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In health care systems with a competitive health insurance market, governments or other sponsors (e.g. employers) often subsidize premiums to encourage enrolment. These subsidies are typically independent of plan choice leaving the absolute premium differences in place so as not to distort consumer choice of plan. Such subsidies do, however, change the relative premium differences across plans, which, according to theories from behavioral economics, can affect choice. Consumers might be sensitive to differences relative to a reference premium ("relative thinking"). Furthermore, consumers might be particularly sensitive to a reference premium of zero ("zero-price effect"), a relevant range for some subsidized health insurance markets. This paper tests these ideas with two sources of evidence. We argue that observed equilibria in Germany and the U.S. Medicare Advantage markets are consistent with a powerful zero-price effect, resulting in an equilibrium focal pricing at zero. This contrasts with the Netherlands where equilibrium premiums are well above zero. In an empirical test using hypothetical questions in a web-based survey in these three countries, we also find evidence for both a relative thinking and a zero-price effect in the demand for health insurance. Our findings imply that well-designed subsidies can leverage relative thinking to increase demand elasticity for health plans. Creation of a powerful reference price (e.g., at zero), however, risks subverting price competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within a healthcare system with managed competition, health insurers are expected to act as prudent buyers of care on behalf of their customers. To fulfil this role adequately, understanding consumer preferences for health plan characteristics is of vital importance. Little is known, however, about these preferences and how they vary across consumers. Using a discrete choice experiment (DCE) we quantified trade-offs between basic health plan characteristics and analysed whether there are differences in preferences according to age, health status and income. We selected four health plan characteristics to be included in the DCE: (i) the level of provider choice and associated level of reimbursement, (ii) the primary focus of provider contracting (price, quality, social responsibility), (iii) the level of service benefits, and (iv) the monthly premium. This selection was based on a literature study, expert interviews and focus group discussions. The DCE consisted of 17 choice sets, each comprising two hypothetical health plan alternatives. A representative sample (n = 533) of the Dutch adult population, based on age, gender and educational level, completed the online questionnaire during the annual open enrolment period for 2015. The final model with four latent classes showed that being able to choose a care provider freely was by far the most decisive characteristic for respondents aged over 45, those with chronic conditions, and those with a gross income over €3000/month. Monthly premium was the most important choice determinant for young, healthy, and lower income respondents. We conclude that it would be very unlikely for half of the sample to opt for health plans with restricted provider choice. However, a premium discount up to €15/month by restricted health plans might motivate especially younger, healthier, and less wealthy consumers to choose these plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examine the effects of the introduction of free choice and price competition in social health insurance in Germany and the Netherlands. Using panel data at the sickness fund level we estimate the price elasticity of sickness fund choice in both countries. We find that the price elasticity in Germany is high and rapidly increasing. Consistent with findings of other studies on health plan choice, the price elasticity is much lower for elderly than for non-elderly. In the Netherlands, by contrast, the price elasticity of fund choice is negligible. Only when people were forced to choose a sickness fund, they were quite sensitive to premium differences. Key factors in explaining the observed differences in switching behavior between both countries are the degree of financial risk for sickness funds, the features of the risk-adjustment mechanism and the role of employers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]