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Road user charging has long been advocated as a means of dealing with congestion in urban areas. Numerous schemes have been proposed but have advanced little beyond the drawing board. This paper draws on the experiences of two such road user charging schemes, namely Electronic Road Pricing in Hong Kong, China, and Congestion Metering in the city of Cambridge, UK, and it seeks to make comparisons with the way implementation of congestion charging in Central London, UK, has been undertaken. What lessons can be learnt from the three examples that would aid authorities considering such a course of action? Certain issues have contributed to the two schemes not being implemented, such as the level of congestion not being severe enough, the clarity of objectives, invasion of road user’s privacy, and timing and presentation. The paper seeks to compare and contrast the issues resulting in the schemes not being implemented with those of the successfully implemented scheme. The conclusion is that it is not possible to attribute the successful implementation of congestion charging to one issue alone. The role of a policy champion, public support given the severity of congestion, a single implementing agency, an understanding of the scheme’s objectives, and timing and clear presentation have all been important factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the principal-agent problem as part of a broader discussion of the challenges of privatising and outsourcing of public utilities. The research asks: how can a public transport authority (the principal) motivate bus operators (agents) to achieve the authority's goals (more and better public transport) when their respective interests may not align? The case study is based on the UK "Quality Contract Scheme", an option that has never been used before, thus providing an opportunity to understand the challenges in such cooperative schemes, and explore how public authorities struggle to achieve their goals via private service providers. Our findings reveal that the actors could not align their incentives due to transaction costs and information asymmetry, which ultimately damaged the quality of the financial projections and thwarted approval of the scheme. • The information asymmetry between the principal and the agent is one of the defining features of the principal-agent problem. • There is no incentive for bus operators to give up their business in favour of having to bid against competitors. • The agent currently retains the power and the principal cannot act directly. • There are flaws within the Acts which provided the statutory framework for implementing a QCS. • The London model of regulation and franchising is recognised as a viable option for Britain outside London. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]