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Counterinsurgencies mostly fail, as the 2021 allied withdrawal from Afghanistan illustrates. Still, confronting insurgencies remains a central component in ongoing counterterror efforts around the world. The crux of counterinsurgency (COIN) centers on winning the 'hearts and minds' of noncombatants in order to cut militants off from a needed source of material and psychological support. In practice, however, COIN has failed to leverage a pacified civilian population into a military victory and has instead led to protracted engagements with unclear and contradictory goals. I argue that this policy failure can be explained by rehabilitating the doctrine's colonial heritage to its contemporary deployment. I do so by tracing the doctrinal origins of COIN to American-led pacification programs in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Using time as a conceptual anchor, I draw on postcolonialism and social theory to unearth how embedded imperialist notions of Self/Other in the doctrine help explain this ongoing failure. A temporal lens augments an analysis of COIN in three respects. First, it illustrates the longevity of counterinsurgency as a geopolitical practice of pacifying 'disruptive Others'. Second, it reveals a paradox in a doctrine that intimates an end state marked by the absence of those disruptive Others but is designed to constantly seek out disruption. Finally, it lays bare differing motivations for the imperial Self to endure the encounter with the Other in the first place. I conclude by reflecting on the potentially harmful consequences both at home and abroad should the underlying assumptions of COIN remain unexamined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction The minimisation of disease and non-battle injury (DNBI) is essential for maintaining efficiency in a fighting force. Third molar-related morbidity is a common cause of DNBI. With extended lines of communication in current military deployments, travelling for dental care is often subject to significant danger.Material and methods Military dental officers in Afghanistan and Iraq recorded data on patients presenting with third molar pathology. Related previous history was obtained from the individual and from the military dental records.Results Three hundred and three individuals presented during the 23 month study period; 27.7% were unable to access care immediately, most commonly citing work pressure or lack of safe transport. Of those needing to travel, 70% were moved by helicopter. Pericoronitis was diagnosed in 84.4% of cases, 20.6% of these teeth being extracted; 53.5% of patients reported no prior symptoms, 22.7% with two or more episodes. There was documented evidence in military dental records of previous problems in 29.2% of cases. 11.3% had previously been listed for extraction of the presenting tooth.Discussion Dental treatment for troops in combat situations is fraught with difficulty. Special consideration must be given to the management of third molars in military personnel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]