Search

The post 9/11 world has generated renewed interest in the problematic implications of asymmetrical conflictual interaction between states and non state actors. This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on asymmetrical warfare by focusing on ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-9/11 move by democracies to enact security measures which appear to challenge both domestic constitutional and international legal human rights norms, such as the creation of the Guantánamo Bay prison camp, the practice of extraordinary rendition, and the use of torture in interrogations has resulted in growing scholarly concern with the problem of states of exception. These measures, whether considered justified or not, are conceptualized by some theorists as belonging to a temporal condition associated with war time emergency. Other more critical scholars, in contrast, examine exceptions in their relation to the constitution of sovereign power. In exploring these contending analytical perspectives, my paper aims to better understand the character of contemporary exceptionalism. Using American intelligence practices in both the pre and post-9/11 period as a case study, I explore the extent to which covert and clandestine state security has ever been constrained by a substantive conception of the rule of law and human rights. I ask how exceptional the current state of exception really is. In doing so, I find that norms of exception are a part of ordinary state security practice, but that an excessive focus on sovereign decision and legal black holes obscures the ambiguities of Bush administration policy. Despite the extremely troubling nature of the "War on Terror", I conclude there is hope for societal contestation and the rule of law as checks on human rights abuses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Desires for revenge against the 9/11 perpetrators heightened U.S. public support for war against Iraq in January 2002, controlling for left-right ideology, the rally-round-the-flag effect, and the perceived terrorist threat. Four explanations could account for these findings: prior enemy images of Saddam heightening suspicions of Iraqi complicity in the attacks, as well as anger's tendency to heighten indiscriminate blame, prejudice, and self-confidence. We test for the prejudice effect and find evidence that vengeance heightened support for attacking Iraq in part by increasing anti-Arab prejudice. Vengefulness also partly mediated the effects of retributiveness (proxied by right-wing authoritarianism) on support for war, and largely mediated the effects of patriotism (as intergroup emotion theory would predict). Additional data shows that even as war approached, most supporters acknowledged it would satisfy a desire to avenge 9/11. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush Administration's strategy in response to the 9/11 attacks is increasingly viewed as a failure by almost every measure. Using the decision to invade Iraq as a case study, I identify the expected steps in national security policy formation and track how the policy process in this case differentiated from past practices. For example, the intelligence assessment step usually involves weighing both the capabilities and intentions of a potential foe, while in the case of Iraq the capabilities assessment was both inept and politically-compromised, and the intentions assessment essentially not accomplished. As George Tenet recently point out, the weighing of threats and potential strategic outcomes steps were also not undertaken. I also examine how future policy-makers can employ the existing policy process to optimize strategic outcomes. Furthermore, I identify improvements to the process in light of the current threat from non-state actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanitarian Intervention after ‘9-11’: The case for continuing relevanceIn the wake of the ‘9-11’, some scholars have claimed that we may very well have witnessed the ‘sunset of humanitarian intervention’. They refer to the shift in the international agenda, the troublesome relationship between the great powers following the US-led attack on Iraq, and the ineffective international response to the ongoing crimes against humanity in the Sudanese province of Darfur. This paper argues a different case. The war against Iraq has, admittedly, increased the suspicion towards intervention as such in many parts of the world, and it is also obvious that the US has lost a good deal of its credibility as a leader of collective intervention for ‘the common good’. However, this is not necessarily the end of humanitarian intervention. First, the international community and its leading powers have not renounced the right of humanitarian intervention. On the contrary, the 2005 UN Summit outcome document supported the associated principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’. Second, it is too early to rule out a humanitarian intervention in Darfur, and one should also not ignore the coercive steps taken by the UN so far. Third, depending on its policy on Iraq and the ‘war on terror’, the US might recover from the loss of legitimacy and capacity it has suffered in recent years. Finally, the institutionalization of humanitarian intervention at the UN and beyond since the early 1990’s has progressed to a stage where it will continue to serve as a signpost and a warning, and, at times, a platform on which to return for a variety of interventionist measures against atrocities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S. government often creates ad hoc advisory commissions on national security issues. Recent examples include the 9/11 Commission and Iraq Study Group. Yet few scholars have examined the impact of commissions. I argue that commissions can help increase support for a presidential, congressional, or partisan agenda, and can help policymakers overcome collective action problems by providing a focal point for debate. I test hypotheses about the sources of commission influence with an original data set of 39 national security commissions that reported between 1981 and 2005. I find that commissions are likely to have greater impact when they are established after a national security disaster or scandal—a finding that challenges the conventional view that such commissions only perform symbolic damage control. I also find that the recommendations of presidential commissions are adopted more often than those of agency or statutory commissions, and that, absent a crisis, commissions addressing highly salient issues are not more likely than those addressing less salient issues to influence policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we measure compliance with the demands on which economic sanctions on Iraq were conditioned with rigor and precision? We argue that it is possible, but only with a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of compliance. This paper uses structured, focused comparison of cases to guide the construction of a spatial model for the study of sanctions compliance. It then uses that spatial model to examine the patterns of compliance that Iraq exhibited with the demands of the United Nations Security Council economic sanctions regime in the 1990s. We argue that a multi-method approach allows scholars to compare relative partial compliance in an innovative way. The sharpness that this methodological innovation brings to the study of compliance, we argue, provides deeper insight into the political relationship between sanctioner and sanctioned than current work on sanctions is able to provide. Our model is uniquely able to demonstrate that Iraq's relative partial compliance increased through the early and mid-1990s, decreased in the late 1990s, and increased again in the months following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. We conclude by formulating hypotheses concerning the reason behind these policy shifts on the part of the Iraqi government, which provide insight into the question of whether Iraq was the 'threat to international peace and security' that the United States claimed in its petition for Security Council aid in the invasion. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 1990s, the Caspian Sea region has been seen as a potential major oil and gas producer. Following the 9/11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the 2003 war in Iraq, energy consumers have shown more interest in the Caspian region and Central Asia to supplement energy supplies from the Middle East and to contain militant Islam. This essay examines the Caspian region's energy outlook. Particular attention is given to the competing pipeline schemes. The study also analyzes the strategic rivalry between the United States, Russia, and China. It suggests that despite conflicting interests, the strategies of these global powers should not be seen in zero-sum terms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the impact of the events of November 9, 1989, September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War on the important variables constituting the relationships that drive theories on international relations. It emphasizes the need for international relations scholars to reexamine the fundamental theoretical understandings underlying their approach to interpreting international reality and formulating international policy. It also notes that the terrorism in the U.S. left international relations theory and scholarship unprepared.

The article aims to understand the reasons for the foreign policy shift of Russia and its opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It examines the concept of positional goods in international relations theory. An overview of Russian foreign policy from the collapse of the country through the post September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks reconciliation is provided. It analyzes the opposition of Russia to the war in Iraq in light of positional goods and considers the role of the U.S. in precipitating positional conflict between itself and Russia.

The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patters of alliances in world politics. After 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded its power in the economic and security institutions of the post-1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between 'old Europe' and the new conservatives in Washington. As the transatlantic architecture came crashing down, the hopes of Old Labour internationalists came down with it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "American Vincibility in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq: Future Challenges in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Arenas" presented at the "46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the impact of the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq invasion on the political and economic terms of the U.S. It emphasizes that the present U.S. policies are insufficiently advancing the interests of the country in the era of globalization and national vulnerability.

The article explores the role of popular culture in producing official fear and trying to provide the people with security against the terror of uncertainty. It mentions that the paper is inspired by reading newspapers and watching news and movies since the 9/11 terrorist attacks through the Iraq war in 2003. It states that popular culture makes up a network of micro-power which circulates through individuals and becomes a strategy of biopolitical power.

The paper examines the range of international law debates on war in Iraq as they appeared in the leading journals and discussion forums. Divergent interpretations of existing rules of war contributed to a degree of conceptual and practical confusion over whether war was justified. Two lines of analysis are identified. One argument is that a fundamental change in circumstances after September 11th allows for a reconsideration and even reform of existing rules of war. A second argument sees the concepts of imminent threat and collective security as still relevant in the post-September 11th world. The author’s primary focus is on the weakness of either argument to offer fresh ideas on the meaning and goals of war in this new era and to suggest new ways of moving the field forward on such questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was to declare war on terrorism. The aspects of this war that have received the most attention have been the unilateral and military nature of the US response. What has been overlooked is another part of the Bush administration’s reaction: an effort to reconfigure the international norm of sovereignty as it applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The US has adopted the view that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their sovereign right to autonomy over their territory. This has been accompanied by an effort to persuade or compel the international community to accept this view as well, as can be seen in US efforts to garner international support in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. This raises several theoretical questions, which this paper will try to address. First, is this merely a hegemon acting to reshape the international community to suit its national interests? Realists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree about the value of international institutions; will a dominant state reject institutions that it doesn’t think serve its interests, or will it try to modify them to avoid the costs of creating replacements? Constructivists and proponents of the English School argue that the shared rules, interests, and values of the international society of states will influence the behavior of its members. US behavior over the last two years includes elements that support each of these views; it has adopted a with us or against us approach, but at the same time has worked to persuade other states to revise the norm of sovereignty. Second, can a state unilaterally reshape international norms? The US appears to be trying to change shared understandings of when states retain the sovereign right to non-intervention by other states. The US is tacitly arguing that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their right to internal autonomy, because they have not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. (This effort on the part of the US is not entirely new; during the 1990s the US government tried to shape international attitudes toward rogue states, but without arguing that these states had forfeited sovereignty.) While some studies have examined the role of individuals and international organizations in shaping international norms, the role of the state in reshaping international norms deserves further attention. This paper will contribute to this inquiry. It will examine the efforts the US has made to persuade other states to adopt a similar stance toward state sponsors of terrorism, and responses by other states and the international community in forums such as the UN and regional organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coercive diplomacy has generally focused on scenarios where there is a hegemon present (generally the United States) and the target state is a non-WMD power. But this seems to be a very restrictive model and needs to be examined in the present-day context. One of the basic characteristics of the successful conduct of coercive diplomacy is a high degree of credibility of the threat that would be carried out in the absence of the target state’s acquiescence to the demands of the hegemon. In the recent war with Iraq, the United States maintained its credibility by carrying out its threat to use force. But there is a lot more at stake here. Since September 11, 2001, the idea of regime change in certain countries has become more and more attractive to several sections of the Bush administration, in spite of a lack of a clear policy on this. Besides Iraq, there are several other countries where coercive diplomacy might be applied by the U.S. with the objective of regime change and/or a change in the WMD status of the target state. Iran, Syria, and North Korea are seen as future candidates. The ostensible objective for this course of action by the United States (either unilaterally, or in conjunction with members of the international community) is to reverse the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by these countries. This paper examines if and how coercive diplomacy can be carried out in a situation where the target state has reached a certain level of WMD capability and weaponization. Besides the Gulf campaign this year, the other recent example of coercive diplomacy was seen in South Asia after the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In that situation, India launched a massive mobilization of troops on the border with Pakistan, demanding an end to support for separatism in Kashmir. The mobilization ended almost a year later with questionable results. Nuclear deterrence in the Indian subcontinent was the main reason why India couldn’t go ahead with its threat. This is a very clear contrast with the Iraq example. A scenario where both sides have weapons of mass destruction would impede on the credibility of the threats of the hegemon. This weakens the tangibility of power enjoyed by it. With the help of potential cases like Iran, North Korea, this paper looks at how the effectiveness of coercion by the hegemon is damaged in such circumstances, and tries to propose a model through which future cases of coercive diplomacy could be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In general, the American public pays very little attention to international affairs, a condition that does not seem to have been changed by the events of September 11, 2001. It seems to apply a fairly reasonable, commonsensical standard of benefit and cost when evaluating foreign affairs, and is about as accepting of involvement in foreign affairs as ever, but it does not have and never has had much stomach for losing American lives in ventures and arenas that are of little concern to it and does not value foreign lives highly. Although the President does not necessarily need public support in advance to pull off a military venture, there is little or no long term political gain from successful ones. When the value of the stakes does not seem to be worth additional American lives, the public has shown a willingness to abandon an overextended or untenable position with little concern about saving face. However, if they are not being killed, American troops can remain in peace keeping or nation building ventures virtually indefinitely for the most part, nobody will even remember that they are there. In general, it seems that there is a substantial potential for the occupation of Iraq to become a deep political problem for Bush. Under favorable scenarios, public attention will switch to domestic issues, particularly to the troubled economy. Under quagmire ones, people are increasingly likely to see the war as a mistake, and starting and continuing wars that people come to consider mistaken does not enhance a president’s re electability. If Iraq does become a quagmire, the Bush administration could probably withdraw at a bearable electoral cost. The messy aftermath of the war against Iraq suggests that all or most of that self infatuated talk about a brave new superpowered American "empire" and about triumphal "unilateralism" will fade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]