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Comments on the political situation in Iraq. Claim that a gap has developed in recent months between how Iraqi liberals envision elections and how the United Nations and Coalition Provisional Authority apparently want to conduct them; Comparison between the CPA- and UN-backed model of party-slate elections, and the constituency-based system backed by Iraqi liberals; Discussion of how the fissure occurred; Discussion of the potential dangers involved in allowing Islamist parties Dawa and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq gain power; Argument that the constituency-based system would likely result in the election of liberal politicians and those advocating the rights of women and ethnic minorities; Concerns that the plan backed by the CPA and UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi could result in the tyranny of the majority.

Comments on the military strategy of the U.S. against the Iraqi troops. Emergence of conventional wisdom uniting the pundits, military analysts and former U.S. government officials; Criticism on the low morale of Iraqi military; Use of precision bombs and smart weapons; Destabilization of revenue source of dictator Saddam Hussein.

The article informs that, on February 1, Iraqi Kurdish political leaders marked the Eid al-Adha holiday much as they have for the past ten years. Ansar al-Sunna is an outgrowth of Ansar al-Islam Defenders of Islam, a group with ties to Iran and which administration officials have linked to al-Qaeda. Initially operating under the moniker Jund al-Islam, Ansar al-Islam grew out of the September 2001 unification of several militant Islamist groups which had taken root in the mountains of northern Iraq along the Iranian border. It has taken root in Iraq, and especially the area around Mosul, both because of Coalition failure to secure the Syrian and Iranian borders with Iraq and because of a reconciliation policy which mitigates pressure upon planning and organization.

Argues that Iraqis must be trusted to govern themselves if stability is to be restored to the nation following the Iraq War of 2003. Details of a town-hall meeting hosted by the administrative council of Dibis; Refusal of Coalition Provisional Authority head L. Paul Bremer to give such councils budgetary authority; Lack of genuine power held by Iraqis; Suggestions for a successful transfer of power.

The author claims that Iranian Shias are infiltrating Iraq in an attempt to destabilize the country. Since the violence began, American officials and the media have blamed the bloodshed on poor postwar planning, miscalculations of the strength of radical cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, and even Shia anger at Iraq's new provisional constitution. But there's another factor largely unappreciated by the U.S. media and unchallenged by the CPA: the well-organized, highly effective infiltration of Shia into Iraq by the government of Iran. The Iranian security apparatus, having sparred with American forces in Bosnia and Afghanistan, was well-prepared to challenge the United States in Iraq. Almost a month before the opening salvos of the war, the Islamic republic began broadcasting Arabic-language television across the border. My first night in Baghdad, several Iraqis intercepted me in the Rashid Hotel lobby. [T]hroughout the evening, Arabs and Kurds alike warned that Iranian intelligence was taking advantage of the U.S. failure to secure Iraq's borders. Later that month, several Iraqis warned me that over 10,000 Iranians had entered Iraq. Coalition officials I spoke to seemed unconcerned, suggesting that the influx was simply Iraqi refugees returning home. But these American diplomats seemed unable to differentiate between returnees speaking Iraqi Arabic and people proficient in Persian, who spoke little or no Arabic; many of the Iranians coming into the country fell into the latter category.

Calls for the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush to guarantee military support and protection to Iraqi Kurds to convince Kurdish leaders to support a U.S. invasion of Iraq. Examples of foreign betrayal suffered by the Kurds; Implication of the refusal of Kurdish leaders Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani not to allow the Central Intelligence Agency to renew a permanent U.S. presence in Kurdistan.

Comments on the impact of the United Nations (UN) economic sanctions against Iraq. View that the poverty in central Iraq is brought on by Iraqi mismanagement of UN funds rather than the sanctions; Relative prosperity of the Kurdish ruled Northern Iraq, which also operates under the sanctions, and protection of the UN; Political freedom in Northern Iraq.

Offers a look at the political development in Iraq as the National Assembly writes a draft of the Iraqi constitution. Role of the U.S. in trying to facilitate compromise among Iraq's disparate sectarian, ethnic and political groups; Claim that Iraq is modeling its strategy on Yasir Arafat, the former leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization; Rise of militia leaders in Iraq who do not listen to the National Assembly; Discussion of political and social conditions in the Kurdistan region; Claim that U.S. officials have a history of failing to enforce their demands.

The article profiles Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi, who recently visited Washington, D.C. for meetings with top officials. Chalabi has been a lightning rod for criticism among proponents of the status quo because he advocates regime change and democratization. He has been criticized by the U.S. State Department as an exile with little connection to his own country. Condoleeza Rice made attempts to marginalize Chalabi, calling his efforts "unhelpful." It was believed that he would fade away without U.S. patronage. However, a great deal of Chalabi's political base rests in his connection to the Kadhimayn Shrine, one of the holiest pilgrimage sites in Iraq. It is a focal point of Shiite-Sunni political interaction and Chalabi's father financed the shrine's renovation.