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UN peace operations are often accompanied by parallel forces from individual states, regional organizations, or "coalitions of the willing." These forces remain distinct from the UN to address security concerns outside the remit of traditional peacekeeping. The deployment of UN stabilization operations, however, has resulted in an overlap between UN and parallel forces. This article investigates the complex relationships between UN stabilization operations and parallel forces using as examples the French and UN deployments in Mali and the Central African Republic. It concludes that when UN and parallel forces have distinct mandates, they often create military synergies but political tensions. In particular, when peacekeepers are reliant on parallel forces for military support, the UN can struggle to achieve its longer-term political tasks. When parallel forces are explicitly mandated to support UN efforts, the UN is better able to leverage its relationship with parallel forces to achieve its military and political objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Attaher Zacka Maïga was born on 10 May 1963 in Bia, Bourem Cercle, Gao Region, Mali. He has spent his life in the service of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, joining the Mali Red Cross as a volunteer in 1987 before working for the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies as a nutritionist in a pilot centre for nutritional recovery and education in Bourem from January 1988 to June 1990. In 1990 and 1991 he acted as consultant to a number of organizations, including World Vision and UNICEF. In April 1992, Attaher Maïga joined the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as a "resident" (i.e. local) employee. Since then, he has held many positions. From 1996 to 2000, he was in charge of the Gao office, which employed almost 100 staff, both resident and "mobile" (expatriate). He then took charge of the ICRC's programmes in northern Mali from 2001 to 2006, ran the organization's office in the Malian capital Bamako from 2007 to 2008 and was responsible for the Mali communication programme between 2009 and 2011. From November 2011 to November 2014, he was head of the ICRC's northern Mali sub-delegation, one of the first resident employees to lead an ICRC sub-delegation. Since 2015, Attaher Maïga has been Networking Coordinator for the ICRC's Mali delegation. In 1996, Mr Maïga initiated the ICRC's post-conflict programmes in his country, covering the fields of agriculture, veterinary services and health. In 2009, he launched a pilot migrant project in Kidal, northern Mali. These much-appreciated initiatives resulted in his being invited to participate in the 2010 Montreuil meeting, which laid the foundations for the reforms currently underway. Attaher was the first Mali focal point for the ICRC's Unit for Global Affairs. This role gave him a deeper understanding of trends in the Islamic world and enabled him to help the ICRC adjust its dialogue with Jihadist armed groups. Our interview with Mr Maïga highlights his extensive experience with one of the oldest humanitarian organizations and is an opportunity for him to share his understanding of the ICRC's interaction with the armed groups that controlled northern Mali in 2012, when he was representing the ICRC in the region. Attaher Maïga holds a degree in public administration from the Institut de Gestion et des Langues Appliquées aux Métiers, Bamako. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012 the seemingly stable country of Mali experienced a sudden collapse, this along with the declaration of independence of the brand new Tuareg state, the massive spread of extreme Islamism shocked the international community. Initial disbelief gave way to the UN Security Council's resolution to restore Mali's territorial integrity. Fueled by the fear of a greater and bloodier conflict and its overspill, limited military operations began. Along with the Economic Community of West African State-led operation, the country's former colonial master, France, began its own controversial military operation. Many people think that by doing so, France is trying to prove itself a great power and able to intervene on the world political stage according to its own diplomatic interest and being a force to contend with. Others however think that France is facing another Indochina-like fiasco in Mali. Who is right, will be determined by the failure or the success of the current operations and by the results of the restoration afterward. In this paper I would like to clarify the reasons for the events taking place in the country, their dynamics and possible consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article discusses the 2013 French intervention in Mali to combat Tuareg separatists and Islamic fundamentalists, known as Operation Serval. It comments on the Islamic fundamentalists and extremists affiliated with the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali. The author reflects on military expeditions to Mali led by Mauritania beginning in 2010. Other topics include Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré, the presidential elections scheduled for 2012, and the involvement of China in Mali.