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Consensus democracies outperform their majoritarian counterparts, but reform is difficult. From an institutional perspective, a dominant majority can block change. From a political culture perspective, democracy is endogenous to context. However, critical junctures can alter not only political configuration but also political culture. In Myanmar, the Bamar majority split following the 2021 military coup. One fragment aligned with coup leaders. Another, certainly larger, joined ethnic minorities in opposition and resistance. Did the coup inspire a shift toward consensus politics? This article looks before and after the coup at peak institutions and Facebook posts. Opposition institutions in the 2020s are more diverse than cabinets led by the National League for Democracy in the 2010s. Political discourse has shifted from democratic federalism, with a focus on centralized control, to federal democracy, with a centrifugal dynamic. These findings reveal significant change in a centralized authoritarian state long controlled by the Bamar majority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regime change often exacerbates ethnic conflict. This article examines the curious case of Myanmar, where a 2021 military coup was met, on the surface, with broad-based resistance across a divided society. An important question that therefore arises is whether, below the surface, this unity also took a more positive form of national solidarity. Were deep ethnic cleavages intensified or alleviated by the 2021 coup? This question bears theoretical relevance for the study of ethnic conflict and has social relevance for a nation marked by a long history of civil war and a recent experience of genocide against Rohingya Muslims. The article engages in a systematic examination of 180 social media posts uploaded in Burmese by key opinion leaders both before and after the coup. A qualitative analysis of major positive and negative themes indicates a shift in attitudes. The quantitative analysis shows that ethnic relations, measured by a change in themes, ratings and virality, improved significantly in the immediate aftermath of Myanmar's 2021 coup. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Myanmar has long been rigidly centralized. In 2011, however, 14 regional and state assemblies were established. Drawing on extensive field work , this article evaluates the performance of 10 assemblies toward the end of their initial five-year mandate. It finds little evidence of a territorial dispersal of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2012, Myanmar experienced another tumultuous year of reform. Executive, legislative, and civic institutions advanced, but public administration and the judiciary remained largely unchanged. While some ethnic relations improved, others descended into bitter conflict. Economic and social development was patchy. Links with the U.S. and its allies strengthened considerably. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International sanctions, which commonly seek to engineer target state compliance with human rights norms, often fail to deliver on their objectives. In recent years, however, a fresh approach has emerged through the rise of international justice, which can act as either a complement or an alternative to sanctions. In this article, the authors develop three hypotheses. Political change will be facilitated by: (1) lifting sanctions; (2) guarantees of non-prosecution; or (3) lifting sanctions combined with guarantees of non-prosecution. The authors test the hypotheses on Myanmar, a country that has long been subject to international sanctions, but that has rarely complied with human rights norms. Myanmar is also situated in a region where international justice is currently being applied through prosecution of former Khmer Rouge leaders in Cambodia. The authors’ test was undertaken in June 2010 through a vignette-based expert survey that manipulated international sanctions, international justice and their absence in a 2 x 2 factorial design. The findings point to the need for a consistent approach. Lifting sanctions and guarantees of non-prosecution, when applied in tandem, are thought likely to promote political change. At the other extreme, imposing sanctions and prosecuting state leaders, when done together, are also viewed as facilitators of political change, though support is considerably smaller. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An estimated 1.5 million citizens of Burma reside as refugees or migrants in Thailand, where harsh treatment, harassment and social stigmas contribute to a climate of precarity. Although one possible course of action for any community under strain is political mobilisation, for migrants from Burma in the northern city of Chiang Mai, high degrees of exploitation and insecurity have generated an overwhelming disinterest in political issues. The article examines this relationship in five main sections. The first presents the two key concepts that structure the analysis: precarity and political mobilisation. The second examines the context of migration from Burma to Thailand, focusing both on the climate of unrest found in much of Burma and on Thailand's treatment of migrant workers, its non-participation in core international legislation and its sub-standard migrant registration system. The third explains how this study of Burmese migrants in Chiang Mai was undertaken and reviews the ethical considerations required in a study of vulnerable groups. The fourth documents the study's findings and presents migrants' testimony. The fifth seeks to explain the link between precarity and political passivity in this case, and considers the wider implications. The concluding section restates the core finding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author assesses political condition in the country of Burma in 2010-11 following years of military rule. It is noted that general Than Shwe, the ruler of Burma, chose to release Aung San Suu Kyi, a peace activist, from a long period of house arrest. A number of topics are addressed including the electoral results for the Union and Solidarity Party, a political organization backed by the military government, the Burma policy of the administration of U.S. president Barack Obama, and Japanese influence on Burma.

Myanmar is embarking on political reforms that could prove to be the first stage of a gradual transition to democracy. However, critical problems of ethnic discord remain to be resolved. This article draws on the literature on multiculturalism to examine ways forward. First it considers how other democratic states have sought to manage ethnic relations, and constructs a matrix of four ideal types: multiculturalism; ethnic enclaves; assimilation; and marginalization. Next it demonstrates just how difficult matters of ethnicity and identity were in the development of modern Burma. Then it surveys possibilities for ethnic relations in contemporary Myanmar. Finally it sketches future pathways. A brief conclusion reinforces the core argument. Ethnic enclaves and assimilation are the major contenders for ethnic policy in Myanmar. Their relative merits will need to be debated as openly as possible during any future democratization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The re-emergence of China as a major economic and political power has drawn attention to the role it might play in solving regional problems. Prominent among many Asian issues on Beijing's agenda is its southwestern neighbour, Myanmar, and in particular the military machine that has long ruled the country with an iron fist. The junta in place today is both acknowledged as problematic by policymakers in Beijing, and seen by the wider world as a regional challenge on which China should take the lead. However, there is little agreement on ways forward. To determine how Beijing might handle the Myanmar problem, this article first examines the concept of intervention, reviewing the manifold modes found in the contemporary world and drawing up a typology. Then it surveys arguments about intervention, focusing on perspectives that are relevant in this context. Next it presents arguments about intervention in Myanmar, and follows up by looking in some detail at China's current low-level engagement. Finally it considers where Beijing might go from here in dealing with Myanmar. The argument pulled together in the conclusion is that while nobody has a full solution to the Myanmar problem, a case for enhancement of China's role can be grounded not only in its global obligations, but also in precepts found deep in its national tradition. It is here that efforts to boost Beijing's engagement should be directed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses ethnic tensions and nationalism in Myanmar and shows that efforts to bring democracy to the country should focus on the scheduled general election in 2010. Countries in the midst of major governmental transitions are extremely volatile and can easily become embroiled in civil wars. Efforts to democratize Myanmar could quickly deteriorate into violence and war unless the changes are made democratically. There are numerous rival ethnic groups in Myanmar, and given an uncertain, transitional government, several of them would be capable of taking power forcefully.

In common with many Asian governments, Myanmar's military junta makes frequent appeals to harmony. However, incessant demands that the nation cultivate a narrowly conceived and centrally imposed unity make this a degenerate case of governance for harmony in which militaristic calls for discipline, strength, and vigilance hold sway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Myanmar is in political deadlock. In part, this is because the opposition has not confronted problems of transitional justice, notably how to deal with members of the military junta who have participated in gross human rights violations. There are therefore few incentives for the ruling generals to consider talking about change. To tackle this problem, the article develops a model of pre-transitional justice that is focused on the critical ‘torturer problem’. It is also informed by recent developments in international criminal law, and by the spread of truth commissions and lustration systems. The integrated reconciliatory model that results is suitable for political negotiation, capable of generating discontinuities with an authoritarian past, and legally and technically feasible. Applying it to Myanmar, the article holds that qualified amnesty is necessary for political reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In debates about economic globalisation, the case for leading corporations to engage with some of the world's most desperate development challenges is increasingly heard. However, it remains an open question whether investment should take place in extreme contexts. On the one hand, foreign capitalist involvement in extractive industries has long been seen as highly exploitative. Should such activity now be encouraged? On the other, all forms of corporate engagement with regimes that commit gross human rights violations are widely viewed as thoroughly unprincipled. Should this activity now be endorsed? The article tackles these issues by examining the controversial involvement of Western oil companies in Myanmar's Yadana gas project. It addresses two main questions. First, is that involvement itself to be welcomed? Second, from this experience, can wider lessons about global corporate citizenship be drawn? The argument is that it is not possible to reach an overall evaluation of the Yadana project. However, principles of responsible cross-border corporate engagement can be derived from it.1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether to do business with rights violating regimes is one of many dilemmas faced by socially responsible corporations. In this article the difficult case of Myanmar is considered. Ruled for decades by a closed and sometimes brutal military elite, the country has long been subject to informal and formal sanctions. However, as sanctions have failed to trigger political reform, it is necessary to review the policy options. The focus here is on the contribution socially responsible corporations might make to change. The article sketches contextual features of the case, examines the recent history and present pattern of business links with Myanmar, and assesses whether current approaches can stimulate reform. Concluding that they cannot, it considers fresh possibilities for corporate engagement. The argument is that socially responsible corporations, committed to improving individual life chances through engagement with developing societies, should undertake collaborative and principled direct investment in Myanmar. The underlying strategy and problems of codification and implementation are all analyzed. To close, the article contends that, by doing business with Myanmar's rights violating regime, multinational corporations can extend the frontiers of global corporate social responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. sanctions against Myanmar, intensified in July 2003, are not working. The military junta remains firmly in power. Opposition to it is still repressed. Washington should adopt a more nuanced carrot-and-stick approach aimed at strengthening constructive engagement efforts led by Myanmar's neighbors in East and Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]