooperation with the US. Their active support for terrorist groups both in Lebanon (since 1982) and Palestine also underlines this "revolutionary" approach. It is crucial at this point to give Iran's domestic power structure, with its respective factions, the appropriate weight. While it is tempting to think that if the regime changed its behavior but not its belief, one could label it non-revolutionary, this pragmatic move fails to understand both the factional splits, and related to that, the unequal distribution of power between the elected and the non-elected governing bodies. Put briefly, the election of a moderate president and his faction would change the international behavior of Iran's democratic government; however, this would not affect the conservatives' belief and hence their constant attempts at undermining the foreign policy efforts of the moderate forces. Above all, they are equipped with a degree of political power which allows them to counter the elected bodies at any time. Thus, despite moderating influences in Iran's foreign policy, the revolutionary label appears to be correct. Lastly, realism correctly reminds us that many states violate norms, laws and common expectations about state behavior, and indeed they are not labeled revolutionary. Nonetheless, the distinguishing criterion between those states and Iran remains evident. While the moderate factions have tried to change Iran's foreign policy over the years, their attempts have constantly been derailed by their powerful opponents in the long run. Thus, the revolutionary attitude of the latter ones has continued to be unchanged and uncompromising over the last twenty years... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]